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ABSTRACT 
The civil war in Syria has become a culmination of the Arab Spring, which 
transformed into a complex international conflict, involving many states not only 
from the Middle East region, but also Russia, the US, and some EU states. From 
the beginning of the civil war in Syria, Russia played the key role in the conflict, 
starting from serving as a mediator of the conflict, and ending with active military 
actions initiated in 2015. Intensive discussion, and sometimes a rather negative 
discourse developed over Russian foreign policy in relation to Syria, which shaped 
a demand in an in-depth analysis of reasons behind Russian foreign policy 
decisions. Apart from historically strong ties with Syria, geopolitical and economic 
interests between two states still matter. At the same time it seems that in regards 
to Syria, Russian foreign policy has been mainly security-oriented, and 
simultaneously identity-based. A primary contribution of this thesis is offered by an 
application of a theoretical synthesis of Neoclassic Realism and Constructivism for 
the Russian foreign policy analysis. It is argued that Neoclassic Realism provides a 
theoretical basis for explaining security-oriented Russian foreign policy in Syria, 
while Constructivist theory supports the argument that Russian foreign policy in 
Syria is also identity-based.  
In case of Syria, domestic factors form an operational environment of Russian 
foreign policy-making. To Russia, the Syrian stability is seen as vital to the stability 
in the Middle East, and consequently to the Russia’s national security and territorial 
integrity. In particular, Russia is concerned about the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ in 
the Middle East, because this development could potentially give an impulse to 
further political opposition and intensify insurgencies in the Russian Muslim-
populated regions. Apart from that, Russian foreign policy in Syria is also motivated 
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by the desire to sustain ‘ the Great Power’ status by playing the key role in the 
Syrian crisis. This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of these developments, as well 
as their effects on Russian foreign policy in relation to Syria.  
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arab Spring started as series of peaceful demonstrations across the Middle 
Eastern states, however, soon the protests transformed into a violent civil war 
against dictatorship regimes ruled in those states for a long period of time. The 
political vacuum, which has become a result of the fall of authoritarian regimes, was 
quickly filled by the ‘Islamist’ parties. Overall, the Arab Spring marked a rise in 
‘Religious Extremist’ activities.  
The wave of protests reached Syria in March 2011, and by mid-summer, the conflict 
evolved into a violent war between the state’s and opposition forces and turned into 
a humanitarian catastrophe for the civilian population. From the beginning of the 
civil war in Syria, Russia played the key role in mediating the crisis through 
diplomatic means, although in September 2015 contemplated a military intervention 
to the territory of Syria. With all this, there is perhaps a temptation to criticize 
Russian foreign policy approach as being unpredictable, irrational and volatile. 
Overall Russian foreign policy in Syria, as well as the decision to annex Crimea in 
2014, brought Russia into a deep political crisis, with a subsequent anti-Russian 
discourse in the Western press and media. Such discourse, however, seems to 
result from lack of knowledge and understanding of the Russian history, Russian 
domestic and foreign policy-making culture and traditions. Therefore an in-depth 
analysis of these matters is necessary at the moment.  
After careful analysis of the reasons behind Russian foreign policy in Syria, which 
include historical ties between two states, economic, geopolitical and military 
interests, it was decided that certain matters attracted particular attention in the 
Russian discourse on Syria. In particular, throughout the crisis, the Russian key 
political figures have been stressing the country’s ‘Greatpowerness’ in the World 
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Politics in general and its importance in mediating the Syrian conflict in particular. 
Together with such discussions, a particular discourse was formed over a danger 
for the Russian national security and territorial integrity posed by the rise of 
‘Religious Extremism’ during the Arab Spring and Syria in particular. Discourses 
reflected in a number of political speeches, statements and interviews of some key 
Russian political figures (mainly the President – Vladimir Putin and the Foreign 
Minister – Sergey Lavrov) on Russia’s ‘Great Power’ identity and the threat of 
‘Religious Extremism’ to the Russian domestic security and integrity, serve as tools 
in confirmations of the arguments that Russian foreign policy in Syria is identity-
based and security-oriented. 
The thesis rests on two arguments. In particular, it is argued that in Syria, Russian 
foreign policy is identity-based and security-oriented. Therefore the present 
research is aimed at answering two research questions: 
 
1) To what extent do domestic security implications form Russian foreign policy 
decision-making in relation to the Syrian conflict?  
2) What is the effect of the Russian national identity on its foreign policy in 
relation to Syria? In particular, how does the perception of ‘Great Power’ form 
Russian foreign policy-making in Syria? 
 
A primary contribution of this thesis is laid in an analysis of Russian foreign policy in 
Syria through the scope of certain domestic matters, in particular through the 
Russia’s identity and domestic security implications. When it comes to Russian 
foreign policy being security-based, it is explained through the logic of Neoclassic 
Realist approach, which, unlike other theories of Realism, argues for foreign and 
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domestic policies being interrelated. It is suggested that to Russia, the Syrian 
stability is seen as vital to the Middle East stability, and to the Russian national 
security and territorial integrity. In particular, Russia is concerned about the rise of 
‘Religious Extremism’ in the Middle East, because according to official political 
discourse on this matter, such a rise in ‘Religious Extremism’ has a potential to 
destabilize Russia’s predominantly Muslim-populated regions.  
It is also argued that, together with being security-oriented, Russian foreign policy in 
Syria is simultaneously identity-based. By identity-based Russian foreign policy it is 
suggested that in Syria, Russia tries to pursue its ‘exceptionalist’ ideology. 
According to such ideology, Russia is trying to sustain its ‘Great Power’ identity and 
revive its leading status in the World Politics.  Identity is the focus of the 
Constructivist theory, therefore it is applied to the research of the Russian national 
identity. 
This thesis, however, is limited to the analysis of identity and security as two 
separate matters. Upon making a decision about research questions and 
arguments, it was also considered  Russian identity being affected by certain 
domestic security matters. In connection with the present study, the Russian identity 
might be seen threatened by growing power of ‘Religious extremism’ in the Middle 
East and Russia in particular. As such ‘Religious Extremism’ might cause ethnical 
tensions in Russia, and threaten ethnic Russian population. In author’s opinion, 
research on this matter has all chances to become a topic for a separate thesis, 
although it was decided on analysis of domestic security and identity as two 
independent developments affecting Russian foreign policy, and the evidence base 
in support of the choice was found through the historic continuity in such foreign 
policy-making in Russia.  
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In attempting to answer the research questions, the present study is built upon a 
large body of theoretical and empirical data. It needs to be said since this thesis is 
mainly targeted to the audience in the West (the US and the EU), therefore the use 
of primary sources in Russian was limited in order to avoid the language barrier for 
the targeted readers and subsequent confusion caused by translation of the 
sources used in this thesis. A literature review, as well as analysis of existing data, 
allows to reveal certain gaps in knowledge, which will be addressed and filled in 
during the work on the thesis. A literature review showed the following gaps:  
• Within the large body of scholarly works, there is an implicit assumption that 
Russian foreign policy is largely the product of the external circumstances 
(Fox, 1959; Wolfers, 1962; Rosenau, 1966 and others), rather than the internal 
context. As such, interconnections and interrelationships between domestic 
and foreign contexts of Russian foreign policy seem to be under-analyzed, 
perhaps except for the research made by Tsygankov, Trenin and Snetkov. 
Therefore this research project is targeted at filling this gap with research 
findings and a theoretical approach used in this analysis; 
• Literature on application of a theoretical pluralism in the foreign policy analysis 
is limited to the studies proposed by Katzenstein and Sil (2010), Jackson and 
Nexon (2004), Risse and Simmons (2002), and Barkin (2010). Overall 
application of a theoretical pluralism (weather analytic eclecticism or 
theoretical synthesis) remains problematic, and further research on how to 
apply these approaches, and how to reconcile all difficulties upon the 
application of such methodological approaches, remains in high demand. This 
research is therefore intended to make a contribution to this matter. 
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• The study on a discourse analysis is observed to be problematic by a number 
of scholars for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was noticed that some authors, 
including Larsen (1997), Chernysh (2011), Pietikäinen and Dufva (2006), 
Fairclough, and Fairclough (2013), argue on the matter of a discourse analysis 
terminology. Secondly, scholars also differentiate in their approach to 
application of a discourse analysis in foreign policy analysis. In this research, 
the approaches offered by Fairclough, and Fairclough (2013) and Larsen 
(1997) are carefully reviewed. The present study tends to take the Larsen’s 
side, who offers to focus on states’ political leaders, and their views and 
beliefs, which in many ways reflect on their political decisions. Overall, the 
present study agrees with Larsen (1997) in his emphasis on the use of 
language in discourse analysis. Moreover, it has been discovered that there 
are other authors who also share the same opinion (Davies, 1998; Obeng, 
1997; Chilton, 2004; Obeng and Hartford, 2008). Thirdly, it was found that 
certain disagreement exists in terms of methodology of a discourse analysis. 
In this thesis, an eclecticism of the methodology offered by Newman (2008), 
Manheim, Rich, Willnat, Brians, Babb (2012), and Colin (2004) is applied. 
• The study on the nature of the Russian identity originates in the 18th century 
and continued in further years. Among the authors contributed to the 
knowledge of the Russian national identity, particular stress needs to be made 
on the research made by Prizel (1998), Tolz (2004), Trenin (1996) and 
Tsygankov (2012). Even though these authors contributed the better 
understanding of the Russian national identity, they still do not have a 
commonly agreed definition. It has been discovered that Ponsard (2006) 
offered an approach to defining the Russian identity through some key 
	 12	
characteristics of the identity concept, namely history, geography, ethnicity, 
culture and religion. The approach applied in this thesis in many ways follows 
the line proposed by Ponsard, although with some amendments. Therefore, 
the present study applies a comprehensive conceptual approach to analyzing 
Russian national identity, which addresses the limitations of the previous 
research. 
• According to the author’s observation, the study on the domestic security 
threats in Russia is mostly limited to some key directive documents, which are 
not binding by their nature (National Security Concept (2000), National 
Security Strategy (2015) Military Doctrine (2014), Foreign policy Concept 
(2013). Although the body of research on the Russian security matters is also 
added by empirical research conducted by Mankoff (2011), Shaposhnikov 
(1993), Snetkov (2014) and others. It is also noted that the link between 
Russian foreign policy in Syria and the Russian domestic security matters was 
initially suggested by Malashenko (2013). In the present research research, 
the author applies the Malashenko’s argument and also argues that Russian 
security-oriented foreign policy in Syria continues certain historical tradition. 
Overall, foreign policy position of the Russian Federation in relation to the 
Syrian conflict remains open for further discussion, as the conflict is still active.  
• The study on Islam in Russia also seems to be problematic. Broad research 
projects about Islam in Russia were completed by Hunter (2004), Yemelianova 
(2003), Falkowski (2015), Malashenko (2010) and others, however, the 
authors did not address the confusion existing in the Russian political 
discourse on the matter of differentiation between the ‘Islamist’ currents. This 
thesis takes a challenge and offers a comprehensive study of different forms 
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of ‘Islamism’ existing in today’s Russia. It also explains how ‘Religious 
Extremism’ and subsequent extreme currents of Islam appeared in Russia, 
and how they are represented in modern Russia. It also addresses the rise of 
‘Religious Extremism’ in Middle Eastern states in general, and Syrian conflict 
in particular and the effects of such development on the Russian Muslims. 
Such a study of Islam in Russia represents a unique analytical material and 
adds to the general body of knowledge in the topic of Islam in Russia. 
• The study of Russia’s relations with the Middle East is also problematic. The 
literature on this topic is fractured in many research projects focusing on 
separate Middle Eastern state with minor note on relations with Russia 
(Gusher, 1997; Ozdal, Ozertem, Has, Dimirtepe, 2013; Posterebov, 1997; 
Feifer, 2009, and others). Another body of literature is mainly dedicated to a 
general analysis of geopolitical significance of the Middle Eastern region for 
Russia.  Among these works are those under names of Magen (2013), 
Malashenko (2013), Rubenstein (2004), Kreutz (2006), Nizameddin (1999), 
although these research projects are quite outdated in a way that they were 
completed before the events of the Arab Spring, or didn’t capture the recent 
developments. This thesis addresses the above limitations and offers an 
analysis of Russia’s relations with the Middle Eastern states, their historical 
evolution and modern dynamics. It also makes a critical evaluation of how 
these relationships changed after the regime change during the Arab Spring 
revolutions. 
• Particular attention in the thesis is devoted to the matter of Russia’s relations 
with Syria. Although within the body of existing work, this matter is discussed 
rather briefly (Kreutz, 2006; Nizameddin, 1999; Sharnoff, 2009; Korany, 2008, 
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and others) and with no address to the recent developments. Other studies, 
however, are dedicated only to analysis of current developments in Russia-
Syria relations (Trenin, 2014; Saradhyan, 2015; Al-Marhoun, 2014). This 
thesis takes a challenge to synthesize all existing studies, and add it to a 
critical analysis of modern developments. 
The intended academic contribution of this thesis is therefore threefold. First of all, 
the study makes a theoretical contribution to the existing body of literature through: 
• Making a review of a theoretical debate over the nature of the Russian politics 
and its foreign policy approach. This review represents a list of theories and 
approaches, which were offered by scholars in different periods of the Russian 
history.  
• Applying theoretical synthesis of Neoclassic Realism and Constructivism for 
the analysis of security-oriented and identity-based Russian foreign policy in 
Syria. 
• Applying a political discourse analysis as a method of the research, attempting 
to reconcile certain confusion existing between authors on the nature of a 
discourse analysis. By providing the author’s understanding of a political 
discourse analysis, it is intended to facilitate its use for other researchers. 
 
Secondly, the present study makes a methodological contribution, as it applies the 
unique approach to the foreign policy analysis through theoretical synthesis. As 
such, theoretical synthesis offers a complex approach to the foreign policy analysis. 
Under such approach, the author synthesises two different theories (Neoclassic 
Realism and Constructivism), as well as their different ontological positions. A 
theoretical debate over complexities of an application of theoretical synthesis is still 
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active. In such a way, this thesis makes a contribution towards reconciliation of 
complexities caused by application of a theoretical synthesis, as well as reasons 
why this approach is preferred over analytic eclecticism. The study also 
contemplates a multi-level analysis of Russian foreign policy by taking into 
consideration the effects of external environment (system level), domestic matters 
(state level), as well as the role of the Russian political leadership in state’s foreign 
policy (individual level). At the same time, the focus of this research is made on an 
analysis of Russian foreign policy mainly through the state level and individual level, 
as it is contended that in case of Syria, Russian foreign policy is sourced in Russian 
domestic policy implications. 
As the third contribution, this dissertation seeks to shed light on certain 
developments of the Russian politics, as well as discuss other important matters in 
relation to Russian foreign policy. Knowledge of these matters can facilitate the 
current state of research on Russian domestic and foreign policies in the future. 
Among these tendencies, the author pays attention to the following developments: 
• Understanding of a complex phenomenon of the Russian national identity and 
its components; 
•  Understanding the ideology of ‘exceptionalism’, according to which, Russia 
tends to pursue independent and sovereign foreign policy; 
• Prioritization of individuals over institutions in the Russian politics. In particular, 
the study of Vladimir Putin’s ‘inner circle’. Such a development confirms 
importance of the individual level of analysis in case of Russian foreign policy; 
• In modern Russia, domestic threats are prioritized over external ones;  
• Islam in modern Russia is complex in nature and exists in a number of 
conflicting variations including so-called ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ 
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currents. While so-called ‘traditional’ Islam is represented by Sufism, ‘non-
traditional’ Islam is inspired by ‘Religious Extremism’.  
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is devoted to introduction. 
The second chapter explains a theoretical background of this thesis. This chapter 
makes a review of theoretical debate over the nature of Russian foreign policy. The 
argument for methodological innovation is discussed in the second part of the 
chapter. In this part, the author explains the thesis’s methodological approach 
through theoretical synthesis of Neoclassic Realism and Constructivism, and also 
determines the method of the research, which is a political discourse analysis, as 
well as introduce the reader to ontological and epistemological positions of the 
thesis. In subsequent two parts of the second chapter, the choice of Neoclassic 
Realism and Constructivism as a theoretical background of the research is 
explained. 
Chapter three focuses on answering one of the research questions:  what is the 
effect of the Russian national identity on its foreign policy in Syria. The three parts 
of the third chapter are all devoted to explaining identity-based Russian foreign 
policy in relation to Syria. In this chapter, it is argued that there is a historic 
continuity in identity-based Russian foreign policy and also explain the complexity of 
the Russian identity phenomenon. 
Chapter four aims to answer the second research question: to what extent do 
domestic security implications form Russian foreign policy decision-making in the 
Syrian conflict? In all parts of chapter four, the author analyses different aspects of 
security-based Russian foreign policy, demonstrates historical continuity in security-
based Russian foreign policy. The chapter also explains the perceptions of security 
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threats in today’s Russia and shows how certain domestic security threats affect 
Russian foreign policy in Syria. 
Chapter fifth analyses a complex question of Islam in Russia. It is complex because 
there is some confusion in differentiating the terms of ‘Wahhabism’, ‘Salafism’, 
‘Jihadism’, as well as ‘Traditional’ and ‘Non-traditional’ forms of Islam in Russia. 
Therefore the first part of the fifth chapter clarifies the conceptual differences 
between different currents of Islam in Russia, and also briefly explains the ‘Sufi’ 
tradition in Russian Islam. Subsequent parts discuss a historic background of how 
‘Religious Extremism’ came to Russia, as well as describe the situation in the 
Russian Muslim populated regions nowadays. It is also the aim to explain how the 
threat of ‘Religious Extremism’ in Russia is correlated with the Syrian conflict, and 
how it affects Russian foreign policy in Syria. 
The sixth chapter of this thesis is dedicated to the analysis of Russia’s relations with 
the Middle Eastern states. The author offers a historical note on Russia’s relations 
with the states of the Middle Eastern region, and also analyses how these 
relationships have changed during the events of the Arab Spring. This chapter also 
focuses on Russia’s relations with Syria: their historical background and current 
situation. Overall it is explained why Russia supports Bashar al-Assad and why the 
case of Syria has become different from other states suffering from the Arab Spring 
revolutions.  
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CHAPTER II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1  THEORETICAL DEBATE ON THE APPROACHES ANALYZING THE 
NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION 
AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Foreign policy of the Russian Federation has always been complex. Scholarly 
debate on the Russian foreign policy approach and the nature of the Russian 
politics, in general, has been active through years and remains a matter of 
discussion in modern time. This chapter contemplates a critical study of scholarly 
debates and outlines theoretical approaches, which are used for the analysis of 
Russian foreign policy. These approaches are divided into five broad groups: 
mainstream approaches, ideology-driven approaches, nationalist approaches, 
geopolitically-oriented approaches; and Western-oriented approaches. 
Mainstream approaches include Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. In this 
group, Realism is the oldest and arguably the most long-lasting current in the 
International Relations theory-base. At the same time, the Realist theory also 
evolved through time and adopted new developments in the International Politics. 
The evolution of the Realist theory from Classic Realism to Neorealism, and finally 
to Neoclassic Realism demonstrates how time modifies basic concepts and adapts 
them to modern realities. Neoclassic Realism, which seems to be an advanced 
version Realism, systemizes the insights from Classic Realism, however, at the 
same time incorporates internal and external variables and utilizes a multi-level 
analysis. Neoclassic Realism is selected as one of the theories for the analysis of 
Russian foreign policy in this thesis, and it is discussed in more details in part 3 of 
this chapter. 
	 19	
Liberalist theory in Russia boosted after the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
Communist ideology. However, as Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2010) note, the 
Liberalist theory in Russia has become a product of the Western, rather than 
Russian approaches. Overall, the end of the Soviet system, in political and 
economic terms, also initiated the rise of the liberal ideology and liberal political 
parties such as ‘Yabloko’ (‘Rosiyskaya Demokraticheskaya Partiya’ – Russian 
Democratic Party); The Union of Rightist Forces (‘Soyuz Pravykh Sil’) and many 
others. Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2010) also categorize the Russian liberals into 
three groups: Modernizers, Institutionalists, and National Democrats. Modernizers 
are believed, according to Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2010, p. 61) to be supportive 
of Russia’s cooperation with the West for the purpose of creating a common identity 
and cultural values. Institutionalists and National Democrats, on the other hand, 
despite sharing a sympathy to the West, refuse to adapt to a pro-Western model of 
the government. They also agree on the idea that “pro-American model of 
globalization in many ways caused the spread of terrorism” (Tsygankov and 
Tsygankov, 2010, p. 61). With this so-called ‘American-style’ globalization, 
Tsygankov and Tsygankov in many ways explain the events of the 9/11. 
Constructivism is another theory in the group of mainstream theoretical approaches. 
It is suggested by Stephen Walt (1987), that Realism and Liberalism are limited in 
providing explanations of certain tendencies in the field of International Relations, 
while Constructivism pays attention to the sources of changes. The same thought is 
shared by Snyder (1991), Koslowski and Kratochwill (2007), who agreed on that 
Constructivism explains the demise of the Cold War. Constructivist theory is also 
widely used for the Russian foreign policy analysis. For example, Andrei P. 
Tsygankov, in his book “Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin Honor in 
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International Relations”, suggests that the Russian sense of honor is the key to 
understanding the long history of the country’s relations with the West (Tsygankov, 
2012).  Ted Hopf (2002) also relies on the idea that the identity of a state has an 
effect on its foreign policy. In this thesis, Constructivism is used as one of the 
theories explaining Russian foreign policy in Syria. It is argued that one of the 
reasons behind Russian foreign policy in the conflict has become a result of 
Russia’s intention to sustain and revive its ‘Great Power’ status in the international 
arena. This matter is discussed in more details in part 4 of this chapter.  
Ideologically-driven approaches are also very common for the study on Russian 
foreign policy. Overall, ideological orientation of any state affects its foreign policy 
decisions. It is argued by Wallander, that the type of political regime has systematic 
effects on the content of foreign policy because the institutions and processes of the 
political order play an important role or inform the foreign policy decisions and 
actions (Wallander, 1996, p. 3). Roberts (2005), as well as Jacobson (1994), 
suggest that ideologically informed conceptions of Marxism-Leninism provided a 
strategic context of the action for the Soviet decision-makers. On the other hand, as 
it is suggested by some scholars (Wohlforth, 2012; Tsygankov, 2013; Pursiainen, 
2010), ideologically-driven approach to the Soviet foreign policy analysis was 
contested by scholars who mainly relied on the Realist approach for the Soviet 
foreign policy analysis. With this regard, as Wohlforth (2012) observes, the Realist 
analysis was forbidden in the Soviet Union for many years, and instead all scholars 
were forced to adhere to the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism. More recently, 
ideology-driven approaches evolved into neo-Communist school (Clover, 2012). 
This group is mainly represented by the leader and chairman of the Communist 
Party - Gennadi Zyuganov. According to Shearman (2015), Zyuganov urges Russia 
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to secure the promising future for itself only by returning to the Communism and the 
Soviet Union.  
Another group of approaches for the analysis of Russian foreign policy is 
represented by the Nationalist strain with its roots in the Slavophile traditions. 
Slavophiles (or Pan-Slavs) and Westernizers, the two groups of intellectuals in the 
mid-19th-century Russia, represented opposing schools of thought concerning the 
nature of the Russian civilization. The term ‘Slavophile’ was first introduced by a 
poet Konstantin Batyushkov and Archimandrite Gavriil in 1840 (Horujy and 
Michelson, 2010). Walicki in his “History of Russian Thought” refers to the 
etymological meaning of Slavophilism, which literally means ‘love of the Slavs’. 
Walicki also explains the way this term is described in the Russian historical 
literature. In particular, Slavophiles are referred to represent a group of ideologists 
belonging to the conservative nobility, whose outlook became formed in the late 
1830’s in opposition to the scholarly known as ‘Westernism’ (Walicki, 1979). The 
central issue of the Slavophiles’ ideology was concentrated on Russia’s relationship 
with the Western Europe. The principal tenets of their philosophy were formulated in 
1837 in Ivan Kireyevsky’s1 unpublished article “A reply to Khomiakov”, and were 
expanded in Kireyevsky’s long essay ‘On the Character of European Civilization and 
its Relationship to Russian Civilization’. Kireyevsky argued that the fabric of the 
European civilization was made up of three stands: Christianity, the young barbarian 
races who destroyed the Roman Empire, and the classical heritage (Leatherbarrow 
and Offord, 1987). As argued by Walicki, Russia’s exclusion from the Roman 
heritage was the essential feature distinguishing it from the West. 
The Slavophiles generally considered the Western Europe, which adopted the 
																																																								1	Ivan Kireyevsky – a Russian literary critic and philosopher. 
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Roman Catholic and Protestant religions, as morally bankrupt and regarded the 
Western political and economic institutions (e.g., constitutional government and 
capitalism) as outgrowths of a deficient society. The Russian people, by contrast, 
adhered to the Orthodox faith, and thus, according to the Slavophiles, through their 
common faith and church, were united in a ‘Christian community’, which defined 
natural, harmonious, human relationships (Horujy, 2010, p. 27). Therefore, 
Slavophiles advocated against the Western influences and values at the expense of 
what they considered to be the unique cultural heritage of Russia. Among the main 
Slavophile thinkers were Ivan Kireyevsky, Aleksei Khomiakov (1900-14), Konstantin 
Aksakov (1861-80) and others. Slavophiles’ philosophy was subsequently replaced 
by the Civilisationist school in the 20th century.  
Civilisationists position Russia and its values as principally different from those of 
the West. According to the Civilisationist approach, Russia is viewed as a civilisation 
in its own right, which had a mission of spreading the Russian values abroad 
(Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010). It is argued (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010) 
that in the 21st century, the ideas of the Slavophiles inspired the Russian 
Nationalists or Neo-Imperialists. Zevelev (2014) identifies two groups in the 
Nationalist school in Russia: Neo-Imperialists and Ethnic Nationalists. In the first 
half of the 1990s, the Neo-Imperialist’s project focused on the idea of re-establishing 
the Russian state within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, whereas, the 
essence of the Ethnic Nationalist program in Russia evolved around the idea of 
aligning the borders of Russia as a state and Russia as a nation, or in other words, 
creating a new polity on territories populated by ethnic Russians and some other 
Eastern Slavic peoples (Zvelev, 2014). In modern times, perhaps the most extreme 
Nationalist views are mainly represented by the leader of the Liberal Democratic 
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Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskii. As argued by Nizameddin (1999), Zhirinovskii speaks 
for a restoration of the Russian empire and its expansion in order for Russia to 
enjoy a full access to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Zevelev also points 
out that almost all public intellectuals, who can be considered Neo-Imperialists, from 
Gennady Zyuganov to Alexander Prokhanov, Eduard Limonov, and Sergei 
Udaltsov, expressed their support for the Kremlin’s actions with regard to events in 
the Crimea in 2014 (Zvelev, 2014). 
Another theory in the group of the Russian Nationalists belongs to Anatoly Chubais, 
a Russian politician, and businessman who was an influential member of the Boris 
Yeltsin’s administration in the early 1990s; and the former (1998-2008) Head of the 
UES (United Energy System), the Russian electric power holding company. In his 
article on the Russia's strategy for the 21st century, Chubais contended that Russia 
should construct a “liberal empire’ of its own from the pieces of the Soviet Union” 
(Chubais, 2003). According to Skidelsky (2007), Chubais offered a concept, under 
which Russia’s mission should have been to promote the Russian culture and 
protect the Russian population in its ‘neighborhood’; establish a dominant position in 
their trade and business, and guarantee its neighbors’ ‘freedom and democracy’. 
Only through ‘the liberal empire’, as Chubais argued (2003), Russia could occupy its 
natural place alongside the United States, the European Union, and Japan. 
Later, in 2004, the idea of ‘the liberal empire’ was re-introduced by Leonid Gozman 
– a spokesman of the Union of Right Forces (SPS) party, and laid down as a new 
SPS’s project - ‘Liberal Imperialism’ (White and Feklyunina, 2014). It is argued 
(Benediktov, 2013) that the project of ‘Liberal Imperialism’ suggests that Russia 
would see the post-Soviet environment as a zone of responsibility, so as to uphold 
liberal and democratic freedoms in the former Soviet republics. This also implies 
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that Russia would protect its own business interests in the post-Soviet environment 
on the basis of a liberal market model. Leonid Gozman believes that Russia should 
assume responsibility for protecting the rights of ethnic Russians in the former 
Soviet republics (Sputnik News, 2004). Also in his opinion, responsibility for 
developments in other countries will unite the political missions of Russia and the 
European Union (Sputnik News, 2004). 
Finally, in 2006, Surkov, the Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration, 
introduced a new Nationalist concept. In his concept, he referred to ‘sovereign’ and 
‘managed democracy’ when assessing the Russian political system. By ‘managed 
democracy’ he understood “political and economic regimes imposed by centers of 
the global influence” (Surkov, 2006). In contrast to ‘managed democracy’, Surkov 
argued, that “Russia incorporates ‘sovereign democracy’, which acts in its own 
national interest, and is no different than democracy in Europe” (Surkov, 2006). 
Although, it is hard to agree with Surkov’s argument that the Russian democracy 
concept has no difference from the European perception of democracy. It shall be 
better said that in Russia, the concept of democracy is built through Russia’s 
modern understanding of sovereignty as opposed to the post-modern 
understanding of democracy in Europe.  
Contrast view to the nature of Russian civilisation and Russian foreign policy is 
taken by representatives of the Western-oriented approach. This group is 
represented by two schools – Westernizers (Zapadniki) and Atlanticists. While the 
former was the school active in the 19th century, the latter mainly operated in the 
1990s. The Westernizers take the opposite view than the Slavophiles. They believe 
that in order for Russia to succeed and take its place on the global political stage, it 
needed to adopt the Western industrial, cultural, and economic reforms (Copleston, 
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1986, p. 30). Hosking, in an interview with the Valdai Group in 2012, explained that 
in the 18th century, when Russia acquired the status of ‘Great European Power’, its 
political system, however, was very different from that of most European powers. 
For example, unlike Russia, the European states already were in the process of 
building constitutional political systems and nation-states. Therefore many Russians 
believed that the best way for Russia to strengthen its ‘Great Power’ status was to 
become more like the European countries, and in particular, to move towards 
constitutional and parliamentary regimes, and also become an industrialized nation-
state, like France, Germany and the Great Britain. The Westernizers were firm in 
their belief that Russia was not the unique country with the unique destiny the way 
the Slavophiles believed.  On the contrary, they believed that all countries had to 
follow the similar path the European states did and that Russia lagged severely 
behind the other countries of the world. It was argued (Sutton, 1988) that the 
Russian philosopher of the second half of the 19th century, Vladimir Soloviev, who 
also shared the Westerners’ philosophy, defined Westernism as a direction of the 
Russian social thought and literature, that recognizes the spiritual solidarity of 
Russia and the Western Europe in cultural and historical ways. Leading Westernizer 
thinkers of the 19th century include Peter Chaadayev (in Edie et al., 1976, p. 106), 
Vissarion Belinsky (in Edie et al., 1976, p. 230), Alexander Herzen (in The Memoirs 
of Alexander Herzen, 1968, p. 1649) and many others. 
In the similar fashion, Atlanticism emerged in the late 19th century. In Russia, 
Atlanticist roots back to the post-Cold War time. Smith (2002) identifies the moment 
when Russia first adopted Atlanticism in its foreign policy – in November 1981, 
when the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev argued that Europe was ‘our common 
home’ upon his visit to the West Germany. The doctrine of Atlanticism was revived 
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by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and later applied by Andrey Kozyrev’s tenure as the 
Foreign Minister (1991-1996). According to Deschepper (2013), in his early years, 
Kozyrev insisted on so-called ‘predestinated Greatness of Russia’. Deschepper 
(2013) also adds, that in the first years of the Russian Federation, the speeches of 
political leaders were not only focused on the will of Russia to be a member of the 
international system but also on the fact that this status belongs to Russia naturally. 
However, starting from 1992, Russia opted for improving the partnership with the 
West, in particular with the US and its European allies. It was argued (Morgan, 
2008) that Andrey Kozyrev in his attempts to promote friendly relations with the 
Western states was said to be an Atlanticist. In further years, however, the Russian 
government decided to prompt more independent policy, which marked a departure 
from the Atlanticism. Such a change was mainly initiated by Yevgeny Primakov, 
who took over the Foreign Ministry after Kozyrev, and later became the Prime 
Minister.  
In general, the arrival of Primakov as the Foreign Minister brought up major 
changes in the Russia’s foreign policy model. In particular, Primakov’s diplomatic 
involvement and attention to the former Soviet space helped in negotiating peace in 
Moldova and Tajikistan, as well as ratification of some security documents with 
Ukraine. Also, as Tsygankov (2010) explains, Primakov managed to restore 
Russia’s independent foreign policy, however, some there was still certain 
dependence on the West in economic affairs. Overall, as argued by Livermore 
(1999), Primakov criticized Kozyrev’s rather pro-American approach, which he said, 
“undermined Russian independence” (Livermore, 1999, p. 72).  
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Geopolitical school of thought is represented in Russia mainly by the Eurasianist 
school. Eurasianism, as the political philosophy, was first advanced by leading 
Russian thinkers in the 1920s, including Nikolai Trubetskoi, Pyotr Savitsky and Lev 
Gumilev (Aybak, 2006). During the Soviet time, Eurasianism drew the attention of 
the Soviet leaders, because, how Smith contends, “the Russians felt themselves to 
be not only the most numerous but also the greatest of all European peoples” 
(Smith, 2012, p. 34). Since the Soviet collapse in 1991, Russian academics and 
policy-makers have struggled to develop a concept that could guide Russia's 
revival, and Eurasianism has become one of them. As it was mentioned before, the 
appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as the Foreign Minister in January 1996 signified 
a new direction for Russia in its foreign policy towards a greater cooperation with 
the Central and East Asia, rather than alignment with the US. The negative attitude 
towards the US also seems to be sourced in quite a critical discourse about NATO’s 
actions in Europe. In particular, many Russian politicians expressed their concerns 
over NATO’s expansion into the territories of the East European states. 
As Tsygankov observes, the Eurasianists tend to see Russia as a single cohesive 
civilizational entity formed as a result of coexistence and interaction between 
Europe and Asia (Tsygankov, 2007, p. 375). There is a certain scholarly debate on 
the typology of the Eurasianist approaches. Silviusa (2004), for instance, divides 
Eurasianism into Original and Neo-Eurasianism. Tsygankov (2006) offers to divide 
Neo-Eurasianists into two schools: Modernisers and Expansionists. 
The Modernizers, as argued by Ersen (2004), are mainly supported by Prokhanov 
and Sultanov. According to them, the end of the Cold War brought the decline of the 
former ‘superpowers’ – not only the Soviet Union but also the US; the group also is 
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forecasting a third world war, which they say will reshape the spheres of influence in 
the world (Ersen, 2004, p. 135). The other group, the Expansionist’s, is mainly 
advocated by Aleksandr Dugin (2009, 2014), the founder of the International 
Eurasian Movement.  Dugin seems to be a controversial Russian geopolitical 
thinker. For Dugin, Eurasia is a special geographical space and civilizational zone, 
which represents the legacy of the Russian imperial and then Soviet 
‘gosudarstvennost’ [statehood] (Dugin, 1999, p. 12). Dugin (1999) also argues that 
there is a confrontation between 'Atlanticist New World Order' (principally the US 
and the UK) and the Russia-oriented 'New Eurasian Order', where Russia acts to 
secure the preservation of the Eurasian nations and their cultural traditions. 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS AS THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND 
A POLITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS THE METHOD OF THE 
RESEARCH 
 
Until recently the dominant perspective in the International Relations theory was 
concentrated on the use of a paradigm-bound research, however, as Sill and 
Katzenstein (2010) explain, it proved to produce limitations and blind spots. For this 
reason, the foreign policy analysis cannot be approached by a paradigm-bound 
research. In this context, a theoretical pluralism seems to provide an alternative 
approach, which can be used as “a countervailing effort to overcome limitations 
inherent in paradigm-bound research in International Relations” (Sill and 
Katzenstein, 2010, p. 35). At the same time, a theoretical pluralism hasn’t become a 
mainstream approach to the foreign policy analysis yet, and a number of scholars 
remain quite skeptical about using it in their research. For instance, Kratochwil 
(2007), Lapid (1989), Neumann (2008) can be included in this critical group. Despite 
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the criticism, a number of scholars support this pluralistic view (Katzenstein and Sil, 
2010; Jackson and Nexon, 2004; Risse and Simmons, 2002; Barkin, 2010).  
The concept of a theoretical pluralism pioneered the field of the International 
Relations in the late 90s. In 1997, Adler (1997) suggested that a link between 
typically opposed paradigms could be found in each research. Later on, the idea of 
a theoretical pluralism was supported by Fearon (2002) and Wendt (1999), who 
called to combine insights, cross boundaries and, if possible, synthesize specific 
arguments to gain more compelling answers and create a better picture of reality. It 
seems that the concept of a theoretical pluralism still remains rather new for the 
field of International Relations, and its use in the foreign policy analysis is still 
problematic.  
In this thesis, a theoretical pluralism is used as an umbrella term, which unites a 
theoretical synthesis and an analytic eclecticism. A theoretical synthesis tends to be 
an approach, which mainly combines insights form different, and, in some cases, 
even conflicting theories. In synthesis, there is often no link between various 
theoretical approaches chosen for an analysis. Eclecticism, on the other hand, 
requires the provision of a point by which a researcher integrates different 
theoretical approaches. Overall, according to proponents of an analytic eclecticism, 
it seems to be a more complex approach compared a theoretical pluralism. 
The proponents of an analytic eclecticism, Katzenstein, and Okawara (2010) argue 
that none of the major theoretical paradigms (Realism, Liberalism, and 
Constructivism) can capture the complex interplay among material power, concerns 
over efficiency in the international politics, and the effects of identity. Therefore 
Katzenstein advocates for combining basic insights of theories, which will 
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compliment each other and create a comprehensive approach to the foreign policy 
analysis. In practice, though the application of an analytic eclecticism can be rather 
difficult, as it requires providing the links tying theories with one another, as well as 
the ways of how to reconcile different epistemologies of diverse theoretical 
traditions. A theoretical synthesis in this way tends to be less complex and doesn’t 
overcomplicate the research. It allows a combination of diverse theories without a 
compulsory need to provide ties between theories we use in the analysis like an 
analytic eclecticism requires. Some scholars successfully apply this approach, for 
instance: a theoretical synthesis is used by Laferriere and Stoett (1999), who offer 
in their work ‘International Relations Theory And Ecological Thought’ to combine 
International Relations theories with ecology in order to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the global environmental politics. Andrew Moravcsik (1998) also 
contributes in favor of a theoretical synthesis. In his book ‘The Choice For Europe: 
Social Purpose And State Power From Messina To Maastricht’ he uses a tripartite 
explanation of the European integration – economic interest, relative power, 
credible commitments. Then he introduces their major competitors and derives 
hypotheses, which permit to test these theories in the case of the European 
cooperation. Gulay Mutlu (2012) in his article ‘Turkey’s Foreign Aid Policy Toward 
Central Asia’ takes a synthesis of Neo-Liberal and Neo-Realist views of the 
International Relations to explain the Turkish foreign aid policy.  
This thesis synthesises two theories: Neoclassic Realism and Constructivism. 
Initially some basic insights of the Realist and Constructivist theories may seem 
conflicting, however, combination of key features of these two theories provides a 
strong theoretical bases for contemplating the Russian foreign policy analysis. It is 
also important to note here that not all scholars agree with a conflicting nature of the 
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Realist and Constructivist theory. For example, Constructivists like Wendt, see the 
role of their approach not in competing with traditional approaches but in building 
upon them (Wendt, 1999).  
In this study, Neoclassic Realism is employed as one of the conceptual frameworks, 
which explains security-oriented Russian foreign policy in relation to Syria. In 
particular, Neoclassic Realism proves how do Russian domestic security 
implications affect Russian foreign policy in Syria. Constructivist theory, on the other 
hand, provides a comprehensive explanation for identity-based Russian foreign 
policy in Syria. This thesis studies identity and security as two independent matters, 
which at the same time equally affect Russian foreign policy in relation to Syria. 
Although it might also be suggested that identity and security can be 
interconnected. It can be so, if we see the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ as a threat 
not only to the Russian domestic security and territorial integrity, but also to the 
Russian ethnic population. Ethnic Russians as a group in many ways represent a 
component of the Russian national identity, and if they are threatened, that means 
the whole Russian identity becomes put in danger. That is how security and identity 
might be represented as interdependent matters, although the argument of this 
thesis is rather opposite. As it mentioned above, identity and security are 
approached as two separate matters affecting Russian foreign policy in Syria. 
Moreover, it is argued that there is certain continuity in Russian foreign policy being 
identity-based and simultaneously security-oriented. This point is proved by 
providing a historical background for such a development of Russian foreign policy. 
This matter is discussed in details in subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
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Ontological and Epistemological orientations of the research 
The questions of Ontology and Epistemology are particularly significant for the 
present study and for any research in general, as they shape a methodological 
orientation of the researcher. It was argued that Ontology and Epistemology are 
‘like a skin, not a sweater; they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the 
researcher wants (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, p. 184). According to Bates and 
Jenkins, “the teaching and learning Ontology and Epistemology is an important 
element of the political science, as it helps students to appraise, differentiate and 
choose between competing philosophies, theories and analytic traditions” (Bates 
and Jenkins, 2007, p. 55). Despite the fact that determination of Ontological and 
Epistemological approaches is key for each researcher, it should be noted that 
doing so is not always an easy task. In fact, some key scholars, such as Marsh and 
Stoker, as well as Hay, were heavily criticized for their “inconsistent and, sometimes 
inaccurate” Ontological and Epistemological definitions (Bates and Jenkins, 2007). 
The author tends to disagree with Bates and Jenkins in their critique to Marsh and 
Stoker because their explanations of Ontological and Epistemological traditions 
seem quite clear and logical. Therefore, the author’s Ontological and 
Epistemological positions are mainly structured with the help of Marsh, Furlong, and 
Stoker’s explanation of these approaches. 
According to Marsh and Furlong (2010), Ontological and Epistemological positions 
are related, but at the same time need to be separated. They also contend, that 
“Ontological position affects, although does not determine, one’s Epistemological 
position” (Marsh and Furlong, 2010). This though is also supported by Hay, who 
contends that “Ontology is logically prior to Epistemology” (Hay, 2002, p. 112). 
However Graham, Dixon and Jones III (2010) disagree and claim that the analysis 
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of Ontology is invariably shows it to rest upon Epistemological priors. It is rather 
debatable whether Ontology priors Epistemology, or vice versa. The author’s 
understanding, however, falls into Hay’s (2002) suggestion that determination of 
Epistemological position follows after Ontological. 
If an Ontological position reflects the researcher’s view about the nature of the 
world, Epistemological position reflects the view of what we can know about the 
world. Literally, Epistemology is a theory of knowledge, or, as Blaikie suggests, 
“Epistemology refers to the claims or assumptions made about the ways, in which it 
is possible to gain knowledge or reality” (Blaikie, 1993, p. 6). As argued by Bryman 
(2008), Ontological position is expressed as the dichotomy between Objectivism 
and Constructivism. Although Marsh and Furlong (2010) subdivide Ontological 
position into Foundationalist and anti-Foundationalist. If Objectivists 
(Foundationalists) posit a “real” world, “out there” (Marsh and Furlong, 2010, p. 185) 
independent of social actors, independent of our knowledge of it (Bryman, 2008, 
p.18), Constructivists (anti-Foundationalists) see the world as “socially constructed”, 
and produced through social interaction and therefore being in a constant state of 
change (Marsh and Furlong, 2010, p. 185).  
Epistemological positions, on the other hand, are classified into Positivism and 
Interpretivist (Bryman, 2008). Furlong and Marsh also offer another classification of 
Epistemological traditions into Scientific (Positivist) and Hermeneutic (Interpretivist) 
(Marsh and Furlong, 2010, p. 191). The adherents of the Scientific tradition see 
social science as “analogous to natural science, and advocate for the application of 
the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality” (Bryman, 2008, p. 
13). As Furlong and Marsh explain, “in ontological terms they were 
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Foundationalists, as they believed that the world was real and independent of 
agents” (Marsh and Furlong, 2010, p. 17). In contrast, Hermeneutic adherents 
(Interpretivists) believe, that “the world is socially-constructed” (Marsh and Furlong, 
2010, p. 17). As Bryman (2008) contends, they find application of scientific model to 
the study of the social world inadequate, as it is not able to capture the meanings, 
which human beings attach to social reality. Therefore, in such approach, the focus 
is placed on the meaning of behavior, and such approach has clear methodological 
implications. 
Furlong and Marsh (2010) also suggest three approaches to Ontology and 
Epistemology: Positivist, Interpretivist, and Realist. Positivits approach is based on 
the Foundationalist Ontology, and suggests that the world exists independently of 
our knowledge of it. Interpretivist approach has a contrast view and suggests that 
the world is socially or discursively constructed. Realism is seen by Marsh and 
Furlong (2010) as the approach, which shares Ontological position with Positivism, 
but in Epistemological terms, modern Realism has more in common with Relativism.  
The present study adopts a synthesis of Neoclassic Realism and Constructivism as 
a theoretical approach. While Neoclassic Realism explains how domestic security 
implications affect Russian foreign policy in Syria, Constructivism is used as a 
theory explaining identity-based Russian foreign policy. Neoclassic Realism and 
Constructivism have two contrast Ontological positions. Realism accepts the world 
as it finds it and rests on the premise that the real world exists outside of our own 
perceptions. In this way, it represents the Objectivist (Foundationalist) Ontological 
position.  Constructivist position, in contrast, suggests that perceptions matter and 
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inform our actions, and therefore it shares the Constructivist (anti-Foundationalist) 
Ontological position.  
Epistemological position of this thesis falls into Interpretivist tradition. According to 
such approach, interpretations and meanings can be established and understood 
within discourses or traditions. The present study adopts a political discourse 
analysis as the method. An analysis of political discourses through speeches, 
interviews, statements of key Russian political figures prove that Russian foreign 
policy in Syria is identity-based and simultaneously security-oriented. 
The present research also employs a multi-level analysis as a part of a theoretical 
synthesis, which is chosen as a methodological approach. However, it is important 
to point out that the study has a particular limitation, as the main focus of this 
research is maid on the state level and the individual level. One of the arguments of 
this thesis is that the Russian domestic security implications affect the state’s 
foreign policy in Syria. In this way domestic interests dominate external interests, 
which is why the state level of analysis is prioritized over the system level. The 
individual level in this research focuses of the role of the Russian political leadership 
in formation of the state’s foreign policy. This question is discussed in more details 
in subchapter 3.3 -‘The role of leadership in Russia.’  
Political discourse analysis as the method of research 
Political discourse analysis is chosen as the method of this research. It needs to be 
stated that the study of a discourse analysis is complex. There are a few 
problematic matters concerning discourse analysis. First of all, there is certain 
confusion in regards to the general terminology of a discourse analysis. Moreover, 
as argued by Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough (2013), there is no clear 
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distinction between a political discourse and other types of discourse analysis. 
Initially, there is a controversy over the term ‘discourse’. Moreover, there are many 
conflicting and overlapping definitions of a discourse and a discourse analysis. It 
also seems that definitions and the use of the term ‘discourse’ differ considerably 
from one approach to another. As argued by Larsen (1997), in traditional linguistics 
and social psychology, ‘discourse’ is often used as a micro concept, in other words 
as the way of analyzing a pattern of everyday conversations amongst individuals in 
different situations. Larsen also found, that ‘discourse’ is widely used in social 
theory and analysis as a macro concept, to show how the language shapes societal 
processes (Larsen, 1997). 
Given this disciplinary diversity, it is no surprise that the term ‘discourse’ and 
‘discourse analysis’ have different meanings among scholars. It is said that even 
Foucauld, one of the founders of the concept and, up till date, one of the most 
influential figures in the field, uses different understandings of a discourse in his 
works (Chernysh, 2011). Chernysh offered her own interpretation of Foucauld’s 
understanding of a discourse, as “being a form of the social reality, in which a 
discourse shapes it on various dimensions” (Chernysh, 2011, p. 25). It can be 
suggested that a discourse analysis is an umbrella term for diversity of social-
linguistic approaches, each of which focuses on the use of language in certain 
context. As Pietikäinen and Dufva (2006) also argue, discourse analysis is neither a 
single methodological or an analytical framework, nor a homogenous theoretical 
perspective but is a multi-faceted approach based on the use of language in the 
context. Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough, on the other hand, suggest first 
to view the nature of politics in order to understand a political discourse (Fairclough, 
and Fairclough, 2013, p. 3). 
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After discussing difference in understanding a discourse and a discourse analysis 
among scholars, the reasonable question rises on how to apply and conduct a 
discourse analysis. These two matters also remain problematic. A very interesting 
approach to a discourse analysis is offered by Isabela Fairclough and Norman 
Fairclough. Their unique approach integrates critical discourse-analytical concepts 
with the analytical framework of argumentation theory, on the basis of viewing a 
political discourse as primarily argumentative discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough, 
2013). However this thesis mainly relies on the approach offered by Henrik Larsen, 
and below there are key points of this approach.  
According to Larsen (1997), general problem in the foreign policy analysis is that 
traditional literature-base on the foreign policy analysis tends to present the beliefs 
in individualist and positivist ways without taking into account the impact of 
language and the societal foundation of the beliefs. The problem of the traditional 
literature, as identified by Larsen (1997), is twofold - belief systems and 
psychological mechanisms. As such, “images or perceptions fall within the category 
of belief systems, while the psychological factors usually are supposed to be a 
tendency to focus on the individual decision-maker” (Larsen, 1997, p. 3). Both 
beliefs and psychological mechanisms usually assume that language is a 
transparent medium, which is without its own dynamics. 
Overall, as it is argued by Larsen, literature on individual’s belief systems suffers 
from the lack of general consideration of the impact of an individual on the general 
line of a country’s foreign policy,” while focusing on the individual decision-maker in 
the traditional approach is “mainly concentrated on discussions of roles’ versus 
‘personality’ of the top political leader, individual decision-maker” (Larsen, 1997, p. 
4). It even seems useful, as the focus on the top political leaders reflects his/her 
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views and beliefs, which might well be “a reflection of his/her political office (role) 
and which therefore express more general views” (Larsen, 1997, p. 6). However, 
the treatment of political actor’s views is often positivist in traditional literature 
meaning that these views are presented just out of many variables and seen as not 
meaningful references for the actors (Larsen, 1997, p. 9). Such treatments of the 
actors’ beliefs seems wrong, as the world in a way is constructed by beliefs and 
views, therefore considerable attention need to be devoted to the language and its 
use. As Larsen also notices, the traditional literature considers language as 
transparent medium, which is however quite inaccurate, as the language is argued 
to “have its own dynamics” (Larsen, 1997, p. 9). Therefore, the criticism of the 
traditional approaches leads to adoption of a linguistic approach, drawing on 
elements of both Structuralist and post-Structuralist linguistics – applying the 
concept of political discourse (Larsen, 1997, p. 11). As Larsen also explains, under 
the Structuralist approach, language is the closest we can come to the meaning, as 
we do not access meaning straightaway, just language (Larsen, 1997, pp. 11). 
Overall, it is agreed by a number of other scholars, that the language plays the key 
role in a discourse analysis (Davies, 1998; Obeng, 1997; Chilton, 2004; Obeng and 
Hartford, 2008). At the same time there are a few limitations concerning language in 
a discourse analysis. One of such limitations, as observed by Obeng and Hartford 
(2008), concerns the application of translations to the language, as some 
indigenous meanings might be lost as a result of conversion from one language to 
another. 
When it comes to the procedure of conducting a discourse analysis, it has also 
proved to be problematic. As Muller contends, there is no shared understanding or 
established methodology of doing a discourse analysis (Muller, 2010). Moreover, 
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approaches to a discourse analysis are far from drawing on a commonly accepted 
methodological canon, because different forms of a discourse analysis have a 
different methodology (Muller, 2010). In this thesis, a discourse analysis is used as 
a tool for studying Russian foreign policy in Syria. In a process of use of a discourse 
analysis the model proposed by Newman (2008) is applied. Newman (2008) 
identifies three steps the researcher is recommended to take as a prerequisite for a 
discourse analysis. First, delimiting a discourse to a wide but manageable range of 
sources and timeframes. From these texts, the analyst then identifies the 
representations that comprise the discourse, taking into account censorship and 
other practices that shape the availability of text. Finally, to explore change, one 
uncovers layering within the discourse. However even more comprehensive 
scheme is proposed by Manheim, Rich, Willnat, Brians, Babb (2012), who suggest 
four stages of a discourse analysis: identifying the individuals or group; selecting 
appropriate ‘texts’; refining versus building models; collecting and reporting the 
results. In this thesis, it is decided to build a discourse analysis on that model.  
Interesting point was proposed by Colin, who suggests to separate a foreign policy 
discourse analysis from a foreign policy analysis, as “a foreign policy discourse 
does not relate solely to foreign policy” (Colin, 2004, p. 25). In Colin’s opinion, the 
Russian foreign policy discourse held during the Kosovo crisis “served as catalyst 
for domestic political crisis” (Colin, 2004, p. 25). In other words, the Russian foreign 
policy discourse reveals certain connection between domestic policy and foreign 
policy. It is hard to dismiss this point, as it seems to be quite true in case of the 
Syrian conflict as well. Russian foreign policy discourse during the Syrian crisis is in 
particular influenced by the domestic security situation. As in case of the Kosovo 
crisis, the crisis in Syria, itself “generated the mobilization of the discourse” (Colin, 
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2004, pp. 25). Overall, also according to Colin, dissociation of a foreign policy 
discourse from a foreign policy analysis is quite unusual task, as in “domain of the 
International Relations, a foreign policy discourse is mainly understood with 
reference to foreign policy, meaning that actions undertaken internationally is 
usually correspondent to the discourse held” (Colin, 2004, p. 25).  But, as Colin 
contends, using strictly International Relations approach might be not enough for a 
comprehensive analysis of a foreign policy discourse. In other words, discourse 
practice belongs not only to foreign policy but also to domestic policy. Foreign policy 
discourse shouldn’t be seen as a “manifestation of foreign policy” (Colin, 2004, p. 
25), as “the person or producer of the discourse is usually a domestic policy maker” 
(Colin, 2004, p. 25). This argument supports the argument used for the present 
study, according to which domestic and foreign policies are interconnected.  
The present analysis mainly relies on official speeches and statements of the 
Russian President - Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister – Dmitry Medvedev, and the 
Foreign Minister – Sergei Lavrov and some other politicians in Russia. At the same 
time, when it comes to the analysis of a discourse regarding a threat of ‘Religious 
Extremism’, The study also takes into consideration statements and speeches of 
some Russian military and security personnel (for instance, Alexander Bortnikov, 
the Director of the Federal Security Service; Igor Sergunin, the Colonel-General, the 
Head of the Russian Military Intelligence).  Although it has proven to be quite hard 
to find official scripts of these statements, therefore they were approached via news 
agencies’ websites. Overall, it is suggested contemplating the analysis of speeches 
and official statements of the key figures in Russian foreign policy, because their 
beliefs, views and statements form a Russian foreign policy discourse and reflect 
the country’s foreign policy.  
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Discourse analysis seems to be a useful tool for conducting such an analysis. At the 
same time, it also needs to be said that an option to include interviews into the body 
of present qualitative study was considered. In particular, initially it was planned to 
include the interviews of the members of the Russian Federation Embassy in 
London, which the author had a chance to take as a part of an internship in the 
past. Unfortunately, the results of the interviews showed that the answers to 
interview’s questions were given strictly according to the official political discourse. 
In particular, the members of the embassy copied the spoken word and phrases of 
the President and the Foreign Minister. Moreover, the answers of the interviewees 
were to large extent identical. Any request to demonstrate personal insights to of 
the diplomats to the events in Syria and Russian foreign policy in particular was 
answered with phrases like: “our opinion goes in line with the opinion of the 
policymakers back home”. Therefore, a decision was made to exclude interviews 
from the body of the qualitative study of this thesis, as it is believed believed that 
they do not make any contribution to the quality of this research project. 
In this research, two separate discourses are anlysed. Firstly, a discourse on how 
the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ in the Middle East affects the domestic security 
situation in Russia, and secondly, a discourse on Russia’s ‘Great Power’ identity.  
With regards to the limitations on periods, this study provides analysis of both 
discourses dated between:  
• On the discourse on the threat of ‘Religious Extremism’ - from 15 March 2011 
(the beginning of the civil war in Syria) up till present time; 
• On the discourse of Russia’s ‘Greatpowerness’ – from the beginning of Putin’s 
first term as the President (1999) up until present time.  
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When it comes to the first discourse on ‘Religious Extremism’, it should be said that 
there is a confusion existing on the matter of a terminology of ‘Religious Extremism’. 
The terms ‘Extremism’, ‘Islamism’, ‘Wahhabism’, ‘Salafism’, ‘Jihaddism’ are equally  
used on various occasions when describing the matters of ‘Religious Extremism’. A 
little or none attempt is maid towards differentiation of the terms. This matter is 
discussed in more details in chapter V, and an attempt is maid towards 
reconciliation of a confusion existing in official interpretation of ‘Religious 
Extremism’. It was also noticed that a discourse on the matter of ‘Religious 
Extremism’ is fractured on a few sub-topics’, such as: 
• The global threat of ‘Religious Extremism’, although ‘terrorism’ appears to be 
most common terminology in this case. Such a discourse is traced in a 
number of official sources, including Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to 
media questions at a news conference on Russia’s diplomacy performance in 
2015, Moscow, January 26, 2016 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation Website, 2016). Vladimir Putin, in his article to the New 
York Times in 2013, argued “mercenaries from Arab countries fighting there [in 
Syria], and hundreds of militants from Western countries and even Russia, are 
an issue of our deep concern” (Putin, 2013). He also stressed that the 
“extremists” activities “threatens us all” (Putin, 2013); 
• Threat of ‘Religious Extremism’ to the Russia’s national security (speeches 
named below); 
• Discourse on how some of Russia’s collegues use ‘Religious Extremism’ 
against Russia (Vladimir Putin at the Press statement and answers 
to journalists’ questions following the APEC Leaders' Meeting on October 8, 
2013 (Putin, 2013); the statement by the Chief of the GRU military intelligence 
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service, Colonel-General Igor Sergun on May 23, 2015 (YourNewsWire.com, 
2015).  
It was also noted that a discourse on how ‘Religious Extremism’ threatens Russia’s 
domestic security is largely presented in some key directive security and foreign 
policy documents, such as Military Doctrine, 2014; National Security Concept, 2000; 
National Security Strategy, 2015; Foreign Policy Concept, 2013). The documents 
stress a priority of safeguarding the national interests and security of the Russian 
Federation. The documents also explicitly recognise a threat posed by so-called 
‘terrorism’ for Russian domestic security, as well as a global threat of ‘terrorism’. In 
particular, Foreign Policy Concept states that a “threat of international terrorism is 
one of the most dangerous realities in today’s world” (Foreign Policy Concept, 
2013). The Concept also specifies a threat posed by the Islamic State: “the global 
terrorist threat has reached a new high with the emergence of the Islamic State 
international terrorist organization and similar groups that have descended to an 
unprecedented level of cruelty in their violence” (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013). 
The Concept also recognizes Russia’s essential role in fighting with ‘Religious 
Extremism’ both internationally and domestically: “Russia views combating 
international terrorism as an essential government task and a key priority for 
international security” (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013).  
The Military Doctrine recognizes ‘Religious extremism’ as both domestic and 
international threat. In regards to domestic threat of ‘Religious Extremism’, the 
document states that such activities “undermine the sovereignty and violating the 
unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation” (Military Doctrine, 2014). 
Among other domestic threats of ‘Religious Extremism’, the National Security 
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Concept also says that “terrorist and extremist organizations aimed at changing the 
constitutional order of the Russian Federation through violence, disrupting the 
operation of the organs of state power, destroying or disrupting the functioning of 
military and industrial facilities, critical public infrastructure, and transport 
infrastructure, and intimidating the population, including by the acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction, and radioactive, poisonous, toxic, and chemically and 
biologically dangerous substances, carrying out nuclear terrorist attacks, and 
attacking and disrupting the continuous operation of the Russian Federation's vital 
IT infrastructure” (National Security Concept, 2000). 
If we refer to the official political discourse on the threat of ‘Religious Extremism’ to 
the Russian national security, as well as the global threat of ‘Religious Extremism’, 
particular attention needs to be paid to the following statements and speeches: 
• Dmitry Medvedev’s Statement on the situation in Libya on March 21, 2011, in 
which he contended that the Arab revolutions have “direct impact” on Russia 
(Medvedev, 2011); 
• In 2013, Vladimir Putin, who was the Prime Minister then, expressed particular 
concern over “extremists” activities, which threaten all countries, including 
Russia (Putin, 2013); 
• Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly on December 3, 2015. In the 
Address, Vladimir Putin devoted quite a big part of his speech to “the global 
threat of terrorism”, and to Russia in particular; 
• The Valdai Discussion Club speech by Vladimir Putin on October, 22 2015. In 
the speech, Mr. Putin demonstrated his concern of a possible global 
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expansion of the Islamic State. He specifically argued that the IS “represents 
a threat to everyone, including Russia” (Putin, 2015); 
• Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s live radio interview with Sputnik, Ekho 
Moskvy and Govorit Moskva, Moscow, April 22, 2015. In his statement, Lavrov 
contended that “the Islamic State is Russia’s main foe” (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Website, 2015); 
• Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with NTV on October 19, 2014. In 
the interview, Lavrov outlines how Russia fights with ‘Islamist’ groups in Syria, 
and that “terrorists should be fought uncompromisingly and relentlessly” 
(Lavrov, 2014); 
• The Statement of the Head of Russia's Security Council - Nikolai Patrushev, in 
which he identified the Islamic State as “the greatest threat to world peace and 
security and as the danger, which could be getting closer to home” (Interfax, 
2015); 
• General Sergey Smirnov in his statement said that “the threat coming from the 
so-called Islamic State is absolutely real for Russia and its neighbors” (Russia 
Today, 2015) 
• Address by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the 69th session of 
the UN General Assembly, New York on September 27, 2014. Mr. Lavrov 
urged all Russia’s international colleagues “to establish a united front to 
counter the growing terrorist threat” (Lavrov, 2014). 
It is believed a remark needs to be made on Russia’s discourse on how some of 
Russia’s collegues use ‘Religious Extremism’ against Russia. This matter is 
discussed in chapter VI, part 6.3. It is also believed that certain Russia’s positions 
and discourse are influenced by “political imyths, such as Russia’s poor relation to 
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the West and the memory of the Second World War” (Colin, 2004, p. 25). Overall, 
so-called ‘myths’ play important role in political discourse. According to Kane and 
Jorgensen, one of the main functions of myths is to provide people with a deeper 
story, a narrative that can encompass their own individual stories and give them 
meaning, worth, and hope, connected by something more than mere contingency 
(Kane and Jorgensen, 2014, p. 86). The myth of the Western world as an enemy 
has its own history in Russia. The myth has become more intense after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and remains very vital now. In relation to Syria, 
some Russian politicians contend that Russia’s collegues (in particular those of the 
Western states) provoke the rise ‘Religious Extremism’ and use it as the tool to 
destabilize Russia. 
The second discourse held during the Syrian conflict mainly targeted on a 
representation of Russia as a ‘Great Power’. Here the author would like to refer to 
the research of Colin (2004) on the Russian foreign policy discourse during the 
Kosovo crisis. Colin argues that the Russian foreign policy discourse was “aimed at 
constructing and imposing its own worldview and driving principles of the world” 
(Colin, 2004, p. 25). It seems to be quite a relevant point also in the context of 
Russian foreign policy in Syria. Moreover, certain historical continuity can be traced 
in relation to the ‘Great Power’ discourse in Russia. With this regard, it needs to be 
said that the Russian identity today is in many ways the product of historical 
determinants. It means that throughout the Russian history, there has always been 
the particular discourse on Russia’s ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘Greatness’. In modern 
times, such a discourse can be traced in many public speeches: 
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• ‘Russia at the turn of the Millennium’ statement by Vladimir Putin on 
December 30, 1999. The statement discussed the place of Russia in the new 
Millennium and seemed to send a strong message to the Russian people and 
Russia’s colleagues in the international arena. Although, as the President 
outlined, Russia found itself in deep crisis, including economic and social 
problems, a focus of policies in Russia in the new millennium would be 
directed to “Russia’s revival and prosperity”. According to Putin, such a 
“revival and prosperity” was due to be reached through the “unity of Russian 
society”, “patriotism”, “pride of the country, its history and achievements”. Mr. 
Putin made a stress on the country’s historical “greatness” as the basis of its 
revival  (Putin, 1999);  
• The Munich speech by Vladimir Putin on February 2, 2007. One of the main 
topics underlying the speech is a danger of unipolarity in the world, which 
“creates serious international tensions”. Mr. Putin argued that Russia stands 
against the unipolarity and “supports the renewal of dialogue on this important 
questions”, including those on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the 
same time, the President stressed that “Russia is a country with a history that 
spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used 
the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy” (Putin, 2007); 
• The Crimea speech by Vladimir Putin on March 18, 2014. The speech is 
mainly dedicated to the Crimea matter and draws on the significance of a 
“restoration of unity” with Crimea, which shares “common historical legacy 
and a very important factor in regional stability” for Russia. Mr. Putin stressed 
the legitimacy of a reunification with Crimea, and called all members of the 
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international community to respect the “legitimate decision of the people of 
Crimea”. In particular, he recalled that “Russia is an independent, active 
participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its own national 
interests that need to be taken into account and respected”. (Putin, 2014); 
• The Valdai Discussion Club speech by Vladimir Putin on October 22, 2015. 
The discussion held during the meeting at the Valdai Club was dedicated to 
issues of war and peace. In the speech, Mr. Putin to great extent speaks about 
how the US and its EU allies use war as a way to resolve some contradictions 
and reach their political goals. He also stressed that the West creates 
an enemy image of Russia nowadays. He outlines the difference in foreign 
policies of Russia and the West and does this in order to demonstrate that a 
political line chosen by the West undermines democratic values. Putin also 
recalled “the collapse of the Soviet Union” as “one of the twentieth century’s 
great tragedies”, which had put Russian in a severe economic and social 
crisis. However, the President said, that “Russia has every chance 
of becoming one of the leaders” (Putin, 2015); 
• Address by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the 69th session of 
the UN General Assembly, New York on September 27, 2014. Mr. Lavrov 
demonstrated his concern about “the policy of ultimatums and philosophy of 
supremacy and domination”, which undermine “the process of development for 
a polycentric and democratic world order”. According to Lavrov, Russia is 
strongly committed to a constructive dialogue with its international colleagues 
and “open to discussion of the most complex issues” (Lavrov, 2014); 
• Directive documents (Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept, and 
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National Security Strategy). The Concept sets the basic principles of Russian 
foreign policy. The document stresses that Russia is one of the main actors in 
the global political scene, and as such, pursues the constructive partnership 
with its international colleagues in various spheres, “maintains and 
strengthens international rule of law” and other international values. At the 
same time, the document recognizes a priority of the national interests in 
Russian foreign policy-making (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013). The same 
holds true for the National Security Concept, which specifies the national 
interests of the Russian Federation, as well as the measures it is ready to 
implement for safeguarding the national interests and security (the National 
Security Concept, 2000). 
Just like with a discourse on the threat of ‘Religious Extremism’, a discourse on 
Russia’s ‘Great Powerness’ can be traced in a number of key directive documents 
on Russian domestic and foreign policy (the National Security Concept, 2000; the 
National Security Strategy, 2015; the Foreign Policy Concept, 2013; the Energy 
Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 (2009). The documents stress Russia’s 
importance in the world politics and outline Russia’s pursuit on restoration its place 
on the world political scene.  
In modern Russia, the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology seems to be carefully built by the 
government. A particular focus of such an ideology is made on improving and 
sustaining ‘the Great Power’ identity in Russia’s foreign affairs, rising patriotic mood 
among the Russian population, and improving the social unity. As a part of such an 
ideology, the ‘cult of Vladimir Putin’s personality’ seems to be actively promoted by 
the Kremlin. In the thesis, it is argued that that the ideological orientation of a state 
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affects its foreign policy, and it is believed that the ideology of ‘exceptionalism’ 
continues the tradition of Russian foreign policy being identity-based.  
All sources named above were accessed on-line via the Russian federal websites 
and some news agencies’ portals.  The federal website is open to public and is 
dedicated specifically to the President of the Russian Federation (www.kremlin.ru) 
with all President’s speeches and transcripts of all his meetings and press 
conferences. The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation (www.mid.ru) also provides an opportunity to explore basic documents 
on Russian domestic and foreign policies, as well as statements and speeches of 
the Foreign Minister. Both websites provide an open access and offer a selection of 
all official documents translated into English. 
Apart from the websites of the Russian President and the Foreign Minister, the 
author also accessed the websites of Russian and foreign newspapers, journals 
with input from a number of academic and government experts, and websites of the 
major information agencies in Russia and abroad. The majority of Russian media 
websites, such as Russia Today (https://www.rt.com), TASS Russian News Agency 
(http://tass.ru/en), Russia in Global Affairs (http://eng.globalaffairs.ru), Russia Direct 
(http://www.russia-direct.org) and others are translated into English. Speeches and 
official statements of the Russian government authorities are also translated into 
several languages, which make them easily approachable.  
Cultural competence was argued (Newman, 2008) to be another important element 
of a discourse analysis. According to Newman, “knowledge of language, culture, 
general social and political settings provide the researcher with cultural 
competence, although, on the other hand, there can be possible traps in being a 
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native speaker” (Newman, 2008, p. 63). In case of the present thesis, this advice is 
quite relevant, because as a Russian, the author contemplates an analysis of 
Russian foreign policy, and sometimes it has proved to be quite hard to stay 
objective. Nevertheless, in the present research, the author understands that it is a 
requirement to stay an independent observer in order to deliver a valid analysis free 
of any national sentiments. 
Discourse analysis also needs to be differentiated from a content analysis. 
According to Manheim, Rich, Willnat, Brians, and Babb, a content analysis focuses 
on “the quantitative analysis of words and on the quantitative analysis of 
grammatical constructions and phraseology used in political texts” (Manheim et al, 
2012, p. 351). At the same time, a content analysis might positively compliment 
discourse analysis. For example, a content analysis can make the argument on a 
‘Great Power’ discourse stronger. In the article t of Vladimir Putin on 30 December 
1999 – “Russia at the turn of the Millenium” (Putin, 1999), a content analysis 
presents a particular value. As per the author’s observation, the combination of 
words ‘great’, ‘greatness’, ‘great power’, ‘greatness of Russia’, ‘great achievements’, 
‘great country’ tantamount to seven times in the document. It is believed the 
statement sends a specific ideological message to the Russian people and the 
audience abroad. Moreover, it was the first official statement Vladimir Putin 
delivered at the beginning of his first Presidential term. In many ways, it identified 
the main aims formulated by Putin for his Presidency. By this article, he stressed his 
understanding of Russia as the “Great Power”, as well as his desire to improve this 
status for the country he was going to rule. The content analysis of the document is 
attached in Appendix 1 to the thesis. 
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2.3  REALISM AS THE THEORY EXPLAINING SECURITY-ORIENTED RUSSIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
There is much controversy among scholars and policy makers on the matter of 
which theoretical approach to choose for the Russian foreign policy analysis. The 
main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the expediency of using 
Neoclassical Realist theoretical perspective. Neoclassical Realist analytical 
framework is offered in order to identify the influence of certain domestic factors on 
Russian foreign policy in Syria. Generally speaking, with the help of Neoclassic 
Realism the author demonstrates that Russian foreign policy in Syria is security-
oriented. This chapter also proposes another argument that Neoclassic Realism 
represents an advanced approach within the body of the Realist theory. To prove 
that, an evolution of Realist theory from Classic Realism into  Neoclassic Realism is 
demonstrated in this chapter.  
Realism is widely regarded as the most influential theoretical approach in the body 
of International Relations (Burchil, 2001). It has complex and rich tradition of 
thought, which dates back to the writings of Thucydides (in Crane, 1998; Bugby, 
1996), as well as Niccolò Machiavelli (in Gilber, 1984; Skinner, 1981; Sulivan, 1973, 
D’Amao, 1972), Thomas Hobbes (in Hobbes, 2007), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778). Thucydides was the first to describe International Relations as 
anarchic and immoral. His works had a great impact on the way contemporary 
analysts perceive the International Relations. As argued by Kemos (1994), writings 
of the early Cold War years often derive their inspiration from the Thucydides work, 
specifically the conclusions, which Thucydides drew from his study of power and 
competition in bipolar systems. Niccolo Machiavelli, in his key works, such as "The 
Prince" (in Machiavelli and Bull, 2003) and "The Discourses" (in Machiavelli, 2005), 
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expresses his views on the manner in which a state should be run and the manner 
in which interstate relations should be conducted to achieve the best results for the 
state. 
As a school of thought, Realism contains numerous related branches, such as 
Classical Realism, Defensive and Offensive Realism, Structural Realism 
(neorealism), and Neoclassic Realism. Whereas Doyle (1990) has another view on 
Realism typology, according to which he identifies three forms of Realism: 
minimalism, fundamentalism, and structuralism. He differentiates minimalism from 
fundamentalism by saying that minimalism is less certain about the permanence of 
human nature, whereas fundamentalists claim that human nature is characterized 
by a permanent drive for power, both in domestic and International politics. 
According to Doyle, Martin Wright is an example of minimalist, while Hans 
Morgenthau’s work is an example of fundamentalism (Doyle, 1990). Structuralism 
(or Neorealism), represented mainly by Kenneth Waltz, claims that the international 
structure itself determines rational action and power seeking (Doyle, 1990). 
Classic Realism as a theory of International Relations was established in the post-
World War II, however, often associated with the names of Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Thomas Hobbes, Edward H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr (1940). 
Among Classical Realism’s leading proponents perhaps the most prominent was 
Hans Morgenthau. He takes much inspiration from earlier scholars such as 
Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbs. In his notable work  “Politics among Nations”, 
Morgenthau puts forward what he considers to be the six principles of political 
Realism (Morgenthau, 1948). According to Mearsheimer, the logic of Classic 
Realism suggests that states are the main actors in the world politics (Mearsheimer, 
2005). Moreover, according to Morgenthau, Classic Realism sees International 
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Relations as a result of human nature (Morgenthau, 1948). This argument is also 
advocated by Machiavelli and Hobbes, as they state that the human interests 
prevail over ideology (Hobes, 2007; Machiavelli, 2005; Machiavelli and Bull, 2003). 
Human nature is inherently flawed, therefore conflict occurs as a natural outcome of 
conflicting nations’ search for power. According to Carr, as reflected by 
Mearsheimer, International politics is always a power politics, and it is impossible to 
eliminate power from them (Mearsheimer, 2005). 
By contrast, Neorealist theory, advanced by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book 
“Theory of International Politics”, ignores human nature and focuses on the effects 
of the International system (Walt, 1998). For Waltz, the International system 
consists of a number of ‘Great Powers’, each seeking to survive (Waltz, 2010, p. 
79). Continuing Waltz’s thought, because the system is anarchic, as there is no 
central authority to protect states from one another, each state has to survive on its 
own (self-help system). Waltz (2010) also argues that this condition leads weaker 
states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with, more powerful rivals. With 
such a theory, Waltz hasn’t proposed a completely new framework though. He 
rather re-worked some of the already existing ideas and mixed them with new 
concepts. It is also important to note that Waltz’s Neorealism received quite a 
critical evaluation by a number of scholars, such as Ashley (1984), Keohane (1986); 
Buzan, Little and Jones (1993). As outlined by Gilpin (1986), Waltz took common 
Realist assumptions and installed a structural design around this group. Cox also 
criticizes Neorealism as being “too US-centric and time specific in its Cold War 
focus” (Cox, 1986, p. 204). Barry Buzan challenges Neorealism, arguing that it 
underestimated the importance of the regional level in International Relations 
(Soderbaum, 2012, p. 17).  
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Two structural theories derived from the Realist school are represented with 
Offensive and Defensive Realism. These two lines of thought inside the Realist 
school fundamentally disagree over whether the anarchic nature of the international 
system causes states to preserve the status quo, as Defensive Realists argue 
(Waltz, 1986; Snyder, 1991), or to maximize relative power, as Offensive Realists 
believe (Mearsheimer, 2006; Labs, 1997; Zakaria, 1992). 
One of the debates within contemporary Realism evolved around a distinction 
between Neorealism and Neoclassic Realism. The term ‘Neoclassic Realism’, was 
initially coined by Gideon Rose in 1998 (Rose, 1998). Apart from Rose, Neoclassic 
Realism theory was supported and developed by Thomas J. Christensen (1996), 
William C. Wohlworth (1993), Asle Toje (2012), Tom Dyson (2010), Jeffrey W. 
Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M Ripsman (2009). Under Rose, Neoclassic 
Realism “explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and 
systematizing certain insights drawn from Classic Realist thought” (Rose, 1998, p. 
44). Its adherents also argue that the scope and ambition of country’s foreign policy 
are driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically 
by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are Realist. However, the 
impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because 
systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit 
level. This is why they are Neoclassic (Rose, 1998, p. 44).  
Neoclassic Realism, in general, can be seen as a universal approach incorporating 
main properties of the Realist theory. Moreover, Neoclassic Realism offers a multi-
level approach. On the one hand, it derives from Neorealism an idea that systemic 
factors determine the general direction of policy. On the other hand, like other 
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Realist theories, Neoclassic Realism is state-centric and holds that competition for 
power and influence between states in an anarchic international system is the most 
significant feature that defines international politics.  
Neoclassic Realism also addresses the dependence of state’s foreign policy on its 
domestic matters. This point is developed more below. Apart from that, it also 
shares another Classic Realism assumption that foreign policy is made at the state 
level by political leaders. According to Neoclassical Realists, state’s foreign policy is 
typically formulated by a small group of senior leaders and officials, often referred to 
as the ‘foreign policy executive’ (Rathbun, 2008). Therefore, Neoclassic Realism 
approach utilises a multi-level analysis, one that scrutinises both the state unit and 
the system unit it is embedded in.  
Initially, the idea of multi-level approach was advocated by Edward Carr (1964). If 
one imagines a state in the international system as a ship, all components matter in 
its operation at the sea: the captain of the ship (the individual level), the size, 
technical attributes of the ship (the state level), as well as the weather, sea 
condition, as well as other ships, how they interact with each other during their 
navigation (the system level). A ship sails normally provided all ‘the systems’ 
operate in a uniform way. Just like with the navigation of the ship, state’s foreign 
policy can be analysed in a scrutiny of the International system environment (the 
system level), the state’s domestic policy implications (the state level), as well as 
the decision-making of the state’s leaders (the individual level).  
It is crucial to understand that on the one hand, Neoclassic Realism shares with 
Classic Realism and Neorealism the basic assumptions about the nature of the 
International Relations, which are fundamental to the Realist paradigm. On the 
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other hand, Neoclassic Realism holds that, while the distribution of power within the 
international system is the key independent variable in determining the range of 
state’s foreign policy (the dependent variable), it is conditioned by the interplay of 
‘intervening variables’ within the state itself. These ‘intervening variables’ can be the 
perceptions of its leaders, the system of the government, or others. Tatyana 
Romanova suggests that a broad definition of Neoclassic Realism would describe it 
as a search for an answer to why the pressures of global and regional factors 
produce a certain type of foreign policy (Romanova, 2012). If we remember the 
famous metaphor of a 'billiard ball', Neoclassical Realism contends that the 
properties of a 'billiard ball' affect the tactics of state’s actions. In other words, 
foreign policy of a country is determined by its domestic structure and factors, as 
well as the external environment (Northedge, 1986).  Therefore, foreign policy to a 
large extent is the product of a complex process of interaction between internal 
(domestic) and external factors. Both, domestic factors, along with external 
variables, form the operational environment of foreign policy-making. Sebastian 
Harnisch (2012) notes how some scholars contend that external pressures alone 
are inadequate to explain the trajectory of Russia’s foreign policy. That means that 
domestic factors often serve as a bridge between external forces and foreign policy 
choices. Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda continue this thought by saying that any 
study of the International Relations mostly focuses on the International systemic 
level, while domestic factors are most often treated as residual (Malcolm, Pravda, 
Allison, Light, 1996). In this way, Neoclassic Realism provides a solution, as it also 
considers the effects of domestic factors on state's foreign policy. 
One of the core arguments of this thesis is that Russian foreign policy in Syria is the 
product of an interplay between key variables (historical ties between two states, 
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military interests, economic interests, strategic considerations, domestic security 
implications, as well as desire to sustain ‘the Great Power’ status in the region and 
in the world politics). In this thesis, it is suggested that Russian foreign policy in 
Syria is identity-based and security-oriented, therefore the effects of Russia’s 
domestic security implications and its desire to improve and sustain ‘the Great 
Power’ status in the world politics are stressed.  
With regards to the effect of one independent variable (domestic security 
implications) on the dependent variable (Russian foreign policy), few developments 
need to be taken into account. It was argued that the Arab revolutions have 
drastically changed the situation not just in the Middle East, but also globally 
(Malashenko, 2013). The revolutions intensified the confrontation between Russia 
and the Western countries (the US and its EU allies in particular). The Arab Spring 
also gave impulse for legitimation of the ‘Islamism’ in the Muslim world, which forms 
one of the major Russia’s concerns. As Russian analyst Georgy Mirsky said, the 
“Arab world is a testing ground for the radical political Islam” (Mirsky, 2013). It is 
true that the Arab Spring revolutions have serious domestic implications for Russia. 
According to Alexey Malashenko, “the triumph of the ‘Islamism’ in the Arab Spring 
has resonated with the Russian Muslim population and encouraged development of 
the opposition movements within the community” (Malashenko, 2013). There is a 
common thought that the victories of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the 
Islamist Ennahda Party in Tunisia, as well as the participation of the ‘Islamists’ in 
the Libyan new government and their growing activeness in general, gave the 
Russian Muslims the impression that these ‘Islamists’ could potentially become their 
allies (Malashenko, 2013; Matynyuk, 2012). The success of ‘Islamists’ abroad, and 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, also raises the question of the attitudes toward 
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the Islamic opposition within Russia itself. As Malashenko (2013) argues, the wave 
of protests and demonstrations followed immediately. The protesters called for the 
overthrow of the Russian government in the city of Kazan in August 2012, as well 
as during the demonstration in Dagestan in February 2013. Overall the Arab Spring 
revolutions and subsequent rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ marked an increase in 
terrorist activities in Russia, for example: the assassination of mufti, Ildus Faizov, 
and Islam’s main ideologue in the Volga region, Valiulla Yakupov, in Kazan, July 
2012; general raise in the ‘Islamists’ activity in the Republic of Bashkortostan 
(Malashenko, 2013; Malashenko, 2013; Suleimanov). A further change in the 
Middle East countries quite possibly can strengthen the ‘Islamist’ activities across 
the Russian regions and destabilize the domestic security situation in the country in 
general. This matter is discussed more in subsequent chapters. 
Another serious concern Russia has with regards to the ‘Islamist’ activities in the 
Arab Spring and Syria in particular, is mainly evolves around the fact that many 
‘Islamists’ from Russia are taking part in the Syrian conflict on the side of so-called 
Islamic State. As the President of the Religion and Society Information and Analysis 
Center, Alexey Grishin points out, “Middle Eastern Islamists are providing tangible 
support to their coreligionists in Russia” (Grishin, 2012). This support might evolve 
into direct sponsorship of the Islamists’ activities on the territory of the Russian 
Federation, where numerous Muslim populations live. The situation in Chechnya, 
which was the main source of instability in the region for years, at the moment is 
quite stable, however, how Macej Falkowski (2014) observes, it is to a great extent 
an illusion. A serious economic or political crisis in the Russian Federation might 
cause ‘unfreezing’ of the Caucasian problems, which may explode with a new 
strength (Falkowski, 2014). It is also outlined by Suchkov (2014), that ‘Islamists’ in 
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the Caucasus have significant ties and find inspiration in the Islamic State (IS), 
which has particular plans involving the Russian Caucasus in the future. In such a 
way, one of the purposes of Russia’s policy in Syria is to stop the spread of 
‘Religious Extremism’ and foreign fighters from the Middle East to Russia. 
Therefore, Russia’s concerns regarding the ‘Islamists’ in the Middle East and their 
effect on the Russian Muslim populated regions don’t seem groundless.  
 
2.4  CONSTRUCTIVISM AS THE THEORY EXPLAINING HOW THE NATIONAL 
IDENTITY FORMS RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
This chapter explains how the Constructivist theory forms the argument that 
Russian foreign policy in Syria is also identity-based. This chapter starts with a 
general discussion of the Constructivist theory evolution and then outlines main 
arguments of Constructivist theory, which, help to build the argument of the thesis. 
This chapter proves a hypothesis that one of the key sources of Russian foreign 
policy in Syria is the desire of Russian political establishment to re-build and sustain 
‘the Great Power’ identity in the Middle Eastern region in general, and in Syria in 
particular. Constructivist theory is also used because it better explains both the 
emergence of the phenomenon of the Russian identity and its instrumental use by 
the political elites in the foreign policy decision-making.   
The Cold War challenged the mainstream theorizing in the International Relations 
and forced the scholars to re-evaluate the main approaches in the field. As argued 
by Jackson and Sorensen (2010), it soon became clear that the Neorealist theory is 
not clear about the future developments of the balance of power. Perhaps the crisis 
in the Realist theory served as a catalyst for the Constructivist theory development. 
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Some scholars (Pass, 2004) tie the emergence of the Constructivist theory with the 
names of a Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, and a Russian psychologist and 
philosopher in the 1930's Lev Vygotsky. If the former develops cognitive 
Constructivism, the later is most often associated with the Social Constructivist 
theory based on social interaction, which plays a fundamental role in the 
development of cognition. However, as noted by Jackson and Sorensen (2010), 
Constructivism has rather deeper roots. It also grows out of the old methodology 
that can be traced back at least to the 18th-century writings of the Italian philosopher 
Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), and the British idealist philosopher George 
Berkeley (1685-1753). Ernst von Glasersfeld contends, “Vico changed the concept 
of human knowledge by saying that the natural world is made by God, but the 
historical world is made by Man” (Glasersfeld, 2007, p. 91). It seems that by saying 
that, Vico supposed that history is created by men and women rather than being 
some kind of unfolding or evolving process that is external to the human affairs. 
Moreover, as mentioned by Jackson and Sorensen, “states are artificial creations 
and the state system is artificial too; it is made by men and women and if they want 
to, they can change it and develop it in new ways” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010, p. 
162). British Philosopher George Berkeley, developed a theory of so-called 
‘immaterialism’, which denies the existence of material substance, contending that 
some familiar objects “are only ideas in the minds of perceivers” (Armstrong, 1989, 
p. 34; Atherton, 1990, p. 110). Nevertheless, Onuf was the first theorist, who 
introduced the term ‘Constructivism’ in the field of International Relations in 1989. 
According to the argument offered by Onuf, states, much the same as individuals, 
are living in a “world of our making” (Onuf, 1989, p. 15), where many entities such 
as ‘social facts’ are made by human action, as opposed to “brute facts, that do not 
	 62	
depend for their existence on human action but rather are phenomena of human 
condition” (Searle, 1995, p. 67). Although Onuf was the one who introduced the 
concept in the field of International Relations, Wendt developed it into a uniform 
theory, which questions on the key assumptions of Realism and Liberalism.  
It is worth saying that Constructivism is critical of the International Relations theory 
in general, and its contemporary structural variants, Neorealism and Liberalism, in 
particular. Kowert contends that both Neorealism and Liberalism “are poorly 
equipped to explore normativity in international politics” (Kowert, 2001, p. 158). 
According to Tsygankov (2005), there are two problems with Realist and Liberal 
understanding of foreign policy. First, both theories tend to emphasize one aspect of 
the international system at the expense of others (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 12). 
Secondly, both Realism and Liberalism are ethnocentric in the sense that they view 
Russia's foreign policy through similar Western culture and do not sufficiently pay 
attention to the Russian indigenous history and system (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 12). 
When it comes to the analysis of Russian foreign policy, it seems to be a mistake to 
dismiss the Russian identity. The reason for such an assumption is that Russian 
foreign policy in many ways seems to be inherently identity-based. This issue is 
explained in details in subsequent chapters through a historical background. 
The Constructivist theory developed by Alexander Wendt (1999) mainly challenges 
the most dominant at that time the Realist theory, in particular, the main Realist 
assumption stresses the primacy of anarchy and the distribution of relative power 
(the Materialist Ontology) in the world politics. Wendt labels Waltz’s Neorealism as 
“individualist and materialist” because it “misses what is often a more determinant 
factor, namely, the intersubjectively shared ideas that shape behavior by 
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constituting the identities and interests of actors” (Wendt, 1999, p. 35). In other 
words, as noticed by Jackson and Sorensen, “the well-known ‘billiard ball image’ of 
the international system is rejected by Constructivists because it fails to reveal the 
thoughts, ideas, and beliefs of the actors involved in international conflicts. 
Constructivists want to probe “the inside of ‘the billiard balls” in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of such conflicts” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010, p. 162).  
Another core argument of Constructivism is built on objecting the Neorealist 
argument about the anarchy. In his famous article of the early 1990s, Alexander 
Wendt argued that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or 
causally from anarchy, therefore self-help is a result of a process, rather than 
structure (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). In other words, self-help and power politics are 
institutions, not essential features of anarchy. According to Wendt, anarchy is more 
“what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992, p. 395). Thus, Constructivist argument 
mainly rests on an assumption that a structure of the international system is 
primarily social rather than material.  
According to Kenneth Waltz, “what matters is only the number and power of states” 
(Waltz, 1986, p. 70).   If one follows that materialist logic, structural changes are 
seen in terms of changes in the number and power of states in the international 
system. Wendt (1999) contends that such logic explains the structural change only 
in one sense. Constructivism defines the political structure as a social rather than 
material phenomenon.  According to Alexander Wendt, “the Ontology of 
international life is idealist and holist”, therefore “structures of the human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces 
and identities, and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared 
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ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999, p. 310). To Constructivists, the 
social world is not something that is given: it is not something ‘out there’ existing 
independent of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it (Wendt, 1999; 
Hopf, 1998). Conversely, according to Constructivism, a social world is a world of 
human consciousness: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages 
and discourses, of signs, signals and understandings among human beings, 
especially groups of human beings, such as states and nations. Moreover, 
according to Constructivism, such a social world can only be understood in contexts 
of everyday interactions and socio-historical development. Moreover, in the world of 
human interactions, beliefs and emotions are often behind decisions. Therefore it 
might well be suggested that foreign policy action is a social phenomenon and 
cannot be adequately understood without fully exploring the context in which it is 
formed. This idea is also advocated by Roxanne Doty (1996), Ted Hopf (1998), and 
Peter Katzenstein (1996).  
Following the Constructivists logic, structured by Wendt, “each actor has many 
identities linked to institutional roles; these identities are a basis of interests” 
(Wendt, 1999, p. 398). In other words, interests presuppose identities because an 
actor cannot know what he wants until he knows himself. Therefore, identities 
become crucial in the Constructivist analysis because they provide the basis for 
interests. How it is argued by Wendt (1999), actors do not have “the portfolio of 
interests”, instead they define their interests in the process of social interaction. 
Constructivists also focus on constitutive processes and argue that identities are 
always in the process of being formed and reformed. As Christian Reus-Smit 
mentions, “this emphasis on identity formation differs from the rationalists’ approach 
which takes interests and identities as pre-given” (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 209). 
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Despite the popularity of the Constructivist approach in the International Relations 
theory, it is still criticized by many scholars. According to Yücel Bozdaglioglu (2007), 
the major critics come from the Realist school, which blames Constructivism for 
being empirically and methodologically wrong. This group is mainly represented by 
Barkin (2010), Zehfuss (2001), Copeland (2000). Other criticism is mainly targeted 
at questioning the nature of Constructivism. In particular, it is said that 
Constructivism is not a theory, but a “research program that supplements Realism 
rather than supplanting it” (Desch, 1998, p. 141). Houghton (2007), for instance, 
suggests that Constructivism does not form a single unified perspective, but rather 
constitutes a general social scientific framework, which is not a ‘theory’ as such. 
Fred Chernoff even calls Constructivism “a mostly interpretive metatheory stemming 
from the works of such philosophers as Wilhelm Dilthey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and 
R. G. Collingwood” (Chernoff, 2008, p. 68). Finally, other critics (Jackson) contend 
that a growing body of research on Constructivism shows that the problem with 
contemporary Constructivism is that it was initially dominated by Liberalism and 
Idealism (Jackson, 2004, p. 337). Despite the critics, Constructivism has proved to 
be useful in contemplating the foreign policy analysis.  
The author’s understanding of Russian foreign policy goes along with Andrei 
Tsygankov's (2014) postulate that contemplation of the Russian foreign policy 
analysis requires exploring an identity-based interpretation of a state’s international 
behaviour, as all national governments are, to a certain extent, open to the influence 
of ideas across the political and intellectual spectrum. In this thesis, the author tests 
the hypothesis of Russian foreign policy being identity-based. Chapter III of this 
thesis is devoted to discussing this point in details.  
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It is also essential to determine the concept of the national identity, and its sources, 
although it has proved to be rather complicated. As Phillip Gleason noticed, “the 
meaning of identity as we currently use it is not well captured by dictionary 
definitions, which reflect older senses of the word” (Gleason, 1983, p. 910). The 
same holds true for the Russian national identity concept, which, is noticed by 
Ponsard to “lack any commonly agreed definition” (Ponsard, 2006, p. 6). The author 
agrees with Lionel Ponsard (2006), that the Russian identity is based on what are 
traditionally considered as the fundamental components of the identity concept, 
namely history, geography, ethnicity, culture, and religion. It is also argued 
(Likhacheva, 2014) that, Russia has always been characterized by cultural and 
national openness, which became the foundation of the multi-ethnic state of the 
Russian civilization. Moreover, there seems to be a significant link between Russian 
geographical position as a Eurasian power in the world and its national identity. 
Ponsard (2006) recalls to famous Russian writers, Fyodor Dostoevsky and 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who argued that the Russian land is the symbol of the 
Russian identity. According to them, “the Russian steppe, the Siberian taiga, and 
the peasant villages are all inherent features of this identity” (Ponsard, 2006, p. 8). 
Moreover, it is contended by a number of scholars (Sakwa, 2009; Isakova, 2004; 
Krejci, 2007), that Russia has the unique geographical and geopolitical position, as 
its land stretches across both Europe and Asia. In the present research, the author 
suggests adding two components into the concept of the Russian identity, which is 
economy, and the political leadership as two additional components of the Russian 
identity. 
Russian identity today is in many ways the product of historical determinants. 
Throughout its historical evolution, Russia had a strong belief in its ‘exceptionalism’. 
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Even after the demise of the USSR in 1991, which in many ways was a landmark 
event for Russian domestic and foreign policies, Russia continued representing 
itself as a powerful member of the international society. This tendency improved 
significantly with Vladimir Putin appointment as the President in 2000. In the thesis, 
it is argued that under the rule of Vladimir Putin the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology has 
been formed. This matter is discussed more in chapter III of this thesis. One of the 
components of this ideology is ‘the Great Power’ identity, and, according to 
‘exceptionalist’ ideology, such an identity needs to be improved and sustained both 
domestically, and internationally. The quite similar idea is developed by Angela 
Stent (2013), who believes that under Putin, Russia developed a new national idea, 
largely based on the traditional nationalism and the Orthodox Church, one that 
stresses Russia’s unique path as a ‘Great Power’ and rejects the Western definition 
of democracy and human rights.  
Russia’s support to Assad also to great extent is formulated by a logic of supporting 
Russia’s allies. Russia’s friendship with Syria dates back to the Soviet Union time. 
Since then two states developed quite stable and trustful relations, including military 
and economic cooperation, as well as cultural bonds. This topic is discussed in 
details in chapter VI, part 6.2. Supporting loyal allies to great extent forms part of 
Russian national identity. In this regards, Syria hasn’t become an exception. From 
the beginning of a conflict in Syria, Russia has played a strategic role in mediating 
the crisis. Such a status, on the one hand, significantly sustains Russia’s image on 
the international stage. On the other hand, a certain sense of honor is formed by 
fulfilling the mission to help its most loyal Russia’s allies. This argument is 
propagated by former Russia’s UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, who stated in his 
interview for Foreign Policy journal that: it is “a matter of national honor to stand up 
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for Russia’s friends” (Lynch, 2015). He also added that “being a Russian diplomat, 
for us, if you have good relations with a country, a government, for years, for 
decades, then it’s not so easy to ditch those politicians and those governments 
because of political expediency” (Lynch, 2015). In Syria, for about four years since 
the beginning of the conflict, the Russia’s position remained essentially unchanged 
and was limited essentially to diplomatic support. However, in September 2015, 
Russia resourced for a military intervention, by which invoked further political 
opposition by the US and its European allies. This matter is discussed in more 
details in chapter VI, part 6.3. 
CONCLUSION 
The intellectual debate concerning the nature of the Russian civilization and 
Russian foreign policy remains quite intense. Different scholars propose different 
theories explaining the Russian foreign policy approach. This chapter shall be seen 
as an attempt to systematize all theories, which have been used through times for 
the analysis of Russian foreign policy and the nature of Russian politics in general. 
It is offered to divide those theories into five broad groups: mainstream approaches, 
ideology-driven approaches, Nationalist approaches, Geopolitically-oriented 
approaches; and Western-oriented approaches.  
The group of mainstream approaches basically serves as an umbrella uniting basic 
theories of International Relations, such as Realism, Liberalism, and 
Constructivism. All these theories can be used as a theoretical approach to 
analyzing different aspects of the Russian foreign policy. However, in this thesis, the 
author uses a synthesis of Neoclassic Realism and Constructivism as the 
theoretical background. In particular, Neoclassic Realism is used for explanation of 
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security-oriented Russian foreign policy in Syria, while Constructivism serves as a 
theory for analysis of identity-based Russian foreign policy in relation to Syria. 
In an analysis of Ideologically-driven approaches, the main focus is made on a case 
of the Soviet Union, and the Marxist-Leninist ideology, which dominated the Soviet 
domestic and foreign policies at that time. It is also proved that ideologically-based 
approaches for the Russian foreign policy analysis haven’t lost their applicability in 
modern Russia. In particular, it was contended that contemporary ideologically-
driven approaches in Russia unite Neo-Communists, who are mainly represented 
by the Communist Party and its leader Gennadi Zyuganov. 
When it comes to the Nationalist approaches, they are presented through the prism 
of a scholarly debate between Slavophiles (Pan-Slavists) and Westernizers. It is 
outlined that these two theoretical currents disagreed on the nature of the Russian 
civilization. It is also contended that the Slavophile philosophy was not abandoned 
in later years, and in the 20th century was represented by the Civilisationist school, 
and in the 21st century – by the Nationalists and mainly by their so-called ‘radical’ 
wing, Neo-Imperialists. In this chapter, It is also outlined other main concepts, which 
were offered in Russia within the body of the Nationalist approaches, including the 
concept of ‘liberal empire’ by Anatoly Chubais, and the concept of ‘sovereign 
democracy’ by Vladislav Surkov. 
Within the group of the Western-oriented approach to Russian foreign policy, the 
author discusses the Westernizers’ philosophical approach, which is, by its nature, 
opposite to the one proposed by Slavophiles in the 19th century, and the Atlanticist 
approach, which was mainly promoted in Russia by Mikhail Gorbachev and Andrey 
Kozyrev between 1980s and throughout 1990s.   
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The Eurasianist school of thought is also addressed and mainly represented it in 
connection with the names of Yevgeny Primakov and Aleksandr Dugin.  
This chapter also outlines a methodological approach and a method of the present 
study. With regards to the methodological orientation of this thesis, it is explained 
how a theoretical synthesis of Neoclassic Realism and Constructivism is applied as 
a conceptual framework of the present study. A problematic nature of a theoretical 
pluralism in the field of International Relations is also addressed, as well as the 
limitations during its use in the present analysis. The reasons to chose a theoretical 
synthesis over an analytic eclecticism for the present research project were 
explained. 
This chapter also outlines an orientation with regards to methods of a research. It is 
explained why the study doesn’t include interviews, and why the focus is made 
mainly on a political discourse analysis, and a content analysis. It also addresses 
the problems and limitations connected with a discourse analysis, including 
problems with terminology, the application of a discourse analysis in the research 
and a general procedure of using a discourse analysis as a method of research. 
The last two parts of this chapter explain the choice of synthesising Neoclassic 
Realism and Constructivism for analysing Russian foreign policy in Syria. In both 
parts, the knowledge of both the Realist school and the Constructivist school is 
systematised. Moreover, the evolution of the Realist theory from Classic Realism 
into Neoclassic Realism is demonstrated. In the Part dedicated to Constructivism. It 
explains why it has been chosen as a theoretical base for explaining the 
phenomena of the Russian national identity. It also argues how the Russian national 
identity, and the sense of ‘Great Power’ affect Russian foreign policy in Syria.  
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CHAPTER III. IDENTITY-BASED RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
3.1 PHENOMENON OF THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
The term identity is complex. The definition proposed by the Valdai Group 
represents the national identity as “a sense of belonging to a certain state or nation, 
which is shared with a group of people regardless of their country of citizenship” 
(Valdai Discussion Club Report, 2014). When it comes to defining the Russian 
national identity, a few matters need to be addressed. Firstly, as Vera Tolz argues, 
that Russia’s nation-building process, which represents the search to define the “us” 
and the “other” of the Russian state, has always been and remains a priority for the 
Russian political and intellectual elites in the post-Soviet era (Tolz, 2004, p. 160). 
Nevertheless, most part of the Russian history there was a certain ambiguity in 
regards to the distinct Russian identity. Ilya Prizel outlines historical tendency of 
differentiation between ‘rossiskii’ (of the lands of Rus) and ‘russkii’ (ethnic Russian)” 
(Prizel, 1998, p. 164). The equation of the terms ‘narod’ (the people) with 
‘gosudarstvo’ (the state) also reflects this ambiguity (Prizel, 1998). 
In general, the sense of the national identity plays a vital role in the formation of 
foreign policy. As argued by Prizel (1998), a sense of the nation and the national 
identity helps to define the parameters of what a polity considers its national 
interests at home and abroad. Ted Hopf confirms this thesis by saying that, 
“identities tell others who you are and tell you who others are, and in doing that, 
identities imply a particular set of interests or/and preferences with respect to 
choices of action” (Hopf, 1998, p. 171). In case of Russia, ‘Great Power’ identity 
forms certain choices when making foreign policy decisions. In particular, in many 
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official speeches of key Russian politicians, there is a stress on Russia pursuing so-
called sovereign foreign policy. By this, Russian officials try to demonstrate an 
independence in foreign policy-making, and that Russian foreign policy decisions 
mainly serve to satisfy Russian national interests.  
Overall, the Russian identity is a complex phenomenon. Moreover, it is argued 
(Ponsard, 2006), that the notion of the Russian identity still lacks any commonly 
agreed definition. Nevertheless, it seems possible to define the Russian identity 
based on its unique characteristics. Among these characteristics Ponsard (2006) 
suggests to include some fundamental components of the identity concept, namely 
history, geography, ethnicity, culture, and religion. Below these components are 
discussed in more details.  
 
Geography 
According to Bobo Lo (2015), geography is the component that contributes to the 
Russian political culture. Ponsard (2006) also agrees that there is a certain link 
between a geographical position in the world and the national identity. It is true that 
geography defined Russia as one of the world’s leading powers since the mid-18th 
century. Overall, Russia’s geographical size, and the fact that the country stretches 
“almost the length of Eurasia” (Lo, 2015, p. 102), affects Russia’s self-perception of 
being a Eurasian power and significantly nurtures the sense of ‘Greatness’ in the 
Russian identity. Territory, as a component of the Russian identity, is also 
problematic though. Such a problematic nature results from a debate on whether 
Russia belongs to Asia or Eurasia (Bassin, Glebov, Laruelle, 2015; Szvak, 2010; 
Goodrich, 2008; Bell, 2002). It is worth saying that the origins of the Eurasianist 
school are rooted in this debate.  
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Multiplicity of ethnicities & nationalities  
Throughout history, Russia has been a multi-ethnic state and remains so in modern 
times. Nowadays the Russian Federation is a very ethnically mixed state and 
comprises of more than 100 distinct nationalities and several of the world’s major 
religions. As Bobo Lo contends, “Russia is not European or Asian, Christian or 
Muslim, it is all those things” (Lo, 2015, p. 105).  Such a development offers a 
perspective to see the nature of the Russian national identity as ‘chameleonic’.  This 
idea finds a confirmation in practice of the Russian political establishment. For 
example, it was argued (Lo, 2015), that President Putin quite often exploits the so-
called “transcending nature” of the Russian identity for concrete ends. In particular, 
he stresses Russia as a part of the European civilization when it is engaged with the 
EU while emphasizing Russia’s Asian identity when cooperating with the Asian 
countries (Lo, 2015, p. 105). Such a ‘double-faced’ nature of the Russian national 
identity in many ways forms part of its ‘exceptionalist’ ideology in today’s Russia. 
Russia, from its earliest days as a state, has always been a multinational 
conglomerate. Even the Ancient Rus’ between the 9th to the 13th centuries brought 
together around 22 different nationalities. As found by Sakharov (1998), the 
Muscovite state incorporated lands inhabited by people of various linguistic groups. 
Since the 16th and 17th centuries, the centralized Russian state included the Volga 
Khanates, Siberia, part of the Northern Caucasus - all inhabited by numerous 
nationalities, and also the territory of Ukraine. Imperial Russia completed the 
formation of a huge multinational state, which included the peoples of the 
Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the Baltic regions, the South-West lands, Poland and 
Finland.  Some of these lands and nationalities were forcibly brought into Russia. 
As argued by Sakharov, in each case their entry into Russia was a dramatic one 
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and marked a turning point in each people’s history (Sakharov, 1998). As a result, 
Sakharov also contends that all Russian governments, from ancient times up to the 
20th century, were forced to follow flexible nationalities policies in different contexts 
in order to maintain the unity of the huge multinational state and, later, the huge 
empire (Sakharov, 1998, p. 8). That is, however, remains as uneasy task even in 
modern time, and often works rather ineffectively.  
 
History and historical memory 
The basic premises of Russian foreign policy have been shaped by Russia’s 
historical experience.  It was argued (Ponsard, 2006), that the Russian identity 
today is in many ways is the product of historical determinants. The term ‘historical 
determinants’ shall be used as an umbrella term uniting important periods of the 
Russian history (Kievan Rus’, Tsarist Russia, Imperial Russia, Soviet Russia or 
USSR, RSFSR, the Russian Federation), important dates (Adoption of Christianity 
in 988 by Vladimir, the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and others), the dates of major 
military battles, as well as dates when some key political decisions or reforms were 
taken (First Constitution in Russia, first time when judiciary became an independent 
branch of government in 1864 and others). It is important to say that for a great part 
of its history Russia was one of the largest and strongest Empires in world history. 
That fact affected the formation of ‘the Great Power’ identity. The same holds true 
for modern Russia. ‘The Great Power’ identity has become a part of the 
‘exceptionalist’ ideology in today’s Russia. As it was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the ideology in many ways has become so-called ‘a product’ of a new 
direction for Russia initiated by Vladimir Putin. A particular focus of the 
‘exceptionalist’ ideology is made on sustaining of ‘the Great Power’ identity in 
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Russia’s foreign affairs, rising patriotic mood among the Russian population and 
improvement of social unity. As a part of such ideology, the ‘cult’ of Vladimir Putin’s 
personality is carefully created by the Kremlin. As per the author’s observation, the 
Russian political figures regularly stress ‘the Greatness’ of Russia in their public 
speeches. It is believed that it has a purpose of affecting the public opinion and 
bolstering patriotism and a sense of pride among the Russians.  
 
Religion 
Orthodoxy also embodied a sense of a nation and identity in Russia. The Russian 
Orthodox Church played the crucial role throughout the Russian history. During the 
Tsarist period, the Church was largely exploited in many imperial ceremonies. The 
monarchs were religious and insisted all people follow their example. As Mark 
Steinberg (2007) notes, ‘the Holy Synod’ [a ruling body of the Orthodox Church] 
was aimed at converting the Russian people and society to a religious form of social 
thought and action through the wide dissemination of religious reading matter, by 
sponsoring a network of parish primary schools, and by encouraging the opening of 
new monasteries, convents, and charitable institutions.  
The Orthodox Church was oppressed at the turn of the 20th century. The Soviet 
regime established atheism, which was followed by the anti-religious campaign, 
when the church property was confiscated, believers and the church’s 
representatives (bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans) were prosecuted and 
harassed. Nevertheless, when the Nazis attacked Russia in 1941, Stalin revived the 
Russian Orthodox Church to raise the patriotic support for the people. Further 
periods were marked by a gradual revival of the Church and the Orthodox faith. In 
the post-Soviet era, as argued by Zigon (2013), the Russian Orthodox Church has 
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re-established itself as one of the most stable and influential cultural institutions in 
the Russian Federation. 
Nowadays, Orthodoxy is the predominant religion of the Russian state. Even though 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Articles 13 and 14, the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, 1993) stipulates that Russia is a secular state and that no 
religion may be established as compulsory or as the state religion, the Orthodox 
Russian Church occupies a leading public and legal position among all other 
religious institutions in Russia. The Church enjoys support from the state. Moreover, 
as argued by Codevilla, the state uses the Church as an instrument of “shaping a 
national patriotic idea with Orthodoxy as its basis (Codevilla, 2008). 
 
3.2 HISTORICAL CONTINUITY IN IDENTITY-BASED RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
This part is dedicated to providing an evidence base in confirmation of the thesis’s 
argument that throughout the Russian history, ‘the Great Power’ identity played the 
key role in domestic and foreign policy-making. The first united East Slavic state, 
called the Kievan Rus’, was founded in 882 by ‘knyaz’ [Grand Prince] Oleg. It was 
from Byzantine, whose center was Constantinople, that the Eastern Orthodox 
branch of Christianity was introduced into Rus’ (Petro and Rubinstein, 1996). It is, 
however, argued that as the only major Orthodoxy country at that time, Russia 
“used its religious uniqueness to define the rest of Christendom as the ‘other” 
(Prizel, 1998, p. 32). Prizel also contends, that ”by virtue of being the only ‘true’ 
Christian country, it claimed the right to project its influence beyond its frontiers” 
(Prizel, 1998, p. 32).  
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The sense of ‘uniqueness’ or ‘exceptionalism’ was active in later years as well. 
From the time of Ivan III reign, tsars [the monarch] nurtured the view of Moscow as 
‘the Third Rome’ (after Rome, and Constantinople), after which there would be no 
fourth (Wren and Stults, 2009). Nikolai Petro and Alvin Rubinstein suggest that, 
although this doctrine was often interpreted as a political manifesto, in reality, it was 
a theological speculation about the Orthodox faith (Petro and Rubenstein, 1996). 
Whereas Edward Keenan suggests that the doctrine of ‘the Third Rome’ was 
utilized as a justification for the imperial expansion (in Prizel, 1998). The Keenan’s 
(1998) argument that the doctrine was abused to justify the territorial expansion, 
which was in priority at that time, seems to be correct.  
Russia became the empire in 1552-56, when Ivan IV captured Kazan and 
Astrakhan, incorporating non-Orthodox and non-Russian-speaking people into the 
Russian state. Although many historians date the emergence of Russian Empire to 
1721, at the time when Peter I The Great proclaimed himself the first Emperor of 
Russia. It seems that a distinct Russian identity started to emerge after the 
Napoleonic wars of 1812-15 and was also reinforced by the flowering of the 
Russian music, painting, and literature in the 19th century.  
The 19th century also signified the birth of the intellectual debate concerning the 
nature of Russian civilization – the debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers. 
Philosophical orientations of these schools were discussed in chapter 2.1. In terms 
of foreign policy, both Westernizers and Slavophiles were committed to expanding 
the Russian empire and supported the methods used by Russian tsars in that 
process. In other words, imperialistic wars were welcome by both groups. For 
example, the Great Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky stated, “wars were fought in 
the pursuit of a sacred idea of Russia’s Universalist Christian mission that would 
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ultimately lead to perpetual peace” (in Prizel, 2006, p. 170). Among other famous 
Russian intellectuals who supported Russian imperialism were: Aleksandr Herzen, 
poets Aleksandr Pushkin, Bestuzhev-Marlinski, Lermontov, Russian composers 
Rimsky-Korsakov, Balakirev, Mussorgsky (Prizel, 2006). 
It also shall be noted that war played a rather important role in the formation of the 
Russian identity. By the same token, it affected security orientation of Russian 
foreign policy throughout years. On the one hand, war always served as a chance 
to demonstrate Russia’s military power and ‘Greatness’. Russia, under Peter the 
Great, ended Sweden’s pretensions to the ‘Great Power’ status. Russia broke 
Napoleon’s power and the Hitler’s Third Reich. Moreover, with wars, and 
subsequent territorial gains, the country expanded its territory. As a result, by the 
end of the 19th century, the size of the Empire reached about 22,400,000 square 
kilometers or almost 1/6 of the Earth's landmass (Jahn, 2004). Military victories won 
over the centuries were also a source of the national pride. Moreover, through wars, 
the Russians were proud of the fact that their country played an influential role in 
the World Politics. 
Another important aspect of war was that it nurtured and improved a sense of the 
national identity. As argued by Jahn, the unity of the Russian people was especially 
strong at the time of war, or at imminent risk of war (Jahn, 2004). It is essential to 
consider as an example the great heroism of the Russian people at the time of the 
World War II, as it seems to reach the high point of the unity of the Russian people. 
However, as Guroff and Guroff (1994) contend, it was also an example of a paradox 
of the Russian people. Guroff and Guroff explain that “victory over Nazi Germany is 
the greatest achievement of the Russian people, while the losses incurred are their 
greatest tragedy” (Guroff and Guroff, 1994, p. 88). It should be noticed that the 
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Russian leaders often manipulated with the patriotism of the Russian people. For 
example, Stalin speculated the Russian patriotism to aid the war efforts. Another 
example is how the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917. In their mission to force the 
Tsar to abdicate the Imperial throne, the Bolsheviks used the nationalist sentiments 
as a tool. As Prizel notes, Lenin manipulated nationalism as a tool of weakening the 
Romanov’s dynasty (Prizel, 1998).  
The type of political regime affects a foreign policy direction of a state. According to 
Wallander (1996), the institutions and processes of the political order preclude 
certain policies and tend to produce other. The term ‘ideology’ is one, which is more 
often used than defined though. The Soviet Philosophical Dictionary (1954), calls 
ideology “a system of definite views, ideas, conceptions, and notions adhered to by 
some class or political party” (in Hunt, 1991, p. 102). Throughout the Russian 
history, perhaps the time of the Soviet rule can serve as an example of when 
ideology fully controlled foreign policy. In modern Russia, as it is mentioned above, 
the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology is promoted by the government.  
The USSR fall has become a landmark event for Russia in many aspects. First of 
all, the Russian people saw the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which dominated 
their polity for seven decades, de-legitimized. Moreover, they lost the vast 
territories, which for centuries were forming the polity and served as a source of the 
country’s ‘Greatness’. What is more, the Russians witnessed a disappearance of 
‘the Great Empire’ status, which has been part of the national identity since the 16th 
century. In this way, the Soviet disintegration had the most devastating impact on 
the Russian national identity. The transformation from the Soviet Union into the 
Russian Federation turned out to be a very painful process, and since then Russia 
has been seeking its new identity in the World Politics (Khrusheva and Hancox, 
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2006). During the first post-Soviet decade, conceptions of the Russian identity 
evolved around two key questions. The first was that of a new civilizational location. 
As it was mentioned before in this chapter, the Eurasianist school of thought took its 
start from that time. Eurasianists tried to fill the vacuum appeared after the demise 
of the Soviet Union regarding the civilizational location of the new Russian state.  
The second question related to Russia’s new place in the post-Cold War world. The 
transformation from the Soviet Union into Russia, as a nation state, was rather a 
painful process. Russia found itself in a different state in a different world. Despite 
that, after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia continued to portray itself as the 
‘Great Power’ (Malinova and Casula, 2010).  As Guroff and Guroff observe, “much 
of today’s Russian nationalist movement is a direct response to the loss of this pride 
and national self-assuredness” (Guroff and Guroff, 1994, p. 89). According to 
Deschepper (2013), a discourse on Russia’s ‘Great Power’ status can be traced in a 
number of public statements during the first post-Soviet years. For example, Andrey 
Kozyrev’s (Russian Foreign Minister 1990 – 1996) speeches, such as the one 
published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 1 April 1992, in which he stated, that “Russia 
is predestined to be a Great Powe”r, or his speech at the conference on the 
transformations of Russia in the New World of February 1992 (Deschepper, 2013). 
As Deschepper explains, at that conference he stated that: “Russia is ready to 
assert itself in the world as the Great Power", and "will stay a Superpower in the 
domains of the culture, and the human and natural resources” (Deschepper, 2013). 
Therefore, it seems that the emphasis on Russia’s ‘Greatpowerness’ was one of the 
key elements in the Russian identity-shaping in the aftermath of the USSR collapse. 
As Melville and Shekleina (2005) observe, the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept placed 
the accent on Russia as the ‘Great Power’, on the need to protect the sovereignty 
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and unity of the state and the rights of the Russians in the countries where they 
were now a minority, and on the importance of promoting the integration of the CIS.  
The discourse on Russia’s ‘Greatpowerness’ was also actively promoted by 
Yevgeniy Primakov, who was serving as the Foreign Minister between 1996-1998. 
Primakov opposed the idea of a unipolar world and sought to establish Russia as a 
regional power within the Eurasia, limiting the influence of the US in the former 
Soviet states (Legvold, 2007). His approach found support among the Russian elite 
of the mid-1990s, and it continued to inform Russian foreign policy into the next 
decade (Govella and Aggarwal, 2011). 
As said by Kocho-Williams (2013), by the end of the 20th century, and as Russia 
moved into the 21st century, the interests were coming into conflict with those of 
other states. The year 2000 was marked by the appointment of Vladimir Putin as 
the President of the Russian state. Vladimir Putin’s political career began in 1990 
when he left the KGB after 15 years stationed mainly in East Germany to become 
the Head of external relations and later the Deputy Mayor under Anatoly Sobchak, 
the Mayor of St Petersburg (Polikanov and Timmins, 2004). He was drafted by the 
Presidential Administration in 1996. Later on, he served as the Head of the Federal 
Security Bureau and the Security Council. In August 1999, he was appointed as the 
Prime Minister (Polikanov and Timmins, 2004). 
Putin’s keynote statement ‘Russia at the turn of Millennium’ on the 30th of December 
1999, acknowledged the material and mental damage of the Soviet-type system for 
the Russian society and signaled a policy agenda of a societal reconciliation, state 
reform, and greater economic efficiency. In the speech, he outlined major goals for 
Russia in the 21st century, such as: “to rebuild its strength, find its own path and 
become an active participant in the international society in the future” (Putin, 1999). 
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Putin also mentioned about Russia’s predestined ‘Greatpowerness’. He specifically 
stated, “Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the 
inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence” 
(Putin, 1999). The National Security Concept (accepted on 10 January 2000) 
followed the same discourse: “despite the complicated international situation and 
difficulties in domestic affairs, Russia objectively continues to play an important role 
in global processes by virtue of its great economic, science-technological and 
military potential and its unique strategic location on the European continent” 
(National Security Concept of The Russian Federation, 2000). The Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation also outlined the key foreign policy goals: 
“promoting the interests of the Russian Federation as a Great Power and one of the 
most influential centers in the modern world” (Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation, 2013). 
Overall, it seems hard to disagree with Aglaya Snetkov who argues that ‘the Great 
Power’ mentality is at the core of the Russian national identity. Snetcov contends 
that in the Post-Soviet period, Russia was depicted as a ‘fallen Great Power’, but a 
‘Great Power’ nonetheless (Snetkov, 2014). Despite acknowledging that it had 
slipped down the hierarchy of ‘the Global Powers’, Russia was still presented in a 
political discourse as the major world power with a century-old history and rich 
cultural traditions (Snetkov, 2014).  The same holds true for modern Russia – in the 
official political discourse, despite the apparent weaknesses, Russia is still 
represented as ‘the Great Power’. 
During the Putin’s Presidency, much of the discussions turned around the concept 
of ‘the sovereign democracy’, which was described by Vladislav Surkov as a state, 
whose goals and methods – both at home and abroad – are made solely on the 
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basis of calculations of national interests, rather than because of external pressure 
to conform to behavioral norms (Kommersant, 2006). Under Jeffrey Mankoff, the 
focus on the sovereignty as a value, coupled with the revival of Russia’s economic 
stability during the Putin years, greatly enhanced Moscow’s ability to conduct an 
independent foreign policy (Mankoff, 2011). There is also a quite relevant metaphor 
proposed by Trenin in 2006, which depicts the Russia’s ‘independent’ foreign policy: 
“Until recently, Russia saw itself as a Pluto in the Western solar system, very far 
from the center but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely” 
(in Mankoff, 2011, p. 26).  This metaphor sharply stresses the new development 
adopted by the Russian political establishment (in particular the President and the 
Foreign Minister), in which they no longer try to adapt to the Western interests, and 
instead try to generate the unique path Russia has chosen to follow.  
In present research on the Russian national identity, it is offered to view the Russian 
Energy sector as one of the components of the national identity. In many ways, the 
new direction of Russian foreign policy became possible due to the economic 
recovery in the 2000s. Economy boosted in many ways due to the energy export 
revenues. The Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation, which sets out policy for 
the period up to 2030, considers the energy sector as one of the main sources of 
the country’s revenue (Energy Strategy Of Russia For The Period Up To 2030, 
2009). It’s worth saying that historically, the energy sector has been one of the main 
sources of the country’s revenue, and as such, it contributed to Russia’s ‘Great 
Power’ status. In the 1800s, oil export revenues tantamount to 7 percent of the 
export earnings (Geopolitical Weekly, 2013). The amount doubled by late 1920s, 
and by 1950s rose to almost half of the country’s export earnings (Geopolitical 
Weekly, 2013). Modern Russia’s economy also depends heavily on its energy 
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export. Therefore the importance of the energy sector in Russia nowadays is almost 
absolute. According to Paris-based Energy Agency (IEA, 2003), Russia possesses 
30,5 percent of the world’s gas reserves (Lounev, 2011). The oil reserves are also 
very high. According to the paper prepared by The Institute of Energy Economics, 
“Russia is the largest oil producer in the non-OPEC countries, and second-biggest 
in the world after Saudi Arabia” (Komori et al, 2005). In 2013, oil and gas sales 
accounted for 68 percent of Russia’s total export revenues (US Energy Information 
Administration, 2013). Nowadays, Russian energy exports are mainly targeted to 
the European market. Throughout the 2000s, Russia was a reliable supplier of 
energy to the EU, however, numerous frictions took place after a cut-off of gas 
supplies in 2009 (Leal-Arcas, 2009). Since then, the Russia’s position as one of the 
most important energy players in the world has been questioned. It was even 
suggested by some scholars, that energy resources in Russia are used as a 
“political instrument to prompt the political agenda” (Kaveshnikov, 2010, p. 585; 
Gould-Davies, 2016). Other scholars (Makarychev, 2006) contend that Russia’s 
approach to the energy policy, apart from being politicized, is also highly 
securitized, in many ways due to the fact that Russia treats most of its neighbors as 
security challenges. It is true that Russia tends to broaden its political influence by 
economic means, although such ‘politicized’ approach to energy policy significantly 
decreased Russia’s economic growth and development. The recent geopolitical 
crisis happened between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 confirms this point. After 
Russia annexed Crimea, it found itself in a deep economic crisis resulted due to an 
imposition of sanctions on the Russian economic sectors by the US and the EU. 
The sanctions targeted specific Russian oil and gas companies, as well as 
businessmen and politicians, and, as estimated by some experts, “there is a 
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potential for further escalations in energy trade relations, which would have negative 
consequences on the overall relationship” (Gusev and Westphal, 2015). This crisis, 
however, didn’t change the Russia’s politicized approach to its energy policy. 
Instead, the Russian administration reconsidered its energy partners and decided to 
develop relations with the Asian states. Such policy has become a continuation of 
the strategy taken by the Russian administration in 2012, which was named by 
Vladimir Putin as “the turn to the East” (Putin, 2012).  
 
3.3 THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN RUSSIA 
In present research on the Russian national identity, it is also suggested to view the 
Russian political leadership as one of the components of the national identity. This 
part explains this argument in more details. Firstly, it needs to be said that in the 
realm of the foreign policy analysis, an impact of personality on the decision-making 
seems contentious. Nevertheless quite a numerous group of scholars, including 
Jensen (1982), Hermann (1980), Hart (1991), suggest that a political personality or 
personalities can be helpful in adding to the understanding of the foreign policy 
decision-making. In this thesis, it is argued that key political figures play a significant 
role in foreign policy of any state because their beliefs and thoughts seem to form 
the general foreign and domestic policies of states. The author agrees with Mikhail 
Bezrukov’s saying that the foreign policy mechanism of each state needs a leader 
of the unquestionable authority, and without such a leader, foreign policy remains 
rather amorphous (Bezrukov, 1994). Russia confirms this point by its history, as 
there is certain continuity in having powerful political leaders as the heads of the 
Russian state.  Since the Christianization of Rus’ and until the beginning of the 20th 
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century, there has always been ‘the ruler’s cult’. For the Russian people, ‘tsar’ [the 
monarch] has been seen as a saint, who is “close to God, who inspired his actions 
and words and to whom the tsar is ultimately responsible” (Steinberg and 
Khrustalev, 1995, p. 17). Many Russian monarchs were illustrated in icons and 
even buried in or at the church along with other Christian Saints. As argued by 
Moss (2004), the ‘tsar’ was often labeled as the ‘tsar batiushka’ [the affectionate 
father of the peasant people], who unites the Russian people. 
According to Tuminez (2000), the tradition of the Russian autocracy entailed a norm 
locating all political-legal authority ultimately in the hand of the monarch. Foreign 
policy as well was in the exclusive domain of the ‘tsar’ and his close circle of 
advisors and ministers (Tuminez, 2000). Quite often the autocracy of the Russian 
leaders transformed into ‘the cult of personality’. During the Soviet Union, as it is 
agreed between a number of scholars (Ryan, 2009, Plamper, 2003), there was ‘the 
personality cult’ of Lenin and Stalin, when both were treated as ‘the Gods’. 
Moreover, as noted by Cocks, Daniels, and Heer, “the cults of Lenin and Stalin 
stand in inverse and interdependent relationship to one another, one cult rising at 
the expense of the other, manipulated by the contemporary leadership for its own 
glorification” (Cocks et al, 1976, p. 14). Phillips also adds that ‘the cult of 
personality’ was only one of the methods used to mobilize support for the regime 
(Phillips, 2000, p. 122). The People became accustomed to life with only one 
political party and with no criticisms whatsoever of the 'Great' leader. Moreover, all 
spheres of life were controlled by the regime: the Soviet people had to read what 
the state allowed, see what the state allowed and listen to what the state allowed. 
Post-Stalin leaders seemed to have insufficient confidence and coordination of their 
policies, which consequently followed by the country’s stagnation in many aspects 
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of life. The Gorbachev’s rule started with reforms of the political system. Those 
reforms were represented by the policies of ‘Perestroika’ [restructuring] and 
‘Glasnost’ [openness]. The academic world divided into two camps in the evaluation 
of the Gorbachev’s reforms. One group of scholars, represented by Richard Sakwa 
(2013), Robert Stayer (1998) and others, support the view that the reforms caused 
destabilization and became one of the central factors provoking the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Stayer even notices, that “large numbers of people look back on this 
feature of the Soviet economic life with wistful nostalgia” (Stayer, 1998, p. 56). The 
opposite view is shared by Karen Dawisha (1990), Christopher Marsh (2005) that 
the Soviet Union collapsed due to long-term weaknesses, and that Gorbachev was 
actually trying to “breath new life into the decrepit Soviet system” (Marsh, 2005, p. 
56).  
As the First President of the newly emerged Russian state, Boris Yeltsin had quite a 
controvercial personality. As argued by Bezrukov (1994), his vague interest in the 
foreign policy domain and even certain reluctance in determining foreign policy, 
together with his drinking problem, weakened the Russia’s international position 
even further.  Although, there is another opinion on the Yeltsin’s policy supported by 
some scholars (Belopolsky, 2008; Khamidov, 2015). According to this opinion, 
Yeltsin and his circle (mainly the Foreign Minister Kozyrev) are seen as proponents 
of the Atlanticist approach and even as those who introduced some liberal 
developments to the Russian politics. As the proponents of Atlanticism, they and 
mainly sought better relations with the Western states.  
Further changes came with the appearance of Vladimir Putin on the Russian 
political scene. A number of scholars (Gill, 2013; Ross, 2004; Vaughn, 2016; 
Goscilo, 2013; Arutunyan, 2014, and others) notice traces of ‘the personality cult’ of 
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Vladimir Putin in Russia. As Jason Vaughn (2016) contends, that significant part of 
such a cult consists of spreading the image of Putin in a notable or attractive 
context to what extent possible by authorities. This idea is elaborated in details by 
Helena Goscilo (2013), who claims that the Putin’s image is carefully engineered by 
the Kremlin. According to Goscilo, “adulation of Putin during his Presidency 
assumed not only ideological, but also sundry identificatory, romantic, and creative 
forms – all reported and disseminated in the media” (Goscilo, 2013, p. 6). However, 
not all agree with the opinion that there is a ‘personality cult’ of Putin.  
According to Gill (1984), the term ‘personality cult’ has a very negative connotation 
and, in the context of Russia, is typically associated with Stalinism, the repression of 
civil liberties, and the consolidation of state control. With Putin, the popularity of his 
personality has reasonable explanations. Anna Arutunyan (2014) suggests that the 
uniqueness stems from the Putin’s personality itself, his background as a military 
officer, the way he was brought up to power. Moreover, in comparison to other 
Russian rulers, Putin demonstrated himself being an uncompromised leader, who 
can “resolve issues by extrajudicial means and instigate repressions where 
necessary” (Arutunyan, 2014, p. 130). According to Fiona Hill, Clifford G. Gaddy 
(2015), Vladimir Putin is a man, who’s past experiences have clearly informed his 
present outlook. He is seen as a strong national leader emerged out of a chaos of 
the immediate post-Soviet period (Cassiday and Johnson, 2013). One of the most 
important things is that with Putin, as argued by some scholars (Nichol, 2007; 
Szabo, 2014; Gavrilenkov, 2004), there was a significant Russia’s economic rise. It 
is true that Putin was quite successful in transforming the Russia’s economic 
performance. As a result, following the Bobo Lo’s argument, for most Russians 
Putin has become a symbol of stability, as he represents the promise of a return to 
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an idealized world of order and stability (Lo, 2008). Lo continues that “for the first 
time in years there is hope that Russian foreign policy is moving out of the vicious 
cycle of stagnation and unpredictability that characterized conduct under Yeltsin” 
(Lo, 2008, p. 1). All this in many ways explains why a majority of the Russian 
population supports the Putin’s policy. According to Levada Center, Putin’s approval 
rating among Russians scores to approximately 80 percent (Levada Center). In the 
West, however, the attitude towards Putin and his policy is rather controversial. 
Most common critics fall into the authoritarian style of the Putin’s rule (Sperling, 
2015; Zimmerman, 2016; Kotz and Weir, 2007). This critic doesn’t seem to be 
groundless because politics in the Putin’s Russia can be characterized by the 
centralization and control of all the three branches of power: legislative, executive 
and judiciary. The legislative branch is currently dominated by the “United Russia” 
party, which is widely called  “the party of power” (Gel’man, 2013, p. 42), and other 
parties, which are said to be largely dedicated to supporting the Kremlin (Roberts, 
2012).  
The executive branch was also reformed to serve the interests of the state, and the 
President in particular. As a part of this strategy, Putin surrounded himself with a 
small group of loyal people (so-called ‘inner circle’).  During a research conducted 
for this thesis, it was noted that the study on Putin’s ‘inner circle’ presents the matter 
of a great interest for scholars (Dawisha, 2014; Maness and Valeriano, 2015; 
Myers, 2015; Watkinson, 2015; Zygar, 2016). According to Michail Zygar (2016), 
Putin’s ‘inner circle’ consists of so-called ‘people of Saturday’ and ‘people of 
Sunday’. The latter, as argued by Zygar, consists of the closest friends of Vladimir 
Putin, who have unlimited access to the Presidential residence in Novo-Ogarevo 
(Moscow), even ‘on Sundays’ (Zygar, 2016). While the former – are the members of 
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the Security Council and other governmental bodies, who are also considered to be 
the allies of Vladimir Putin, but their visits to the President are limited to certain 
dates (Zygar, 2016). In this thesis, the author offers a research on some members 
of ‘the inner circle’ of Vladimir Putin, which proved to include most powerful men of 
the Russian business and political elite (or how they often called ‘siloviki’). The list 
provided below, however, is not full. Moreover, as argued by Monaghan (2015), 
Russian leadership team appears to be constantly expanding.  
• Arkady Rotenberg (the owner of the Stroygazmontazh Corporation (SGM 
group, the largest construction company for gas pipelines and electrical power 
supply lines in Russia); 
•  Igor Sechin (the Head of Russian oil company Rosneft); 
• Nikolai Patrushev (former director of the FSB internal security service; now 
serves as the Secretary of the Russian Security Council);  
• Sergei Ivanov (former Defence Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. Since 
2011 – the Head of the Presidential Administration);  
• Dmitry Medvedev (the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation); 
• Alexei Kudrin (the Finance Minister until 2011; now serves as an advisor on 
financial and economic matters);  
• Sergei Shoigu (former Minister of Emergency Situations; now serves as the 
Defense Minster of the Russian Federation); 
• Vyacheslav Volodin (the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration);  
• Gennady Timchenko (co-founded of petroleum giant Gunvor, now he heads 
the private investment company – Volga Group); 
• Alexey Miller ( the Chief Executive of the gas giant Gazprom); 
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• Vladimir Yakunin (the Head of the Russian Railways); 
• Vladislav Surkov (was the First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential 
Administration (1999-2011) - he was widely seen as the main ideologist of the 
Kremlin who was the first to suggest the idea of the concept of sovereign 
democracy in Russia). 
• Ramzan Kadyrov (the Head of the Chechen Republic). 
In addition, Putin enacted a number of measures to restructure the federal and 
regional governments. Among these measures were chosen the appointments of 
individuals to the political office, instead of previously practiced elections. Such 
appointments are practiced from regional governors to deputies in the upper house 
of parliament (Federal Council) to plenipotentiary representatives (‘polpreds’) of 
Russia’s seven federal districts (Oliker et al, 2009). Like many aspects concerning 
the government of Vladimir Putin, the judicial system has also been restructured to 
defend the interests of the state rather than to operate as an independent branch of 
power. 
Overall, despite criticism of Putin and his policy, there is a growing consensus in 
Russia and sometimes abroad that the Putin’s Presidency brought some positive 
changes for Russia. Firstly, as argued by Freire (2011), Russia has gradually 
restored its ‘Great Power’ status on the global stage. Secondly, the Russian 
national identity was restructured (Fernandes, 2014). As a part of such a 
reconstruction, according to Chavez (2011), Putin brought the reconciliation of the 
Russian state with the Orthodox Church for the first time in 80 years. Thirdly, 
especially during first years of the Presidency of Vladimir Putin (1999-2008), Russia 
for the first time since the USSR dissolution has become a vital world economic 
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player (Chavez, 2011). As Sergei Ivanov mentioned at the Munich Security 
Conference in 2008: “we don't export ideology anymore - we only export goods and 
capital” (Stent, 2013, p. 213; Chavez, 2011).  
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has proved to be threefold. First of all, it explains a 
complex nature of the identity concept in general and the Russian national identity 
in particular. In present analysis of the Russian national identity, it is suggested to 
follow the approach suggested by Lionel Ponsard (2006), in which he offers an 
understanding of identity through the components of the identity concept, namely 
history, geography, ethnicity, culture, and religion. Further on, each of these 
components is applied to the case of Russia. At the same time, it is also proposed 
to add Russia’s energy sector and the role of the Russian political leadership to the 
existing list of the Russian identity components offered by Ponsard.  
In this chapter, it is also proved that there is certain historic continuity in Russian 
foreign policy being identity-based. In particular, it is argued that the sense of 
Russia’s ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘the Great Power’ identity have always affected 
Russian foreign policy, starting from the moment of formation of Kievan Rus’ in 882. 
Such a development was proved to be true in modern Russia as well. Moreover, it 
is contended that the ideology of ‘exceptionalism’ has been formed in Russia 
recently, and improvement of ‘the Great power’ identity has been suggested to form 
part of such an ideology. 
In the present study, it is argued that the energy sector needs to be considered not 
as a separate variable, but rather as a part of the Russian identity. In this study, 
Russian energy sector is limited to particular natural resources, namely gas and oil. 
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It is contended that historically, Russia’s reach oil and gas resources formed a 
considerable part of the country’s export revenue. Moreover, it is proved that 
Russia’s recovery after the Soviet Union fall was partly facilitated by Russia’s 
economic grow mainly due to its oil and gas exports. At the same time, it is also 
argued that the Russian government quite often abuses the Russia’s status as one 
of the main exporters of energy resources to the EU. As a result, Russia’s energy 
policy quite often is criticized for being politicized and securitized. 
It is also suggested to add the role of the political leadership into the list of the 
Russian national identity components. The author provides a body of evidence in 
order to prove the impact of personality on decision-making, as well as how key 
political figures play a significant role in foreign policy of any state. It is also 
addressed that political leadership historically played a decisive role in the country’s 
domestic and foreign policy-making. Also, it is argued that, in Russia, throughout 
history, there were periods (the Soviet rule) when the role of political leaders was 
absolute. In particular, there was a ‘personality cult’ of Lenin and Stalin. It is also 
discovered that in modern Russia, ‘the personality cult’ was said to be created for 
Vladimir Putin. The author explains why majority of the Russians nowadays support 
Vladimir Putin and his political decisions, as well as the sources of such a 
‘personality cult’ enjoyed by Putin nowadays. This chapter also evaluates a critical 
and positive assessment of Vladimir Putin’s domestic and foreign policies.  
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CHAPTER IV. SECUTITY-ORIENTED RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
4.1 THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN RUSSIA 
The study of foreign policy is diverse and multidisciplinary. The term ‘security’ can 
be defined broadly: as economic and environmental, political or military. There is 
also a differentiation between a security of an individual and a security of a state. As 
argued by Caldwell (2007), when it comes to a state, security studies add to the 
foreign policy study, because the national security in many cases is the core 
component of the state’s foreign policy-making. Russia is not the exception in this.  
As Jeffrey Mankoff notices, “expansion, militarization, and search for secure 
frontiers have been hallmarks of Russian foreign policy for centuries, as Russian 
leaders have pursued their quest for international power and influence” (Mankoff, 
2011, p. 13). In other words, security historically has been an integral part of the 
Russian politics.  
For quite a long period of the Russian history, security in Russia was the matter of 
the so-called “collective effort” (Shaposhnikov, 1993, p. 13). By “collective effort” 
Shaposhnikov (1993) suggests seeing the efforts put together by federal, regional 
and local government agencies and administrative bodies, by all forces at the 
disposal of the state, by all social organizations and all citizens. At the same time, 
as argued by Shaposhnikov (1993), for a long time, the country’s security policy 
was largely shaped according to the ideological dogmas and guidelines. That was 
true during the Soviet period when the USSR’s security concerns were closely tied 
with its imperial ambitions. After the Cold War, however, a lot had changed in the 
understanding of security threats to the national security and in the general concept 
of security in Russia. In particular, there was a shift from the interstate to the non-
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state and even the domestic threat perception. Overall, even though the common 
focus within the security studies used to be made on studying of the external realm 
of a state policy – foreign security policy, later it has become clear that internal and 
external security spheres are often interconnected (Snetkov, 2014). Russia, in turn, 
took a new approach in estimating threats to its national security. In doing so, the 
Russian authorities concentrated primarily on domestic threats, which in some 
cases appear to be more imminent than external risks. The general outline of 
Russia’s domestic and foreign security policies are stipulated by a number of key 
‘security documents’, such as the Military Doctrine (2014), the National Security 
Concept (2000), the Russian National Security Strategy (2015) and the Foreign 
Policy Concept (2013). These documents were first released in a new edition when 
Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000 and were updated after that on a number of 
times. Among these documents, particular attention should be paid to the National 
Security Concept (2000) and the Russian National Security Strategy (2015). These 
documents outline the basis principles of Russia’s national security policy. Strictly 
speaking, the National Security Concept, as well as the National Security Strategy, 
are not legally binding documents. Nevertheless, the documents are important and 
useful as they address general developments in the field of security and foreign 
policy in Russia. The documents are based on the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation (1993) and the Federal Law on Security (2010) and provide a basic for 
concepts and doctrines relating to the economic, political, social, military, ecological, 
and all other aspects of security. The concepts also represent long-term 
programmes in the security sphere and, among other goals, outline the mechanism 
to coordinate security efforts domestically and internationally.  
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The National Security Concept (2000) identifies the national security as “the 
protection of the individual, society and the state from domestic and foreign threats, 
which in turn ensures constitutional rights and freedoms, an appropriate quality of 
life for citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity and stable development of the 
Russian Federation, the defense and security of the state” (National Security 
Concept, 2000). As we see, the domestic threats are represented as the priority 
over the foreign threats. Among these domestic threats are: “demographic 
problems, poverty, insufficient health care, terrorism, separatism, radicalism, 
extremism, organized crime, corruption, and the danger of worldwide pandemics” 
(National Security Concept, 2000). Terrorism and religious extremism are said to 
represent one of the most serious threats to the Russian national security (National 
Security Concept, 2000). The threats to Russia’s national security are discussed in 
more details in part 3 of this chapter. 
 
4.2 HISTORICAL CONTINUITY IN SECURITY-ORIENTED RUSSIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
As it is proved in the previous chapter, Russia has continuously positioned itself as 
‘the Great Power’. As the Empire, Russia had broad imperial ambitions and, as a 
result, was constantly focused on expanding its territory and improving its position in 
the international arena. With the territorial expansion of the Empire, the question of 
securing the state’s borders started playing a key role for the Russian leaders. 
The first and perhaps one of the most dramatic tests to the Russian security and 
integrity was caused by the Mongol-Tatar Yoke, which resulted in the disintegration 
of the Kievan Rus’ as a state. That period is mainly characterized as the rule of the 
Mongol-Tatar feudal lords over the Russian lands, which aimed at the systematic 
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exploitation of the conquered country through obligatory payments and predatory 
raids (Plokhy, 2006). The end of the Mongol-Tatar yoke was put on 11 November 
1480 as the result of so-called “Standing on the Ugra River”. The battle signified the 
defeat of the Mongols and appearance of Russia (‘the Muscovy’) as an independent 
state.  
Under Ivan III (1462–1505), the Russian state was significantly expanded due to the 
process of “gathering the lands of Rus” (Perrie and Pavlov, 2014; Ragsdale, 1996). 
As agreed by Mankoff (2011) and Moss (2003), subsequent territorial expansion, 
and the need to administer Russia’s vast territories encouraged a development of 
the powerful state. The development was continued under the rule of Ivan IV ‘The 
Terrible’ (1530-1584). Among the most significant territorial gains were the Muslim 
‘khaneates’ [kingdoms] of Kazan (in 1552) and Astrakhan (in 1556), which extended 
the Russia’s control over the entire length of the Volga rRver (Perrie and Pavlov, 
2014; Petro and Rubinstein, 1996). Further territorial expansion to the South and 
the West was contemplated by Catherine the Great (1762-1796). Catherin’s defeat 
of the Ottoman Turkey and the subsequent Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774 
advanced the Russian territory to the Black Sea and led to the absorption of Crimea 
(Petro and Rubinstein, 1996). Other significant territorial gains became the result of 
the Caucasian war (1817-1864), which incorporated the lands of the North 
Caucasus into the territory of the Russian Empire (Cheterian, 2011). In total, from 
Ivan the Terrible to Nicholas II Russia was in an almost perpetual state of war.  War 
played a pivotal role in the formation of Russia’s security concerns. As Lawrence 
Caldwell (2007) notes, the vulnerability of the Russian frontiers induced a seven-
hundred-year drive for secure borders.  
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All territorial gains contemplated in the previous years made Russia one of the 
largest polities in Europe in the 20th century. It spread over the East-European 
space from the Baltic sea and the Caspian sea in the South. In Asia, it possessed 
the whole of the Siberia. As Petro and Rubinstein (1996) argue, all these successful 
expansion efforts made the territory of the Empire equal to 1/6 of the surface of the 
Globe. These territorial gains, however, as said by Kocho-Williams (2013), 
intensified a negative discourse and critics of Russia’s imperial ambitions and 
subsequent policies. 
During the Soviet period, Russia continued to place the security at the center of its 
foreign policy. At that period, the Soviet Union faced challenges from both the East 
and the West during the 1930s. At the same time, as Alastair Kocho-Williams 
(2013) notes, despite the security was prioritized, certain controversy remained over 
how the Soviets hoped to achieve it. Some argue that the Soviet Union was 
committed to so-called ‘collective security’ (Fleming, 1948, p. 117; Kocho-Williams, 
2013, p. 55; Hoffmann, 2013, p. 165). ‘Collective security’ was a policy that had at 
its heart the aim of preventing the war breaking in Europe. The mechanism was 
represented by a series of bilateral and multilateral treaties. Faced with the growing 
Nazi hostility and rejection of the Rapallo, Moscow accepted the French-sponsored 
invitation and on the 18th of September 1934, joined the League of Nations, where it 
became the leading exponent of the ‘collective security’ (Petro and Rubinstein, 
1996). Russia, however, was expelled from the League of Nations on the 14th of 
December 1940 mainly due to so-called ‘timperialist policies’ of the Soviets in 
regards to the Eastern Europe (Bialer, 1986, p. 196). According to Cox (2013), as a 
part of the policy, the Soviets carried out a series of repressive moves against the 
leadership of the Eastern European states. Together with that, the Soviets exported 
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the Soviet model for government and economic structures of the East European 
satellites, which “was designed to ensure that Moscow controlled the Eastern bloc, 
making it part of the Soviet Empire” (Kocho-Williams, 2013, p. 94). As Nikolai Petro 
and Alvin Rubinstein (1996) also point, to Stalin, security was synonymous with the 
permanent Soviet military presence, unquestioned political control, ideological 
conformity, and economic subordination to the Soviet needs. 
Stalin’s death in 1953 and subsequent de-Stalinization left deep wounds in the 
Communist system. In the Eastern Europe and the USSR, as it is argued (Cox, 
2013), it caused the Communism crisis (Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland 1980). In the 
West, however, it raised expectations that the USSR would reform itself 
domestically and would begin to see the benefits of the international cooperation 
(Petro and Rubinstein, 1996). These hopes became reality when Mikhail Gorbachev 
became the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 
1985.  As argued by some scholars (Suraska, 1998; Kocho-Williams, 2013), 
Gorbachev ushered in the new era of what he termed ‘New Thinking’ in the Soviet 
politics. According to Kocho-Williams, it encompassed bringing the Soviet system 
out of what he termed stagnation and decline. The path he saw also was one of 
economic development and liberalization (Kocho-Williams, 2013, p. 144). In regards 
to foreign policy, certain changes were marked under Gorbachev. In particular, he 
exposed the idea of ‘the Common European Home’. The concept of ‘Common 
European Home’, as Savranskaya recalls,  “based on the universal human values, 
collective security, and economic integration” (Savranskaya, 2014, p. 337). Roberts 
adds that it was also mainly dedicated to being moved away from confrontation, and 
signaled a retreat from the arms race and the development of economic ties with 
the outside world (Roberts, 2005, p. 90). Shortly after coming to power, in April 
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1985, Gorbachev signaled in ‘Pravda’ newspaper his desire to change the situation 
with the super-powers’ confrontation. As argued by Kocho-Williams (2013), the 
Soviet Union ceased to be the power that the US saw as the threat. At the same 
time, while these shifts in policy were positively assessed by the West, they also 
had the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet power and ideology 
(Kocho-Williams, 2013, p. 144). 
The Eastern Europe had become the most vulnerable part of the Soviet Union at 
the time of the Gorbachev rule. After the fall of the Soviet rule in the Eastern 
Europe, the whole viability of the Communism was put under question. On the 18th 
of October 1991, the Alma Ata Accords were ratified, effectively heralding the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) (Light, 2002). On 25 December 1991, Gorbachev left 
office, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist on the 31st of December 1991. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union signified the major change in many senses. 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia was forced to go through the period of 
dramatic domestic and foreign policy changes. The fall of the Soviet Union severely 
undermined the Soviet influence and authority beyond the Soviet Union. It also left 
Russia in a deep economic, political, social crisis. The country, which previously 
enjoyed ‘the Great Power’ status in the bipolar world, lost that status (Kocho-
Williams, 2013; Govella and Aggarwal, 2011). Most importantly, Russia found itself 
in ‘the new world’, where the global peace was a prioritized over imperial ambitions. 
As argued by Snetkov, since the end of the Cold War, there was a rise in the global 
non-traditional security threats, such as international terrorism, climate change, 
health pandemics, the energy of cyber security, which has challenged traditional 
understanding security and the security concept (Snetkov, 2014, p. 23). In Russia in 
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particular, the concept of security and understanding of the security threats were 
reassessed. The Security Concept of 2000 outlined the priority of domestic threats 
over external ones. 
Overall, despite the changes Russia has undergone since 1991, certain matters still 
remained unchanged. In particular, in modern Russia, the security considerations 
play a significant role in Russian domestic and foreign policy decision-making. In 
such a matter, modern Russia continues the political tradition of its foreign policy 
being security-oriented.  
 
4.3 SECURITY THREATS IN TODAY’S RUSSIA 
As mentioned in the part 1 of this chapter, the National Security Concept of the 
Russian Federation outlines the national security as “protection of individual, society 
and the state from domestic and foreign threats, which in turn ensures constitutional 
rights and freedoms, an appropriate quality of life for the citizens, sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and stable development of the Russian Federation, and the 
defense and security of the state” (National Security Concept, 2000). The document 
prioritizes domestic threats over external ones. Among the domestic threats are 
said to be: “demographic problems, poor economy, insufficient health care, 
terrorism, separatism, radicalism, extremism, organized crime, and corruption” 
(National Security Concept, 2000). This part discusses these domestic threats in 
details. 
 
Demographic crisis 
One of the most serious threats to the Russian national security nowadays comes 
from a poor demographic situation. Since the 1960s, Russia’s human numbers have 
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been progressively declining. Among the main causes of such a demographic crisis 
was a drop in fertility rates. As it is demonstrated by Anatoly Vishnevsky: 
“In 1959-1960, the total fertility rate in Russia was 2.6. In the next decade it quickly 
fell, and by 1960 was held on 2.0. It, however, dropped even lower in 70-80s (1.89), 
and despite a little improvement at the end of the 80s (2.2), it fell again to 1.89 at 
the beginning of 90s. During the 90s, fertility rate plummeted even to the lower point 
(1.39 in 1992)” (Vishnevsky, 1996, pp. 8).  
As Nechepurenko (2014) notices, in 2006 during the State of the Nation Address, 
Vladimir Putin described the population decline as the “country’s most urgent 
problem,” and laid out a state-sponsored plan to encourage families to have more 
children. Mothers were promised to receive childcare benefits of 1,500 rubles 
monthly after the birth of the first child and 3,000 rubles monthly after the birth of the 
second. Mothers who opted to have a second child also were eligible to receive a 
certificate worth 250,000 rubles in three years after the child’s birth. The money was 
allowed to be spent for housing, the child’s education, or the mother’s pension 
(Oliker, Crane, Schwartz, and Yusupov, 2009). Financial support (or how it was 
called in Russia – ‘the mother’s capital’) has been constantly increased in the 
following years. As Elena Slabodiyan (2016) recalls, by 2016, ‘the mother’s capital’ 
reached 475,000 rubles’ allowance. According to Nechepurenko (2014), as a result 
of such measures, the Russian population grew gradually. 
Another aspect of the Russia’s demographic crisis reflects certain ethnic 
disbalance. In particular, while the number of ethnic Russians drops, the number of 
the Muslims in Russia rises. As Oliker explains, “the differential in demographic 
outcomes between ethnic Slavs and ethnic Muslims can be attributed to 
immigration, higher birth rates among the Muslims, and their healthier lifestyles” 
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(Oliker et al, 2009, p. 35). At the moment, Russia has the largest Muslim population 
in Europe. According to Cotte (2012), the Muslims in Russia score to approximately 
10-15 percent out of the total Russian population. It has to be addressed that within 
the body of sources and literature, it is quite hard to find the official data on the 
Russian demographic composition in an open access. Therefore this thesis is opted 
for relying on findings of other scholars. 
During the present study, it has been noted that there is a quite common tendency 
among scholars to perceive that such a disbalance in the ethnographic composition 
of the Russian population as a potential factor for further ethnic destabilization 
(Judah, 2010; Herd and Sargsyan, 2007). It is quite possible to suggest that the 
disbalance between the ethnic Russians and the Russian Muslims threatens the 
Russian national identity provided we consider the ethnic Russian population as a 
component of the Russian national identity. However, such a suggestion seems 
rather inaccurate. First of all, it needs to be said that the ethnic Russians, just like 
the Muslims, both form parts of the multinational and ethnically-mixed Russian 
population. The Muslims in Russia are also considered as the Russians, as such 
should be regarded equal to the Ethnic Russians. Therefore the matter of some 
ethnic disbalance should not be regarded as a threat to the Russian national 
identity, but rather taken as a demographic development. 
 
Economic crisis 
Since Vladimir Putin came to power, the Russian economy has been significantly 
improved. Annual GDP growth scored to 6.7 percent between 1998 and 2007 
(Oliker et al, 2009, p. 45). Russia’s strong economic growth made it possible for 
Russia to increase its prestige in the world politics. As it is mentioned in the 
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previous Chapter, one of the hallmarks of Russia’s economic recovery was the 
increase in earnings from exports of raw materials (mainly oil and gas). In fact, raw 
materials have been the only sector that generated most earnings for the Russian 
economy and remains so now. In many ways, Russia is dependent on the export of 
its raw materials, including oil and gas prices.  
The events of the Arab Spring, Russia’s position in the Syrian civil war, the 
Ukrainian crisis in 2014 – all significantly shook the Russia’s International position 
and negatively affected the country’s economy. In particular, the EU and the US 
introduced the economic sanctions and political isolation in response to Russia’s 
foreign policy in Syria and Ukraine. At first, the sanctions were mainly imposed on 
Russia’s politicians and businessmen, however, later the sanctions were also 
imposed on certain sectors of the Russia’s economy. 
Another factor, which contributed greatly to the current economic crisis in Russia, 
was the fall of the oil prices (from $100 per barrel to almost $15) in 2015 
(Stepanyan, Roitman, Minasyan, Ostojic and Epstein, 2015). As a result, Russia 
continues to sell its oil at an operational capacity, without any increase in the oil 
production to compensate the lower oil price, and thus due to the reduced profit 
from selling oil, the county’s revenue was reduced. All that led to a decline in the 
value of the Russian national currency (ruble) and the Russian stock market, as well 
as a drop of the Russian reserves of gold and foreign currencies. The crisis also 
touched business, corporate and social sectors. 
Separatism and territorial disintegration 
The main security documents (the National Security Concept (2000) and the 
Russian National Security Strategy (2015) reflect the fear of separatism and 
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territorial disintegration in today’s Russia (Celikpala, 2011). It should be said that 
these fears are not groundless. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia 
remained a multiethnic state. Nowadays, ethnic minorities constitute more than 20 
percent of the population of the Russian Federation and the minority share of the 
population is growing. More than 30 million people in today’s Russia belong to 
various ethnic minority groups. These people often speak distinct languages, 
practice different religions, and maintain diverse traditions. The meaning of ethnicity 
as a social category and the place and role of ethnicity in public life are at the core 
of debates about the nation-building in Russia. As argued by Protsyk and Harzl 
(2013), ethnic nationalists prioritize ethnicity over other matters in their public life. 
The risk of an ethnically-driven territorial disintegration in many ways is perceived 
as the principal threat to the Russian domestic security (Protsyk and Harzl, 2013). 
Few Russia’s regions have a long history of separatism, and these tendencies are 
vital now. Bashkortostan and its sister republic, Tatarstan, are two of the most 
wealthy autonomous republics in Russia. Tatarstan declared its sovereignty on the 
30th of August 1990, with the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar 
Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the first Republic, which claimed the autonomous 
status within the Russian state. In 1992 Tatarstan held a referendum on the new 
constitution, which was declared unconstitutional by the Russian Constitutional 
Court. 
The Bashkir experience with separatism paralleled the one of Tatarstan. 
Bashkortostan declared sovereignty on the 11th of October 1990, two months after 
the Tatarstan’s declaration (George, 2009). The Kremlin's refusal to recognize the 
republics’ independence was expected. First of all, granting independence to the 
regions could set off a chain of secession campaigns across Russia. What is more, 
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both republics were considered to be rich in mineral resources, especially oil, 
natural gas, iron, manganese, copper, salt, and construction stone, therefore, losing 
such wealthy regions could have caused serious consequences for Russia. As a 
result, the Russian federal authorities negotiated a number of agreements with the 
governments of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in particular: the Treaty On 
Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between 
the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of 
Tatarstan, 15 February 1994; the Agreement between the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan (On 
Delimitation of Authority in the Sphere of Foreign Economic Relations); the 
Federative Compact "On separation of authorities and powers among federal 
organs of power of the Russian Federation and the organs of power of the Republic 
of Bashkortostan", 31 March 1992; a Compact "On separation of authorities and 
mutual delegating of powers among the organs of power of the Russian Federation 
and the organs of power of the Republic of Bashkortostan", 3 August 1994. The 
treaties secured for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan the status of sovereign republics 
within the Russian Federation.  
Chechen republic contemplated the most violent separatist campaign in Russia. On 
the 26th of November 1990, the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR 
adopted the "Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic". 
Just like with Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the declaration of the Chechen’s 
independence was refused by the Russian authorities. Losing Chechnya could have 
been a costly loss for Russia on a number of reasons. Firstly, Chechnya and the 
Caucasus region overall were perceived to have an important geopolitical location. 
Moreover, Chechnya represents the region of the strategic importance for Russia, 
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mainly due to its Southern borders. Chechnya was also a transit country for oil and 
gas pipelines from the oil-rich Caspian Sea region to the Black Sea Cost. Secondly, 
the region historically represented economic value for Russia. As Trenin contends, 
back in times of the Soviet Union, certain Soviet industries “were exclusively 
developed in only a few locations across USSR”, and those locations were mainly 
concentrated in the Caucasus, and the Transcaucasia (Trenin, 1996, p. 94). 
Nowadays, the Russian Caucasus is the region rich with mineral and energy 
resources, in particular with the Caspian petroleum and natural gas in the region, 
and the surrounding export channels and pipelines. The resources have been 
exploited by Russia since the XIX century, with the first oil refinery opened in 1864 
in Krasnodar-Krai, and continue to make a significant contribution to the Russian 
economy in modern time (Karagiannis, 2002). 
Chechnya and the Russian Caucasus region are integral parts of the Russian 
territory and have always been the regions of the great significance for the Russian 
government. Although the region had a turbulent history. It was forcefully included in 
the Russian territory in the 19th century. As pointed by Dmitri Trenin, back then the 
Caucasus became both a ‘buffer zone’ and a battlefield between the predominantly 
Orthodox Christian Empire in the North and the Muslim powers in the Middle East. It 
is important to highlight that the ethnic Russians have always been the minority in 
the Caucasus region, whereas the Muslims – indigenous population of this region – 
represent, as pointed by Trenin, the group of people who are “closely linked, both 
culturally and ethnically” Trenin, 1996, pp. 93). These ethnical differences seem to 
always represented the matter of great concern for the Russian government, to 
which maintaining the unity of its ethnically-mixed population is the priority. At the 
same time, it is also important to note that the ethnically-mixed population forms 
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part of the Russian national identity. Although according to Yemelianova, “the 
Russian Muslims urged their a distinct national ideology after the demise of the 
Soviet Union (Yemelianova, 2002, p. 199). Such a development, according to 
Yemelianova, in many ways came as a reaction to a pro-Western direction of the 
Russian politics pursued by the Yeltsin’s administration (Yemelianova, 1999).  
Today’s Russia prioritises peaceful coexistence of all its multiple ethnicities and 
nationalities by the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) because that 
serves as the basis for the Russian territorial integrity and domestic security. 
 
Terrorism and ‘Religious Extremism’  
During a research made for present thesis, the author has come up with an 
understanding that terrorism and ‘Religious Extremism’ represent perhaps one of 
the most serious threats to the Russian national security nowadays. This topic is 
also discussed in Chapter V of this thesis. 
Despite the domestic threats to the Russian security are prioritized over external 
ones, the external threats cannot be ignored as well. In the current international 
political crisis, external threats to the Russian national security have probably 
become as dangerous as domestic ones. The National Security Concept (2000) 
outlines the basic external threats to the Russian national security. The main threats 
in the international sphere are determined by the following developments: 
• “the striving of individual states and inter-state associations to lower the role of 
the existing mechanisms of ensuring international security, above all the UN 
and the OSCE; 
• the danger of weakening the political, economic and military influence of 
Russia in the world; 
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• the strengthening of military-political blocs and unions, above all the eastward 
enlargement of NATO; 
• the possible appearance of foreign military bases and large military 
contingents in direct proximity to the Russian borders; 
• the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles; 
• the weakening of the integration processes in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States; 
• the appearance and escalation of conflicts close to the state borders of the 
Russian Federation and the external borders of countries members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States; 
• claims to the territory of the Russian Federation” (National Security Concept of 
The Russian Federation, 2000). 
As we see, in Russia, the perception of external threats to the Russian national 
security mainly originates from so-called ‘desire of particular states to weaken 
Russia’s position on the international stage’. Such a perception results from few 
developments. Firstly, as some scholars agree, the NATO’s expansion has always 
been perceived by the Russian politicians as one of the most serious threats to 
Russia’s domestic security (Maksimychev, 1998; Assenova, 2003; Shearman, 
2014). As recently stated by some members of the Russian political establishment, 
including the President Putin, the Foreign Minister Lavrov, as well as the head of 
the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, this threat is perceived as the most 
imminent for Russia (the National Security Strategy, 2015; Putin in TASS, 2015; 
Patrushev in Russia Today, 2015).  
Anti-Russian discourse intensified mainly due to Russian foreign policy in Syria and 
Ukraine. Moreover, the discourse was also followed by the anti-Russian sanctions 
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imposed on Russia by the US and the EU in 2014.  Such a decision from Russia’s 
Western colleagues was characterized by President Putin as "silly and damaging 
decision” (TASS, 2016). He also added that such a reaction of Russia’s Western 
partners was “aimed to restrain the abilities of Russia’s further growth” (TASS, 
2016). In reply to the sanctions, Moscow responded by imposing an embargo on the 
agricultural products, food and raw materials on countries, which joined the anti-
Russian sanctions (Russia Today, 2016). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Chapter provides the evidence-base proving that Russian foreign policy 
historically has been security-based. The first part of this chapter introduces the 
concept of security in general and also in an application for the foreign policy 
analysis. Then it demonstrates how the concept of security has changed in case of 
Russia throughout its history. It also describes how security is understood in 
modern Russia either in the official policial discourse and in some political 
documents. These documents outline the security policy of the Russian Federation 
as well as determine the main threats to the national security in modern Russia. It is 
explained that in this thesis the emphasis is made on the following documents for a 
study of security in modern Russia: the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
(2014), the National Security Concept (2000), the Russian National Security 
Strategy (2015) and the Foreign Policy Concept (2013). One of the main 
developments in the Russian security policy was proved to be prioritization of the 
domestic security threats over external ones. It is argued further that in modern 
Russia, the Russian government builds its security policy according to such a 
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development. Moreover, it is explained that certain domestic security matters affect 
Russian foreign policy. 
In a subsequent part of this chapter, it is proved that one of the political traditions in 
Russia is represented by the historical continuity in security-oriented foreign policy. 
The argument is proved by a demonstration that such a development was taking 
place on different stages of the Russian history. Moreover, this argument is 
developed further by proving that modern Russia continues this tradition, and it is 
proved by using Syrian conflict as an example.  
The third part of this chapter outlines the main threats to the domestic security in 
today’s Russia. It introduces and analyses each of these threats, including the 
demographic crisis. It is argued that the crisis had become a result of the population 
decline in Russia. The chapter also addresses how the government tries to solve 
this problem. Another aspect of the demographic crisis in Russia is tied with the 
ethnic disbalance among the ethnic Russians and the Russian Muslims. It is 
explained why such a tendency takes place in modern Russia, as well as the 
consequences it might have in the future.  
Another threat to Russia’s domestic security is represented by the economic crisis. 
The chapter addresses the problem of the Russian economy being 
disproportionally-managed in a way that certain sectors of the Russian economy are 
developed more than others. It also outlines that at the moment, an economic and 
political crisis takes place in Russia mainly due to Russian foreign policy in Syria 
and Ukraine. 
Among the threats to the Russian national security today, a threat of separatism 
and territorial disintegration is proved to be one of the most imminent. It is argued 
that such a threat has become imminent after the demise of the Soviet Union and 
	 112	
with subsequent separatist campaigns contemplated in the 1990s within few regions 
in Russia. 
The chapter commences with outlining another threat to the Russian national 
security, which is regarded as one of the most serious now – the rising threat of 
terrorism and ‘Religious Extremism’. This chapter doesn’t describe it in details, as 
Chapter V is dedicated to the study of this matter. This chapter also outlines what is 
considered to be the external threat to the Russian national security. It is argued 
that despite domestic threats are prioritized over external ones in Russia, in this 
particular period, external and domestic threats are equally dangerous for the 
Russian national security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 113	
CHAPTER V. ISLAM IN RUSSIA 
5.1 ISLAM IN RUSSIA AND FORMS OF ‘RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM’ EXISTING 
IN RUSSIA 
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of Islam in Russia. The first part of the 
chapter clarifies certain confusion existing in the Russian political discourse 
regarding different forms of Islam in Russia. It also discusses how Islam in Russia is 
divided into so-called ‘Traditional’ and ‘Non-Traditional’. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Russia has the largest Muslim population in 
Europe, with roughly 10 to 15 percent of the Muslims living within the borders of the 
Russian Federation (Miller, 2015). Yunus Yilmaz (2013), in his research paper on 
the Muslims in contemporary Russia, also gives the numbers provided by some 
Muslim religious leaders. For example, Ravil Gaynutdin, the Chairman of the 
Council of Muftis of Russia, at the meeting of the European Union of Muslims in 
2005, estimated the total number of the Muslims in Russia as 23 million. He also 
stressed that this number includes only “indigenous residents of the country, not 
migrants or immigrants” (Page, 2005, p. 3). According to the statistical data 
provided by Pew Research Center, the percentage of the Muslims in Russia is 
predicted to increase to roughly 13 percent by 2030 and nearly 17 percent by 2050, 
with about 20 million of the Muslims in Russia (Pew Research Center, 2011). In 
Russia, perhaps the most reliable source of information concerning the ethnic 
composition of the Russian population is composed by the National Servey, which 
is taking place every ten years. At the moment of writing this thesis, the data of the 
National Servey was rather outdated, therefore, the data of some independent 
statistical sources (such as Pew Research Center) was used.  
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Nowadays the Muslim communities exist in all of the Russian Federation’s 89 
territorial divisions (‘Federal subjects’) and constitute the majority in 7 out of the 89 
subjects of the Russian Federation: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, 
Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. However, 
the majority of the Russia’s Muslims are mainly concentrated in two regions: the 
North Caucasus and the Volga-Ural region. As observed by Yilmaz (2013), a large 
number of the Muslim migrants coming mainly from the Central Asian countries. 
The majority of them enter the country on an illegal basis. These groups remain 
mostly in the Central Russia and in particular, in Moscow. 
Islam has deep roots in Russia. It is difficult to establish the exact date when Islam 
first appeared in Russia, because as observed by Shereen Hunter, the lands that 
Islam penetrated early in its expansion were not part of Russia at the time, but were 
later incorporated into the expanding Russian Empire (Hunter, 2004). According to 
Ariel Cohen (2012), the Arab invaders introduced Islam into the Caucasus in the 8th 
century. Shortly after, most people in the North Caucasus were converted into 
Islam, while peoples at the South, including the Georgians and Armenians, 
remained loyal to the Orthodox Christianity (Cohen, 2012). Interesting note was 
made by Yemelianova, that despite the Kievan ‘kniaz’ [monarch] Vladimir was lured 
to adopt Islam as the state religion in 988, he opted in favor of the Greek Orthodox 
Christianity (Yemelianova, 2003). So Russia had all chances to become the Muslim 
nation in the past. 
It was argued (Hunter, 2004), that until the Mongol invasion of Rus’ in 1223, the 
Muslims and Islam were only distant neighbors and not part of Russia’s religious 
and political landscape. Aitamurto (2015) contends that the first Muslim minorities 
were incorporated in the Russian Empire when Tsar Ivan IV conquered the city of 
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Kazan and the Tatarstan in 1552. In the late 18th century to early 19th century, 
while the North Caucasus region was under the influence of the Persian and the 
Ottoman Empires, the Russian empire made major inroads into the region. Despite 
fierce resistance during the Caucasian War (1817–1864), the Russian forces 
conquered the North Caucasus and incorporated it to the Russian Empire (Cohen, 
2012). As a result of the “Russian conquests in the North Caucasus” the Muslims of 
Dagestanis, Chechens, Ingush, and others were brought into the Russian state 
(Yilmaz, 2013, p. 104).  
‘Traditional’ Islam in Russia 
At present, the dominant view in Russia is that ‘Sufism’ represents so-called 
‘traditional’ form of Islam (Russel, 2010). At the same time, there is still no 
commonly agreed opinion among scholars on when ‘Sufism’ first appeared in 
Russia. Some scholars (Yusupov, 2010; Shikhsaidov, 1999) claim that since the 
adoption of Islam by the Volga Bulgars in 922, ‘Sufism’ dominated the spiritual and 
cultural life for the Muslims in Russia. Others (Vatchagaev, 1970; Parfitt, 2007) 
suppose that the ‘Sufi’ interpretation of Islam was practiced in Russia only since the 
end of the 18th century. 
As observed by Hunter (2004) and Popov (2012), ‘Sufism’ represents a mystic flow 
in Islam. Popov (2012) explains that according to such a mystic nature of ‘Sufism’, 
the way to God cannot be described in words and is only possible to be understood 
by hints and spiritual intuition. Moreover, Popov even claims ‘Sufism’ to be so-called 
“unconscious” branch of Islam, which is characterized by ethnic-mythological views 
together with the peaceful and quite passive character of this flow (Popov, 2012). It 
is, however, needs to be noticed that ‘Sufism’ is a rather complex current of Islam. It 
	 116	
has multiple sub-currents or schools and is represented by few brotherhoods (or 
‘tariqats’):  ‘Naqshbanaya’, ‘Qadiriya’, and ‘Shaziliya’ (Hunter, 2004). In terms of 
‘Sufi’ sub-currents, Hilary Pilkington and Galina Yemelianova subdivide ‘Sufism’ into 
4 different schools within ‘Sunni Islam’ – ‘Hanafism’, ‘Hanabalism’, ‘Shafiism’ and 
‘Malikism’, where ‘Hanafism’ is seen as more flexible and moderate school 
(Pilkington and Yemelianova, 2003).  As Shereen Hunter notes, ‘Hanafism’ in 
Russia is considered to have “a cooperative attitude towards the Russian 
government at both local and the federal levels, and it is mainly targeted at gaining 
recognition for Islam as the component of Russia’s cultural heritage” (Hunter, 2004, 
p. 80).  In the modern political discourse, the Russian politicians use the wording 
‘traditional form of Islam’ when they discuss ‘Sufi Islam’, and mainly ‘Hanafism’. 
However, Malashenko (2013) contends that ‘Hanafism’ was initially followed by the 
Bashkirs and Tatars, while the Muslims in the North Caucasus followed ‘Shafiism’. 
Although Hunter (2004) argues that ‘Hanafism’ is the dominant form of ‘Sufism’ 
either for the Muslims in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, as well as for the Muslims in 
the North Caucasus. Moreover, according to Shereen Hunter, ‘Hanafism’ is 
considered to be the position of the official clergy of the Russian Muslim, including 
the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and the European Countries of the 
CIS and the Russian Council of Muftis (Hunter, 2004).  
The complex nature of ‘Sufism’ is also represented by its brotherhoods. According 
to Hunter (2004), historically the mainstream Islam in Russia was dominated by 
‘Sufi’ brotherhoods, notably ‘Naqshbanaya’, ‘Qadiriya’, and ‘Shaziliya.’ According to 
Vahid Akaev, in Russia, ‘Sufism’ exists only in the form of ‘Naqshbanaya’ and 
‘Qadiriya’ brotherhoods (Akaev, 2009, p. 66). As argued by Vatchagaev, the 
‘Naqshbandi’ and ‘Qadiriya’ brotherhoods appeared in Russia in the 19th century. It 
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was also argued (Vatchagaev, 1970) that, historically ‘Naqshbandi’ brotherhood 
served as a support for Muslims, who opposed to the Russian occupation of the 
Caucasus during the Caucasian War of 1817–1864, but later on opted for a 
peaceful coexistence with the official authorities. In contrast to the ‘Naqshbandi’ 
brotherhood, the ‘Qadiri’ brotherhood, first promoted nonviolent resistance to the 
Russian ‘colonization’ in the 19th century, but later adopted a stance of active 
resistance towards the Russian authorities (Vatchagaev, 1970).  
In much later years, as a part of the atheist campaign initiated by the Soviet 
administration, ‘Sufism’ was seriously suppressed (Green, 2012; Westerlund, 2004; 
Weismann, 2007; Rippin, 2013), although during the 1990s enjoyed a revival in 
Russia (Green, 2012). ‘Sufism’ also played one of the decisive roles during the 
Chechen wars in the 1990s. As argued by Vatchagaev (2014), “majority of the 
members of ‘Naqshbandiya’ brotherhoods, and all ‘Qadiriyya’ adopted a stance in 
favor of independence” (Vatchagaev, 2014, p. 225). Nevertheless, the Federal 
authorities managed to find the way to ally with the ‘Qadiri’ brothers and soon 
received a significant support by the ‘Qadiri’ representative – Akhmat Kadyrov 
(Vatchagaev, 2014). In latter years, Akhmat’s son, Ramzan Kadyrov, inherited his 
father’s ideas and even developed them further. Nowadays, Ramzan Kadyrov 
enjoys a strong backing from the Russian President, Vladimir Putin (Parfitt, 2007). It 
was also observed by Vatchagaev, that Mr. Kadyrov “elevated Sufism to the level of 
a cult celebrating Russia’s state policy in Chechnya” (Vatchagaev, 2014, p. 229). 
Overall, in modern Russia, the indigenous mystic nature of ‘Sufism’ has 
transformed. As noted by Mairbek Vatchagaev, ‘Sufi’ structures in Chechnya today 
are very openly and actively involved in the republic’s political life (in Huerou et al., 
2014). At the same time in modern Russia, ‘Sufism’ is seen as one of the main tools 
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in fighting with ‘Religious Extremism’ within Russia. As the head of the Muslim 
Spiritual Directorate of Moscow - Mufti Albir-khazrat Krganov contends that ‘Sufism’ 
shall be revived in order to immunize young Muslims in the country against the 
appeals of the radical Islamist trends (Goble, 2013). 
 ‘Non-traditional’ Islam in Russia  
According to the author’s observation, in the Russian political discourse, so-called 
‘non-traditional’ Islam or ‘Radical Islamism’ is associated with ‘Religious’ or ‘Islamic 
Extremism’. ‘Islamic Extremism’, how said by Malashenko, is usually used as an 
umbrella term for the ‘Islamist’ currents, such as ‘Salafism’, ‘Wahhabism’ and 
‘Jihadism’ (Malashenko, 2010). These ‘forms’ of Islam were not traditionally 
practiced in the Muslim-habited regions in Russia and were mainly brought to 
Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union from the Middle Eastern countries. That 
is why these forms of Islam are associated with ‘non-traditional’ Islam. As the author 
observes, the major problem has always been sourced in differentiating between 
the ‘forms’ of Islam in the Russian political discourse. Russian key political figures 
often equate these terms. On the 16th of September 1999, the Dagestan’s 
parliament adopted the Law ‘Concerning the Prohibition of ‘Wahhabism’ and other 
‘Extremist’ activities in the Territory of Dagestan, and later similar laws were 
adopted in other republics of the Northern Caucasus. As observed by Walter 
Richmond, the documents didn’t explain what was considered as ‘Wahhabism’, or 
‘Extremist activity’, these terms were equated in the document (Richmond, 2008). 
Rather than attempting to understand the distinctive features of ‘Extremism’ in the 
Northern Caucasus, the Russian government settled on this equation and even 
simplified it further: any Islamic movement not specifically indigenous to the region 
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was labeled ‘Wahhabi’ or ‘Salafi’, and therefore ‘Extremist’ (Richmond, 2008). This 
equation of terms seems to be a critical error and quite often becomes a very 
sensitive issue in a political discourse. Therefore, it is crucial to differentiate 
between ‘Wahhabism’, ‘Salafism’, their extremist forms, and ‘Jihadism’, as the terms 
have different meanings.  
It needs to be said that differentiating between ‘Wahhabism’ and ‘Salafism’ is not an 
easy task. Some scholars believe that ‘Wahhabism’ is a form of ‘Salafism’ (al-Tijani 
al Samawi, 2008; Durie, 2013), whereas others equate them (Ronczkowski, 2011; 
Kabir, 2013). For example, Galina Yemelianova contends that ‘Salafism’ has 
become a post-Soviet reincarnation of ‘Wahhabism’ “based on a wider doctrinal 
foundation than the teaching of al-Wahhab” (Yemelianova, 2003, p. 185). Those 
‘post-Soviet Wahhabis’ preferred to call themselves ‘Salafi.’ As Yemelianova also 
explains, all that had become a result of “the reintegration of the post-Soviet Muslim 
regions into the Muslim world” (Yemelianova, 2003, p. 186). Another group of 
scholars (including, but not limited to Scheafer, 2010) differentiates between 
‘Salafism’ and ‘Wahhabism’. From the knowledge acquired during present research, 
it seems to be important to distinguish ‘Wahabism’ from ‘Salafism’ for a number of 
reasons.  
As found by Wagemakers (2012), the term ‘Salafism’ refers to the broad ultra-
conservative movement within Sunni Islam emphasizing a close adherence to the 
model of the ‘Salaf’ or 'predecessors', who were the first few generations of the 
Muslims. According to Trevor Stanley, The name ‘Salafi’ comes from ‘al-salaf al-
saliheen’, the ‘pious predecessors’ of the early Muslim community (Stanley, 2005). 
The Islam of the first generations of the Muslims — ‘the Salaf’ — is considered the 
purest and most prestigious Islamic current to follow. If a Muslim walks close to ‘the 
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Salaf’ in how they live, then they will be rightly guided and on the path to gaining 
Allah's favor (Durie, 2013). Some scholars (Wagemakers, 2012), when discussing 
the roots of ‘Salafism’, refer to the names of Jamal al-Dim al-Afghani (1838-1997), 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). As argued by 
Sagramoso and Yarlykapov (2013), in Russia, the first underground ‘Salafi’ 
communities appeared in several mountainous villages of Dagestan in the early 
1970s. But in the 1990s, ‘Salafi’ ideas received further impetus with various 
contacts and exchanges that developed with the Middle Eastern scholars 
(Sagramoso and Yarlykapov, 2013). By itself, this form of Islam does not seem to 
be violent, however, there is a ‘sub-division’ or a ‘militant branch’ within ‘Salafism’, 
which I offer to refer to ‘Salafi Jihadist.’ As observed by John Turner, they aim to 
return to ‘true and pure Islam’ through violent ‘Jihad’ (Turner, 2014). In Russia, 
‘Salafi Jihadists’ are located mainly in the North Caucasus and are those who 
perceived to be the matter of concern for Russia, and its security, as they see 
‘violence as a necessary tool for establishing the Islamic rule’ (Conant). 
‘Wahhabism’, on the other hand, refers to a specific type of ‘Salafism’ propagated 
by the 18th-century reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1766) from the 
Central Arabian region of Najd. It was suggested by some scholars (Hroub, 2011; 
Lacroix, 2011; Baraz, 2010), that ‘Wahhabism’ has become ‘the Muslim World’s 
reaction to modernization forced by the Western world.’ 
Therefore, it should be noted that ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘Salafi’ share their strife for Islamic 
fundamentalism, however, as Joas Wagemakers (2012) contends, they differ 
ideologically, because of the ‘Wahhabi’ strict enforcement of their beliefs, their lack 
of tolerance towards others. Moreover, ‘Wahhabism’ is recognized (Ronczkowski, 
2011) for its strive toward establishing a government based on the Sharia law, 
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therefore ‘Wahhabis’ can hardly accept a secular government as a legitimate 
government. Just like with ‘Salafism’, ‘Wahhabism’ has its extreme forms, and 
propagate violent ‘Jihad’ as a method of promoting ‘Wahhabist’ philosophy. In their 
violent forms, ‘Salafism’ and ‘Wahhabism’ looks quite similar, as both apply ‘Jihad’ 
as the tool to achieve their goals. At the same time, some scholars see ‘Jihadism’ 
as a separate Islamist current. 
‘Jihadism’ is considered to be a separate form of ‘Religious Extremism’, which calls 
for ‘Islamization’ by violent means or through the waging of holy war (Jihad), as they 
interpret this concept (Hunter, 2004). ‘Jihadist’ ideas gained credence and a 
significant number of adherents as a result of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). 
According to Balderson (2013), the Afghan war left behind a vacuum of power. That 
vacuum quite quickly was filled with fractions, like the Taliban. Overall, how 
Eremenko (2015) argues, the Taliban was born in the struggle to expel the Soviet 
army during the occupation. After the Soviets withdrew the forces from Afghanistan, 
the Taliban was actively gaining supporters, and later on, their “Islamist propaganda 
spilled over the Northern border into the Soviet Central Asia, together with drug 
trafficking and arms smuggling for the future Jihad” (Cohen, 2002, p. 558). 
Therefore, as we can see, the war in Afghanistan and subsequent Taliban 
breakthrough into the post-Soviet space also contributed to the rise of ‘Religious 
Extremism’ in Russia. 
Also according to Hunter (2004), an offshoot of the ‘Jihadism’ movement in the 
North Caucasus is that of the ‘Shahidists’, whose members celebrate martyrdom as 
a way of achieving their goals. Perhaps the most common examples of ‘Shahidist’ 
attacks in Russia are the hostage-taking operation in Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater 
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in October 2002 and the suicide bombing of the headquarters of the pro-Moscow 
Chechen administration of Grozny in December 2002.  
Overall the terrorist attacks in Russia committed by ‘Religious Extremists’ provoked 
the rise in Islamophobia in Russia. At the same time, Yilmaz (2013) characterizes 
such a development as a reaction to “the flood of Muslims (including those who 
came to Russia illegally) in the major Russian cities”. Others see Islamophobia 
being a logical consequence of the rise in the Nationalistic mood among the 
Russian population (Wiginton, 2011; Mayers, 2006; The Washington Times, 2006). 
St Petersburg and Moscow in particular, have become potential centers of 
xenophobia and ethnically inspired violence (Yilmaz, 2013). In particular, in 2013, 
there was an increase in ethnic crimes in Russia in the capital cities (Laine, 2015, 
pp. 27). The  victims of those crimes were for the most part of the Central Asian 
origin (Laine, 2015, p. 27). The list of the Nationalist groups in Russia is given below 
in order to support the argument on increase in activities of nationalist and 
Islamophobic groups in Russia. Among the Nationalist groups in Russia, a few are 
most commonly listed by scholars:  
• The National Socialist Initiative (Natsional'naya Sotsialisticheskaya 
Initsiativa) is an active group formed at 2009 (Mirovalev, 2015); 
• The Russian Imperial Movement - founded in 2002, its ideology represents 
“Christian Orthodox imperial nationalism” (Shekhovtsov, 2015). 
• The Russian National Union - the group supported Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea, and called it “the Russian Spring” (Jensen, 2015).  
• The People’s Union - founded in 2008, but has evolved from the “People’s Will 
“ (Narodnaya Volya) party (Kaplan and Orlov, 2013);  
• "The Russians" (Russkie) Association, which acts as the successor to the 
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banned Movement Against Illegal Immigration, which was declared extremist 
by the High Court of Russian Federation and banned in 2011 (Laine, 2015, pp. 
27); 
• “Russian Action Coalition” (Russkaia koalitsiia deistviia) (Yudina and 
Alperovich, 2015); 
• “The Russians in St. Petersburg”  - led by Dina Garina (Mirovalev, 2015); 
• “The Motherland” (Rodina) party was founded in 2003; the party’s ideology is 
represented by Russian Nationalism and National Conservatism (Jensen, 
2015); 
• “Great Fatherland” party (Velikoe otechestvo) was founded in 2013; the party’s 
ideology rests on Centrism and National Conservatism (Jensen, 2015);  
• “National-Liberation Movement” - has the goal to unite everyone in Russia 
regardless of their political views: the restoration of the sovereignty of the 
country and liberation from its occupiers (Fyodorov).  
Overall, the relationships with Islam and Muslims either within Russia or abroad 
were said to be one of the main challenges Russia faces both in domestic and 
foreign affairs (Yilmaz, 2013). The matter seems to be quite complex and very 
sensitive on a number of reasons. On the one hand, Russia wants to demonstrate 
its struggles to eliminate terrorism, improve domestic security, and relax ethnic 
tensions. On the other hand, Russian policies ‘against Islamists’ (according to the 
official discourse) are criticized from the perspectives of human rights, because, as 
it’s argued by some Human Rights institutions, quite often the measures 
contemplated by the law enforcement agencies harm the civilian population of the 
Caucasus region (Human Rights Watch: World Report 2014: Russia; Amnesty 
International: Russian Federation 2015/2016; Poulin, 2011).  
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In recent years, Russia also demonstrates its intention to improve Russia’s image 
and relations with the Muslim world. In 2003, Putin even proclaimed, that “Russia is 
to a significant extent a part of the Muslim world” (Dannreuther, 2010, p. 17). A 
significant development took place in Russia’s relationship with the Muslim world in 
2003 when Russia joined the Organization of Islamic Conference as the observer. 
As a part of such a policy towards the Muslim world, recently there has been a 
certain change in a political discourse in relation to Islam. In particular, key 
politicians have become more careful in using terms related to Islam. For example, 
in 2008, Vladimir Putin for the first time made a positive assessment of ‘Wahhabi 
Islam’ in the public domain. In an interview with French newspaper Le Monde, 
which was reproduced in the Russian press, he stated that ‘Wahhabism’ in its 
original form is a normal tendency within Islam and there is nothing terrible in it 
(Putin, 2008). But there are some ‘extremist’ tendencies within the framework of 
‘Wahhabism’, which should be condemned (Sagramoso and Yarlykapov, 2013). In 
2009, Yevgeny Primakov, former Foreign Affairs, in his book made a sharp 
distinction between the Islamic states and the Taliban’s form of Islam, which he 
described as ‘Islamic Extremism’. ‘Fundamentalists’, who observe traditional Islamic 
rituals, but not engaging in violence, he regarded as not threatening (Primakov, 
2009). It seems that a term ‘Islamic Extremism’ or ‘Religious Extremism’ should be 
further used as an umbrella term for extreme forms of Islam in Russia: ‘Wahhabi 
Extremism’, ‘Salafi Jihadism’, ‘Jihadism’ or ‘Shahidism’.  
 
5.2 HOW DID ‘RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM’ COME TO RUSSIA? 
It is argued, that Muslims in Russia have a long history of continuous oppression 
from the side of the Russian government (Bennigsen, 1989; D'Encausse, 2009). 
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Some scholars suggest that such a tragic experience of oppression served as a 
catalyst for the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ in modern Russia (Gorenburg, 2006). 
However, some analysts also believe that such an assumption is groundless 
(Heathershaw and Montgomery, 2014). There are scholars, who also tie the rise of 
‘Religious Extremism’ in Russia with the external factors. For example, Anishchuk 
(2013) contends, that Moscow blames the spread of ‘Islamism’ throughout the North 
Caucasus on foreign influences in the region. Moreover, such ‘accusations’ were 
announced in the official discourse of Russian politicians, for example Vladimir 
Putin in 2013 (Reuters, 2013), Sergey Lavrov in 2016 (Russia Today, 2016).  
Firstly, it seems important to briefly demonstrate historical continuity in the 
oppression of the Muslims in Russia. As it was said before, until the Mongol 
invasion of Rus’ in 1223, the Muslims and Islam were only distant neighbors and not 
part of the Russia’s religious and political landscape. Islam’s introduction to Russia 
as a result of the Mongol conquest and the Tatar rule affected a formation of rather 
a negative were seen by the Russians as aggressors, conquerors, and oppressors 
(Hunter, 2004).  
The period from the conquest of Tatarstan, in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible until the 
coming to power of Catherine the Great in 1762 and further rule of Russian 
Romanovs’ dynasty was marked by a policy of systematic repression of Muslims 
and the destruction of the Muslim civilization within the Russia’s borders (Hunter, 
2004). The Bolshevik’s revolution took place in a country, which had about 10 
percent of the population being Muslims. As Ben Fowkes and Bulent Gokay note, 
the Revolution intensified so-called ‘radical mood’ of the Muslim population who’s 
religious rights heavily oppressed by the Imperial Russia, and in this way the 
Bolshevism was taken by the Russian Muslims as a preferable alternative to the 
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Tsarist rule (Fowkes and Gokay, 2012, p. 4). Fowkes and Gokay (2012) also stress 
that despite the Communist’s worldview was opposed in principle to all kinds of 
religious belief, including Islam, Lenin supposed that it was necessary to persuade 
‘Islamist’ movement to join the Communists in the struggle against the Tsarist rule. 
The North Caucasus Muslims saw  the collapse of the Russian Empire and the 
Bolshevik revolution in 1917 as an opportunity to end a century of occupation, 
however, it soon turned out that the Soviet oppression of all religious groups in 
Russia suppressed Islam along with the Orthodox Christianity (Cohen, 2012). 
However, after Lenin’s death the Bolshevik’s Party, the Muslim-friendly attitude was 
abandoned. Perhaps the most severe oppression the Muslims witnessed took place 
at the time of the Stalin’s rule.  Malashenko argues that despite the Soviets mainly 
sought to eradicate Orthodoxy, they also “viewed Islam in the Central Asia and the 
North Caucasus as a logical consequence of the backwardness of the peoples 
living there” (Malashenko, 2015, p. 63). Malashenko also adds that the Soviets were 
sure that the Soviet modernization would sooner or later help the Muslim 
“aborigines” to overcome their religious misconceptions” (Malashenko, 2015, p. 63). 
Overall, some stages of the Soviets’ anti-Islam campaign can be determined.   For 
example, Hunter (2004) suggests two stages in Stalin’s attitude toward religion in 
general and dealing with Islam and the Muslim populations in particular. First one 
was recalled as ‘Campaign of Eradication’ launched by Stalin in 1928. This attack 
included the massive closure of mosques accompanied by a large-scale 
persecution of the Muslim clergy (Hunter, 2004). The second one – ‘Limited 
rapprochement’ took place at the time of the World War II. The defense and survival 
of the Soviet Union became the main objectives and required the unity of all 
peoples. That affected Stalin’s decision to soften his attitude toward both religion 
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and nationalism (Hunter, 2004). Nevertheless, it is argued (Akhmetova) that, during 
the World War II, the Soviet Union deported many people of the North Caucasus 
under the pretext of allegedly helping the German army during its invasion of the 
Soviet Union. 
The period of Khrushchev’s leadership is known (Hunter, 2004) for his policy of de-
Stalinization. At the same time, he could hardly be called liberal with his attitudes 
towards religion, as he believed in antireligious programs and supported Stalin in 
contemplating them. At the same time, in case of Islam, the Soviet Union’s foreign 
policy objectives in the Middle East played important role in determining an 
approach to anti-Islamic campaigns. In particular, the Soviet Union wanted to 
expand its presence in the Middle East, and Islam’s persecution would not facilitate 
the Soviet’s endevour in the Middle Eastern region.  
Under Leonid Brezhnev, the anti-religious campaign acquired less hostile tone. 
During Brezhnev’s rule, the Soviet Union’s foreign policy interests led the 
government to change its attitude toward Islam and made the practice of Islam 
easier. By the mid-1960s, the USSR had made considerable inroads in the Middle 
East and was further interested in the expansion of its influence in the Persian Gulf 
and the Eastern Mediterranean (Hunter, 2004). Therefore, the Soviet’s attitude to 
Islam significantly transformed. The Soviet government also began to encourage 
limited and tightly controlled contacts between the official clergy and the Islamic 
world (Hunter, 2004). 
In 1988, one year after the official launching of ‘Perestroika’ and ‘Glasnost’ by 
Gorbachev, the Soviet policy toward religion, including Islam, changed further. 
Freedom of religion and freedom of conscience were guaranteed in a series of laws, 
which were adopted by the USSR and the RSFSR in October 1990. As argued by 
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White and Bourdeaux, the USSR’s Law in 1990 ‘On Freedom of Conscience and on 
Religious Organizations’ guaranteed the right of individuals to profess any kind of 
religion “individually or in conjunction with others, and to “express and disseminate 
convictions associated with hi/her relationship to religion” (White and Bourdeaux, 
2009, p. 3). Persecution on religious grounds was banned, and the rights of 
religious organizations were significantly extended and protected by law 
(Bennigsen, 1989). The RSFSR law “On Freedom of Religion” (on the 25th of 
October 1990), reiterated many of the principles upheld in the USSR law, and went 
even further in protecting individual religious rights, by declaring freedom of religion 
an “inalienable right of the citizens of the RSFSR” (in Sagramoso and Yarlykapov, 
2013).  
The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the revival of Islam in Russia. Such a 
revival resulted in the following developments. Among these, as observed by 
Malashenko (2013): 
• construction of thousands of mosques during 90s; 
• establishment of a system of religious education; 
• emergence of many Muslim organizations and charities; 
• establishment of relations with believers abroad.  
Also, as found by Keenan (2013), Muslim students from Russia started going 
abroad for study, particularly to the Saudi Arabia. At the same time, many Muslim 
clerics from Saudi Arabia and Turkey arrived in the region. Although such an 
‘exchange’ also had particularly negative consequences for the Russian domestic 
security. It is argued that ‘Wahabi’ and ‘Salafi’ philosophy, which was previously 
unusual for Russia, flooded Russia’s Muslim-populated regions (Malashenko, 
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2015). As Alexei Malashenko (2013) also notes, these new ideas, which did not 
match with the ideas propagated by the ‘traditional Islam’, brought a confusion into 
the minds and souls of the Muslims in Russia, especially the young people, who 
found these ideas very attractive.  At the same time, some scholars characterize a 
discourse on Post-Soviet ‘Muslim Radicalization’ in Russia as a myth (Heathershaw 
and Montgomery, 2014). However, certain facts speak more in support for those 
who see Muslim so-called ‘radicalization’ as a consequence of the Soviet Union fall.  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and subsequent declarations of 
independence of the former Soviet Republics in the Baltic, Central Asia, and 
Caucasus, most autonomous republics adopted the Declarations of a State 
Sovereignty that proclaimed their sovereign status. In 1992 the Republic of 
Tatarstan held a referendum on independence from Russia, and 62 percent of 
those who participated voted in favor of independence (Akhmetova). Muslims living 
under the Russian control for several centuries were not an exception. In October 
1991, Chechnya declared its independence from Russia, which the provoked 
invasion of the Russian federal troops in the region. Since that time, for almost 10 
years, the region was involved in the war between the Chechen separatists and 
against the Russian Federal government. It is, however, very important to notice 
that the two Chechen wars had different nature. In the first Chechen War (1994-
1996), Russian federal forces attempted to seize control over de facto ‘independent’ 
Chechnya, which ended in humiliating defeat for the Russian forces in 1996. 
Whereas the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) is argued to be marked with 
Islamisation of the conflict, which opened up a fierce sectarian fight between 
‘Sufism’, and violent ‘Islamic Extremists’ (‘Extremist Wahhabism’, ‘Salafi Jihadism’) 
(Falkowski, 2016; Knysh, 2007; Smirnov, 2008). In other words, as Vakhit Akaev 
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puts it, the Chechen nationalism and separatism were replaced with ‘Islamic 
Extremism (Akaev, 1999). The ‘Islamic Extremists’ movement started to increase in 
numbers especially by recruiting jobless and often spiritually indifferent young 
people (Akaev, 1999). 
‘Sufi’ Islam, existing in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Ingushetia, was regarded by ‘the 
Islamists. As a delusion and a deviation from the rules of pure Islam, of which they 
claim to be the only followers. The conflict between the ‘Islamic Extremists’ and the 
followers of ‘Sufi’ Islam began in 1995. ‘Islamic Extremists’ accused the 
representatives of the official ‘Sufi’ clergy of the North Caucasus, who adhered to 
moderate religious and political views, of collaborating with the Russian 
Government and of an unwillingness to uphold the national and religious interests of 
the Muslims in the region (Akaev, 1999). In 2001, the president of Chechnya 
outlawed ‘Wahhabism’ in the Republic, and later in the same year, neighboring 
Kabardino-Balkaria followed suit. Earlier, in 1999, a similar law was adopted in 
Dagestan (Malashenko, 2013). According to Sokirianskaia, as the Army established 
control over the territory in 2001-2002, Overall, the large-scale military operations 
were replaced by the so-called ‘targeted’ operations or ‘zachistki’ [mop-up 
operations], where representatives of the Federal Security Service (FSB) used to 
arrive at particular Chechen settlements (Sokirianskaia, 2008, p. 125).  
As a part of further stabilization, the policy of so-called ‘Chechenization’ has been 
pursued by the Federal authorities since 2002. As a result, significant political, 
administrative and military functions have been transferred to the ethnic Chechens 
because the program entailed the recruitment of local Chechens into the law 
enforcement agencies. Also, the Russian government has made efforts to use its 
Muslim population to increase ties with the Muslim world, including becoming an 
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observer at the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 2005, the most important 
international organization of Muslim states (Therme, 2013). More importantly, by 
late 2000s, the federal and regional authorities in the Caucasus began to change 
their uncompromising attitude toward non-traditional forms of Islam, by encouraging 
a dialogue with moderate non-violent ‘Salafi’ groups. In this way, as argued by 
Sagramoso and Yarlykapov (2013), the federal and regional authorities were 
moderate Islamic currents into the official and legal Islamic space. Persecution 
ceased, ‘Salafi’ mosques were allowed to open and a commission for the 
rehabilitation of fighters was set up. It was argued that the rise of moderate 
‘Salafism’ has cut the number of young people becoming terrorists (The Economist, 
2013). 
 
5.3 THE ILLUSION OF PEACE IN THE RUSSIAN NORTH CAUCASUS AND ITS 
CONNECTION TO RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO SYRIA 
 
Some scholars (like Falkowski, 2014) believe that current relatively peaceful 
situation in the North Caucasus to great extent is an illusion. This doesn’t seem to 
be groundless to me.  The program of so-called ‘Chechenization’, initiated in 2002, 
seems to bring both positive and negative changes in the region. According to 
Falkowski, the program has been mainly based on approval of the autonomous 
status of Chechnya within the Russian Federation and guarantees of high subsidies 
in exchange of stabilising the situation using any mean possible (Falkowski, 2014). 
As a consequence of such a policy, a certain disproportionate distribution of 
subsidies began to develop in Russia. In the same fashion, Natalia Zubarevich 
describes the North Caucasus and Chechnya in particular as “a bottomless pit for 
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federal subsidies” (Zubarevich, 2011). Maria Lipman also contends that “the per 
capita share of the federal budget has been significantly higher in Chechnya than 
the average indicator for Russia’s regions, whereby the Chechen economy itself is 
barely viable: in 2011, 90 percent of the Chechen budget consisted of federal 
transfer funds” (Lipman, 2015). What is more, the federal center did not control how 
these funds were spent. As a result, such a ‘privileged’ position of the Caucasus 
Region in comparison to other regions drew a lot of criticism towards the Russian 
government.   
A lot of criticism evolved also around the figure of Ramzan Kadyrov, the current 
Head of the Chechen Republic. According to Mark Galeotti, Kadyrov “took full 
advantage of the opportunities to plunder the federal subsidies which continue 
to pour into Chechnya, and also dispenses such opportunities to his friends” 
(Galeotti, 2015).  Ramzan Kadyrov in many ways represents a controversial figure 
in Russia. On the one hand, he has gained the image of a guarantor of stability in 
the Caucasus region in the eyes of many Russians and the Russian Muslims 
(Russel, 2014). He is also considered to be a member of Vladimir Putin’s ‘inner 
circle’, and as such proved himself being one of the most loyal and reliable 
associates. However, on the other hand, there is a lot of criticism formed around his 
personality and his policy. According to Mark Galeotti (2015), Kadyrov’s personal 
authority over Chechnya is absolute. Moreover, As Galeotti continues, Kadyrov has 
used this to fill the republic’s hierarchy with his allies, friends, and relatives (Galeotti, 
2015). It is true that Ramzan Kadyrov enjoys a very privileged status in comparison 
to the leaders of other Russian Republics. For example, Kadyrov is the only leader 
in any of Russia’s republics who has a private army (Walker, 2015)  Some scholars .
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even speak about ‘the cult of personality’ of Mr. Kadyrov (International Crisis Group, 
2015).  
The North Caucasus represents the region of a special significance for Russia. Like 
Vladimir Putin said in 2011: “The North Caucasus is not a ballast, but one of the 
pearls of Russia” (in Schwirtz, 2011). However, it seems that Russia is paying rather 
a very high price for the stability in Chechnya. As argued by Judah, this policy has 
already been heavily criticized by opposition’s members, who urged the federal 
government to expel the North Caucasus republics from the Federation (Judah, 
2013). Despite the security situation in Chechnya and the North Caucasus has 
relatively normalized, some of the region’s problems remain unresolved. 
Unemployment in parts of the North Caucasus is quite high (Schwirtz, 2011), 
poverty in the villages hasn’t decreased, and hundreds of people die from frequent 
‘Islamists’ attacks (Judah, 2013)  As Maciej Falkowski (2014) suggests, the .
Caucasus’s stability is to great extent linked to the stability of Russia itself. A 
serious economic or political crisis in the Russian Federation might cause 
‘unfreezing’ of the Caucasian problems, which may explode with a new strength 
(Falkowski, 2014). The crisis may well re-activate the idea of the Chechen 
independence. Under Falkowski, “Ramzan Kadyrov is laying the foundations for this 
idea much more successfully than the General Dzhokhar Dudayev did in the early 
1990s” (Falkowski, 2014). Also, despite the stabilisation of the situation in 
Chechnya and an overall decrease in the terrorist activities, ‘Religious Extremists’ 
were not fully eradicated in the region, and continue committing terrorist acts 
throughout Russia. 
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According to the Global Terrorism Index for 2014 prepared by the Institute for 
Economics and Peace, Russia ranked 11th out of 162 countries, behind only 
countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan (Institute For Economics & 
Peace, 2014). For many years following the fall of the Soviet Union, terrorism in 
Russia was primarily referred to the North Caucasus, however, later on, it also 
spilled out to other regions in Russia. In March 2011, Doku Umarov, the former 
President of the Republic of Ichkeria, and later a rebel leader, in the video message, 
announced his intention to expand the so-called ‘Caucasus Emirate’ into Russia’s 
heartland, and called for the Muslims in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to revolt 
against Russia (Ferris-Rotman, 2011). The Emirate in the Caucasus was 
proclaimed by Umarov in 2007 when he abolished the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
and named himself the Emir of the Caucasus Emirate (Hahn, 2011). Before that, as 
observed by Keenan (2013), Tatarstan has long been a model region for religious 
and ethnic tolerance. However, in July 2012, in the Republican capital Kazan, the 
Muslim leader, Valiulla Yakupov, was shot dead, and the Mufti of Tatarstan, Ildus 
Fayzov, was seriously wounded (Ivshina, 2012). The assassination was carried out 
by the local ‘Jihadists’, who fought Faizov’s campaigns to rid Tatarstan of ‘Religious 
Extremism’. Overall, there is a common development of religious traditionalists 
gradually losing their popularity among the Muslim youth in Russia, because, how 
Margaret Conant states, ‘Religious Extremists’ are often capable of offering 
answers to the questions that concern the youth (Conant).  
As noted above, in 2007, Umarov, “declared a creation of what he called ‘the 
Caucasus Emirate’ in order to establish the Islamic state under the Sharia law 
encompassing the entire North Caucasus region and Dagestan” (Russe, 2014, p. 
154). As Falkowski (2015) argues, the emergence of such Islamic State in the 
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Caucasus poses an additional threat to domestic security of the Russian 
Federation, primarily for the ethnic Russians and the residents of the Caucasian 
republics due to the risk of a new wave of ‘Islamist’ terrorism in Russia, and the 
intensification of the militants’ actions in the Caucasus. Hahn (2007) contends that, 
since its foundation, the Caucasus Emirate cells and operatives have carried out 
nearly 3,000 attacks in Russia. Being a “part and parcel of the global ‘Jihadist’ 
revolutionary alliance” (Hahn, 2007, p. 59), it is said that, the Caucasus Emirate 
have significant ties and find great inspiration in the Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham, which has great plans involving Russian Caucasus (Suchkov, 2014).  
In September 2014, The Islamic State militants posted a video threat addressed to 
Bashar al-Assad and the Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the video, the 
terrorists said that Assad’s weapons would be turned against him as well as the 
Russian equipment, which was used to bomb the Islamic State fighters 
(Dubovikova, 2014). One Islamic State militant said he would like to convey a 
message to Vladimir Putin, in which he warned that the Islamic State will “liberate 
Chechnya and the Caucasus” and also added, “Putin’s throne would be taken by 
the Islamic State” (in Dubovikova, 2014). Islamic State claims to territory within 
Russia are not new. Earlier there was even a map released by the Islamic State, in 
which the Southern territories of Russia were colored as parts of the ‘Islamic 
Caliphate’. The map was issued as a directive for an estimated Islamic State’s 
territorial expansion by 2020 (Barmin, 2014). Moreover, it has also been proved that 
the Russian nationals are fighting for the Islamic State and other ‘Islamist’ groups in 
Syria. According to Alexander Bortnikov, the Director of the Russian Federal 
Security Service, nearly 1,700 Russian nationals are believed to be fighting on the 
side of the Islamic State (TASS, 2015). Some Islamic State’s militants are also said 
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to be the veterans of the Chechen wars or relatives of the exiles (Dearden, 2014). 
The President of the Religion and Society Information and Analysis Center, Alexey 
Grishin, points out, that the Middle Eastern ‘Islamists’ are also providing tangible 
support to their coreligionists in Russia (Grishin, 2012).  This support might evolve 
into a direct sponsorship of the ‘Islamists’ activities on the territory of the Russian 
Federation, where the large Muslim groups live. That poses a direct threat to the 
Russian domestic security. Moreover, it is argued, that the Islamic State constantly 
seeks to lure more of their compatriots and has stated a goal of establishing a 
brigade out of the Chechens (Barmin, 2014). As Maciej Falkowski notes, ”the fact 
that the Caucasian ‘Islamists’ have physically joined the ‘Global Jihad’ sets a 
precedent in the history of the modern Caucasian wars - never before have they 
participated in a mass scale ‘Jihad’ outside the Caucasus (Falkowski, 2014). It 
appears, however, that attracting Chechens as fighters is not the sole goal of the 
Islamic State. Recently it became known that the organization has set up a 
Caucasus-focused school for Russian-speaking children, fighters-to-be, in Syria’s 
Rakka (Barmin, 2014).  
Moreover, as observed by Barmin  (2014), the Islamic State created a website, 
which specifically targets Russia. Overall, the Islamic State has proved to be using 
the latest technology to attract the supporters around the world. In this regard, Tom 
Whitehead argues, the Islamic State developed an application for a smartphone 
called “Dawn of glad tidings” through Google Play for Android phones, which allows 
them to lure supporters across the globe (Whitehead, 2014).  
As we can see, the spread and strength of the Islamic State have proved to serve 
as a direct threat to the domestic stability and security of Russia. In many ways, as 
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found by Askari (2013), fears of the ‘Islamist’ expansion prompted Russian support 
for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Snetkov notices that one of the 
arguments of Russia’s support to the Assad’s regime was influenced by a 
perception that the functioning regime in Syria is a better source of defense against 
a further spread of ‘Religious Extremism’ and foreign fighters (Snetkov, 2014, p. 
184). It was argued that on a number of occasions Russian President, Vladimir 
Putin, as well as the Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, urged all Middle Eastern 
states and the US to cooperate with the Syrian government’s fight against the 
Islamic State (in Baczynska, 2015; Pickles, 2015). 
Moreover, as Askari (2013) contends, Russia is opposed to the regime change in 
Syria because it fears that the rise of ‘Religious Extremist’ activities would also 
encourage separatist tendencies among the Muslims in Russia. These fears also do 
not seem groundless. According to Malashenko (2014), the victories of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and the ‘Islamist’ Ennahda Party in Tunisia, as well as the 
participation of the ‘Islamists’ in the Libya’s new government and their growing 
activities intensified political activities of some ‘Islamist’ groups in Russia. In August 
2012, in Kazan, a capital of Tatarstan, protesters called for the overthrow of the 
Russia’s government (Malashenko, 2014). In February 2013, in Dagestan’s capital, 
Makhachkala, two ‘Islamist’s’ organizations held a demonstration to show solidarity 
with Assad’s opponents (Malashenko, 2014). In August 2012, ‘Islamists’ from the 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s cell in Tatarstan organised a celebration of a Muslim holiday in 
Kazan and demanded the Russian flags to be removed and replaced with their 
symbols (Malashenko, 2014). According to Mezzofiore (2014), Hizb ut-Tahrir al-
Islami, or Islamic Party of Liberation, is considered a terrorist organization in many 
countries, including Russia, where the party was banned in 2003 under the 
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Supreme Court decision. It is also found by Malashenko (2014), that ‘Islamists’ have 
also become more active in the neighbouring Republic of Bashkortostan, where 
several ‘Islamist’ groups already existed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Particular attention of this Chapter is devoted to the analysis of Islam, its history in 
Russia, and in particular to the study of ‘Religious Extremism’, which considered to 
be one of the main threats to the Russian national security and integrity nowadays. 
The first part of this chapter explains that in modern Russia, the official political 
discourse on Islam is twofold. It is demonstrated that there is a differentiation 
between so-called ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ Islam. ‘Sufism’ represents so-
called ‘traditional’ form of Islam in Russia. It is contend that by itself, ‘Sufism’ is 
rather a complex form of Islam, having a number of sub-currents or schools 
(‘Hanafism’, ‘Hanabalism’, ‘Shafiism’ and ‘Malikism’), and represented by a few 
brotherhoods (‘Naqshbanaya’, ‘Qadiriya’, and ‘Shaziliya’) in Russia. The chapter 
demonstrates that today, ‘Sufi Islam’ in Russia is represented by ‘Hanafism’, which 
is also taken as the position of key political bodies representing the interests of the 
Russian Muslims - the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and European 
Countries of the CIS and the Russian Council of Muftis. It is also showed that 
‘traditional’ Islam is supported by the Russian government. Such a partnership 
relations between the Muslim Clergy and the Russian government has proved to 
form quite a new development in Russian politics. In this part, the confusion existing 
in the Russian political discourse on the matter of differentiation between ‘Salafism’, 
‘Wahhabism’, their so-called ‘extreme’ forms, as well as ‘Jihaddism’ and 
‘Shahiddism’ is addressed. It demonstrates that these forms of Islam in Russia are 
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recognized as ‘non-traditional’. Moreover, it also shows that so-called ‘non-
traditional’ Islam in Russia stands opposite to so-called ‘official’ or ‘traditional’ Islam 
in Russia.  
Part 2 of this chapter offers an analysis of how Islam and the Muslims were 
historically oppressed in Russia. It also offers a reader the evidence on how 
‘Religious Extremism’ has become one of the consequences of the Soviet demise.  
Part 3 of this chapter is dedicated to proving the argument that domestic security in 
Russia remains rather fragile due to a high risk of ‘Islamist’ terrorism across the 
Russian Federation. It also demonstrates how the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ 
during the Arab Spring, and in particular, activities of the Islamic State, pose threat 
to Russia’s domestic security and territorial integrity. Such evidence also proves the 
argument that domestic security considerations affected Russian foreign policy 
decision-making in Syria.   
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CHAPTER VI. RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
6.1 RUSSIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES 
 
According to Rubinstein (2004), the term ‘Middle East’ has been in general usage 
since 1902, when the American naval historian Mahan described the region around 
the Persian Gulf as, viewed from Europe, neither Near East, nor the Far East. It is 
commonly agreed that the Middle East refers to Turkey, Iran, the Arab Gulf states, 
Israel and its neighbours (Nizameddin, 1999). The Russia’s relationships with the 
Middle Eastern states seem to have been always complex. However, in modern 
time, the Middle Eastern region represents the area of particular importance for 
Russia. Firstly, the region is geopolitically valuable due to its close proximity to the 
Russian borders. Moreover, as Zvi Magen suggests, the region comes as “the place 
where regional and global interests converge, and as such, it is an arena for the 
international competition between the states – political, economic, and security-
based” (Magen, 2013, p. 33). Also, stability in the Middle East has a dramatic effect 
on Russia, as the threats arising from this region are the matters not only of foreign 
policy but of the Russia domestic policy, security and territorial integrity as well. 
These threats mainly concern the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ across the Middle 
East. This development, as it is mentioned in previous chapters, has become the 
matter of particular attention in Russia, because the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ in 
the Middle East affects the domestic security in Russia. As a consequence, Russia 
builds its foreign policy in the Middle East and Syria in particular on its domestic 
security implications. Another important aspect, as observed by Baev (2015), is that 
the Middle East region provides the best opportunity for Moscow to sustain the 
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status of the key player in the Global political arena and in the Middle Eastern 
region in particular. At the same time, it is worth saying that Russia has not always 
had these strategic interests and ambitions in the region. 
Russia’s more direct involvement in the Middle East was foreshadowed by two 
developments: the capture of Kazan from the the Muslim Tatars in 1552, which 
opened up the entire lower Volga River region for settlement and penetration, and, 
the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian Empire in 1654, which ushered in 
centuries of conflict between the Russian Empire and the retreating Ottoman 
Empire. Over the course of 250 years, the two fought each other 13 times (Petro 
and Rubinstein, 1996). Even in the 19th or 20th century, the Middle East was not 
among the most vital interests of the Russian leaders. According to Petro and 
Rubinstein (1996), Russia’s primary security and diplomatic concerns were focused 
on its Western borders in Europe. Russian foreign relations with the Arab world had 
undergone dramatic changes after it was transformed into the USSR in 1922 
following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. As argued by Kreutz (2006), the Soviet 
rulers were in constant search of new partners and friends in their mission to 
struggle against the Western Capitalist domination. In further years Moscow 
invested greatly in military, economic and political integration with the Middle East. If 
Stalin paid little attention to the region as a whole, though paying much attention to 
relations with Turkey and Iran. Khrushchev perceived the region as particularly 
important for enhancing the Soviet prestige and in parallel limiting the US influence 
in the region. During the Brezhnev’s rule, Iraq and Iran were placed at the top of the 
interests in Russia (Nizameddin, 1999). A major change in the Russia-Middle East 
relations came with the Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’, which rejected the role of 
ideology in the foreign policy-making. During the 1990s, Russia did not even 
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attempt to define its national interests in the Middle East and the Arab world. 
However, since the moment of Vladimir Putin coming to power, Moscow started 
pursuing a more active policy in the region (Malashenko, 2013). It is suggested by 
some scholars that Russia’s re-appearance as an active player in the Middle East 
under President Vladimir Putin has the aim of restoring the country’s position as the 
‘Great Power’ (Trenin, 2016; Borshchevskaya and Gordon, 2016; Parker, 2015). 
This part of chapter VI focuses on the Russia’s relations only with the Arab states in 
the Middle East, therefore neglecting the Russia-Israel relations, as they do not 
represent particular relevance for this thesis. 
Iran 
Iran occupies a special position in the Middle East, and mostly because of its 
geostrategic location. In the West, Iran borders with Iraq. In the North-Western 
sector, Iran runs a common border with Turkey. Along with a large stretch of its 
Northern border – Azerbaijan, and in the East, Iran has a common border with 
Afghanistan (Gusher, 1997). Over the years, relations between Russia and Iran had 
their ups and downs. The Soviet-Iranian relations were rather poor between 1945 
and 1961 but improved gradually after 1962. Since the dissolution of the USSR, Iran 
has become one of the main Russian partners in bilateral, regional, and Global 
matters. Both in the Soviet time and after the USSR fall, Russia and Iran has done a 
lot for expanding and strengthening of friendly relations and cooperation between 
each other. One of the important points here is that Iran has been under sanctions 
ever since 1979. According to Nader Habibi (2013), there were about three rounds 
of anti-Iran sanctions: first round was initiated in 1980 after the Iran hostage crisis; 
the second one - in the 1980s, and was a part of the US dual containment policy 
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adopted against Iran and Iraq; the third one was imposed in the 1990s, when the 
United States became alarmed about the Iran’s nuclear programme. As observed 
by Habibi (2013), the EU and the United Nations joined the US in anti-Iran sanctions 
in the 2000s. It can be suggested that in many ways Russia-Iran cooperation is 
based on their common anti-Western sentiments and desire to oust the West from 
the Middle East. Today the two countries have a large number of very close 
interests both on the regional level and in the sphere of bilateral relations. For 
example, in 2015, Russia and Iran signed a contract to supply S-300 missile system 
(BBC, 2015). 
 
Turkey  
Russia and Turkey have a long history of turbulent relations, including periods of an 
open military confrontation, and the periods of a lucrative partnership. The essence 
of the initial rivalry seems to be in a competition between two empires – the Russian 
Empire, which saw itself as ‘the Third Rome’, and the Ottoman Empire. A direct 
rivalry with the Ottoman Empire began from the Crimean war of 1853–1856, putting 
an alliance of Turkey, Britain, and France against Russia (Demirtepe, 2013). That 
quite soon was followed by the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Another important 
episode of confrontation was resulted by the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in 
the 19th century. As a result of Russia’s annexation of the North Caucasus and, as 
argued by Walter Richmond (2013), the subsequent genocide of the Circassian 
population in the region, about one million Caucasus Muslims (mainly Circassians) 
migrated to Turkey (Richmond, 2013). It is suggested that these communities still 
live in Turkey and that they influenced the Turkish negative attitude to the Chechen 
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wars in Russia in the 1990s (Markedonov and Ulchenko, 2011; The Conversation, 
2015). 
During the Soviet rule, the relations between two states remained rather tense 
(Gokay, 1997, 2006). Also, the Soviet’s attitude to Turkey was marked by lack of 
trust. According to Harris (1972), one of the milestones between The Soviets and 
Turkey was mainly concerned over Turkey’s alignment with the West, not the 
Soviets. As Harris also argues, for the Soviets, another “irritant in the relationship 
stemmed from the suppression of the Turkish Communist Party by the Kemalist 
regime in 1925” (Harris, 1972, p. 5). Before the World War II, the relations between 
two states further deteriorated after the Montreux Convention Regarding the 
Regime of the Straits in 1936. In particular, the Soviets were not satisfied with their 
demands of the Straits at the Black Sea. (MacFie, 1989; Rozakēs, 1987). As it has 
been argued, the tension reached the peak when Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and 
placed itself within the Western alliance against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold 
War (Gokay, 2006; Ruff, 2016).  
After the fall of the Communist rule, the Russia-Turkey relations entered a phase of 
peaceful coexistence and strategic bilateral cooperation. According to Ruff (2016), 
Russia became Turkey's largest provider of energy, while many Turkish companies 
began to operate in Russia. Before the Syrian conflict, relations between Turkey 
and Russia enjoyed a very lucrative stage for both states. As Özdal, Özertem, Has 
and Demirtepe (2013) note, Turkey, and Russia made numerous deals in such 
sectors as bilateral trade, the energy sector (including gas, oil, nuclear energy), 
tourism and others. The Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Russian 
leader, Vladimir Putin, seemed to develop a good chemistry between each other. As 
Adam Balcer argues, “since becoming Prime Minister of Turkey in 2003, Erdogan 
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has met with President Putin or spoke with him over the telephone around 35 times, 
an impressive number given that Putin rarely meets with world leaders that often” 
(Balcer, 2015). All that dramatically changed mainly due to different views Turkey 
and Russia had in relation to the Syrian conflict. This is discussed in more details in 
the following subchapter 6.3 The Arab Spring and its effects on Russia.  
 
Jordan 
Jordan initially attracted a little attention of the Russian political administration due 
to a small size of the state, and its rather pro-Western foreign policy. The situation 
began to change after the first Arab-Israeli War, in the aftermath of which Jordan 
gained some territory of the Arab Palestine including the East Jerusalem (the West 
Bank), which made it more important in geopolitical terms (Kreutz, 2006). Kreutz 
(2006) contends that by 1970, the USSR became the main arms supplier to the 
region, and also the Jordanian King was interested in getting the Soviet military 
equipment. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 drastically changed regional and the 
Global dynamics. The Post-Soviet Russia actively supported the Jordan-Israeli 
rapprochement and encouraged King Hussein to sign the peace treaty with Israel in 
1994 (Maddy-Wetzmann, 1995). But two problems emerged: firstly, there was a 
question of Jordan’s debt to Russia, and, secondly, there was the Russian military 
intervention to Chechnya, which was strongly condemned by the Chechen 
community in Jordan (Working, 2001).  
The Circassian community (which also includes Chechens) settled in Jordan during 
the Ottoman Empire times in the middle of the 19th century and became part of the 
Jordanian society and establishment (Natho, 2009, p. 485). As Kreutz (2006) 
argues, anti-Russian and pro-separatist propaganda found a receptive audience 
there, and the Chechen fighters from Russia even managed to find financial support 
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from Jordan. Nevertheless, the Chechen disagreement did not have a deep or 
lasting impact on the Russian-Jordan relations. For Jordan, the matter was a 
peripheral issue that didn’t affect friendship with Moscow. By late 1990s, Jordan 
officially recognised the Chechen conflict as the Russian domestic matter and put a 
strict ban on a pro-Chechen separatist propaganda in the country (Kreutz, 2006, p. 
43). 
According to Kreutz (2006), after the death of King Hussein in 1999, Abdullah II, 
who inherited his throne, expanded the Jordanian-Russian relations by finding a 
suitable partner in the new Russian leader, Vladimir Putin. In the political and 
strategic arena, both countries have common concerns over developments in the 
Israeli-occupied Palestinian Territories and the Israeli policies in the Palestinian 
Territories, as well as a spread of ‘Religious Extremism’ in the region. Another 
common focus was the Iraqi situation and the American role in the region. In 2015, 
Russian and Jordanian officials even agreed to establish a so-called “special 
working mechanism” to share information on counter-terrorist operations in Syria 
(Lendman, 2015). 
Lebanon 
According to Kreutz (2006), the Lebanon’s strategically important coastal location 
and its relatively numerous Christian population had, for a long time, attracted the 
attention of the European powers, including the Russian Empire. When the 
Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they started looking for allies in pursuing the 
Communist ideas in the Arab world. Lebanon became a gateway for “the 
Communist infiltration into the region” (Kreutz, 2006, p. 33). The first Arab 
Communist organization was established in October 1924 under the name of “The 
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Lebanese People’s Party”, and in further years it facilitated the Soviet’s political and 
cultural influence in Lebanon (Kreutz, 2006). During the civil war in Lebanon in 
1975, the USSR supported the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian 
coalition, which included the Lebanese Communist Party (Kreutz, 2006). Soviet 
influence in Lebanon was reduced to a minimum as a result of two events. Firstly, 
The Soviets were not able to prevent the Lebanese Civil War in 1975-1976 
(Rabinovich, 1979, p. 58).  Secondly, as explained by Golan, Beirut was 
disappointed with Moscow’s quite passive attitude towards the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 (Golan, 1982-83, p. 7). As a result, the Russia’s role in Lebanon 
was reduced to a minimum in further years. 
The situation changed after the Soviet Union demise. As Kreutz (2006) observes, 
Lebanon was one of the first states who recognized the Russian Federation as an 
independent state in December 1991. Although the fall of the USSR greatly 
weakened the Russia’s influence in the Middle East. During the last decades, the 
Russian-Lebanese relations have slowly re-emerged. In spring 1995, Kozyrev 
visited Lebanon to restart bilateral relations. As a result, a treaty on trade and 
economic cooperation was signed (Kreutz, 2006). During the Israeli military 
intervention in the Southern Lebanon, Moscow on the one hand strongly 
condemned the anti-Israeli terrorist assault, however, on the other hand, expressed 
concern that the Lebanese sovereignty was violated (Kreutz, 2006). Overall, 
Moscow’s support for Lebanon has not changed, and in the following years, both 
political and economic relations between Russia and Lebanon seemed to be 
advanced. There is economic cooperation between Russia and Lebanon, with trade 
between the two countries increased significantly, particularly after the 2006 Second 
Lebanon War (Kreutz, 2006). After the war, Russia sent humanitarian aid and 
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military engineering units to help in rebuilding infrastructures and construct bridges. 
Russia also supplies Lebanon with weapons (Kreutz, 2006).  
While maintaining relations with the Lebanese government, Russia has also 
established a separate relationship with Hizbollah. Unlike many Western states, 
Russia does not consider Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization. As the Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov says: “They [Hezbollah] have never 
committed any terrorist acts on the Russian territory. Hezbollah was elected by 
people to the Lebanese parliament. There are the cabinet members and ministers 
who are from Hezbollah in Lebanon. It's a legitimate socio-political force” (in Taher, 
2015). Important to notice, the Hezbollah forces appeared to be fighting in Syria in 
support of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is also a Moscow’s ally (in 
Taher, 2015).  
Egypt 
The Russian-Egyptian relations have a long history. Egypt was the first and most 
important polity in the Middle East with which the Soviets established relations. 
According to Potserebov (1997), during the Nasser years, many young Egyptians 
studied in the Soviet universities and military schools, including the future Egypt’s 
president Hosni Mubarak. El-Hussini (2016) contends that during the Presidency of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970), the Russia-Egypt relations entered into a 
cooperative phase, and included a military assistance, economic and political 
support. The relationships went sour when the new President Anwar Sadat started 
reorienting the country toward the West (Shlykov, 2015). In 1981, these relations 
were severed as a result of the Soviet’s opposition to the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
treaty. Relations were reestablished under the President Hosni Mubarak, and 
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further intergovernmental improvement in relations followed after the fall of the 
USSR. In April 2005, the Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Egypt, and 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited Russia back in April 2008. Nizameddin 
(1999) says that both countries agreed to work together to help Egypt to create a 
nuclear programme for the civilian purposes.  
Iraq 
Moscow’s relations with Iraq also have a long and complex history. It is the author’s 
belief that these relations have been important mainly for historical and geostrategic 
reasons. The Iraqi Communist Party founded in 1934, was one of the most effective 
and socially influential Marxist organisations in the region and represented a 
significant political force in the country (Kreutz, 2006). Being soured in January 
1955, when the Iraqi government decided to join the Baghdad Pact (or The Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO), or the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), 
which was mainly intended to prevent the Soviet expansion in the Middle East, 
Russia-Iraq relations were re-established in 1958 by a new Iraqi leader, the General 
Abd-al-Karim Qasim, after a military coup (Kreutz, 2006). Iraq remained a close ally 
of the USSR until the end of the Soviet era (Kreutz, 2006). Magen (2011) suggests 
that Russia considered Iraq being geopolitically important as the link between the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Iran, the Caucasus, and the Central Asia. 
Post-Soviet Russia remained interested in cooperation with Iraq and showed its 
political support to Baghdad against the United States since 1994. According to 
Campbel (1999) and Kreutz (2006), Primakov service as a Foreign Minister (1996-
1998) was marked with his personal links with Iraq. As Kreutz (2006) contends, 
these personal sentiments Primakov developed between 1968 and 1970 when he 
worked as a Soviet press correspondent in Baghdad and had friendly relations with 
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Saddam. Therefore, Iraq became one of his main priorities in the Middle Eastern 
region. It seems that Putin’s and Lavrov’s policy toward Iraq in many ways followed 
Primakov’s lead. The relations between Iraq and Russia were improved and Iraq 
was perceived as the Russia's reliable partner in the Middle East. Although, as 
stated by Kreutz (2006), Russia’s political and economic influence in Iraq decreased 
dramatically after the American invasion in 2001. At the same time, the Russian 
government managed to establish good relations with the new Iraqi regime. Now 
the two states remain partners in military and economic sectors. In particular, in 
2012, Russia and Iraq signed an over $1 billion arms deal package including an air-
defense system, tanks, infantry weapons, warplanes and helicopter gunships (Al-
Amir, 2012). In terms of an economic partnership, Russia trade with Iraq was said to 
reach a record total of nearly $2 billion in 2015 (Sputnik News, 2016). 
 
Afghanistan 
According to Saikal, Farhadi, and Nourzhanov (2012), the roots of the Soviet’s 
interest in Afghanistan can be traced in the 19th century and the ‘Great Game’ 
politics between Russia and Britain, under which Afghanistan served as a strategic 
‘buffer state’ between Russia and Britain. In 1919, Afghanistan proclaimed its full 
independence, and the Soviet Union was the first country to establish diplomatic 
relations with Afghanistan in 1919. As Nicolai Petro (1997) notes, the Soviet-
Afghanistan relations improved in 1954 as part of the Khrushchev’s policy of 
improving relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan and undermining the US 
policy of containment. The Soviets began a major economic assistance program in 
Afghanistan, and between 1954 and 1978, Afghanistan received more than $1 
billion of the Soviet aid, including substantial military assistance, as well as 
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agreements on gas and oil development, trade, transport, irrigation and factory 
construction, were concluded (Saikal, Farhadi and Nourzhanov, 2012). 
In December 1979, the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan in order to protect the 
Communist government of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan against a 
growing insurgency (Feifer, 2009).  At the end, the whole campaign turned out to be 
very costly for Russia. 
As argued by Feifer (2009), the Afghan resistance (the Mujahideen) was heavily 
supported by a variety of international actors, including the US, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, China, and Egypt.  In the end, the Mujahideen prevailed and the Soviet 
Army was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in February 1989, having lost tens of 
thousands killed and wounded (Petro, 1997).  
As observed by Menkiszak (2011), after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001 
by the US and the UK forces, the Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan went through 
various stages. Afghanistan still remains important for Russia by a number of 
reasons. Firstly, as it was perceived by the Russian government, Afghanistan 
occupies an important geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic location, as it is 
a country which connects important regions: the post-Soviet Central Asia and the 
Middle East with South and East Asia” (Menkiszak, 2011). Also, Afghanistan has 
always been one of the central matters of Russian and Soviet foreign policy and 
remains to be one of the important interests for modern Russia in the Middle East. 
Since 2007, Russia increased its public support for the President Hamid Karzai by 
calling an increase in real independence for the Afghan government from the West. 
Russia also began to openly communicate with representatives of the moderate 
Taliban (Menkiszak, 2011). 
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Libya 
Reliable relations between Libya and the Soviet Russia started to develop when 
Muammar Qadhafi came to power in 1969 (Fasanotti, 2016). Qadhafi visited 
Moscow in 1976, 1981 and 1985. During these years two states developed lucrative 
trade partnership, including arms supplies. But perhaps the greater breakthrough in 
relations between Russia and Libya happened in 2008 when Vladimir Putin visited 
Libya (Kremlin.ru, 2008). The meeting was very productive and ended up on 
reaching agreements on a few important matters. Firstly, the resolution of Libya’s 
debt to Moscow from the Soviet times (Katz, 2008). Secondly, a memorandum of 
cooperation between the Gazprom and the Libyan National Oil Company (Gulf 
News, 2008). Moreover, how Mark Katz notes, “Gazprom appeared to become 
heavily involved in Libyan gas exports to Europe through a swap of some Gazprom 
assets in Russia in exchange for some of the assets in Libya of the ENI, Italy's 
multinational oil and gas company” (Katz, 2008). Also, the Russian Railroads 
company was provided with a contract to build a railway line between two Libyan 
cities (Katz, 2008). Overall, the 2008 rapprochement between Russia and Libya 
provided great opportunities for bilateral partnership in further years. 
Arabian Peninsula 
As observed by Andrej Kreutz, the Arabian Peninsula lies between the Persian Gulf 
and the Red Sea and between Eurasia and Africa” (Kreutz, 2004). The territory 
unites the countries: Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. The Russian Empire had only a limited interest in the Arabian 
Peninsula, however, as argued by Kreutz (2004), some minor interest in the Arabian 
Peninsula appeared in the latter half of the 19th century. In modern times, it seems 
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that the region enjoys the Global political importance mainly because of its 
geopolitical location, energy resources (oil), its role in the world oil and natural gas 
markets, and as a place of Islam’s two holiest sanctuaries, Mecca and Medina. This 
part mainly focuses on the Russia-Saudi Arabia relations, because relations with 
other states of the region do not represent particular interest for the arguments of 
this thesis. 
Saudi Arabia 
It seems that unlike Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia has always had quite conflicting 
relations with Russia. As argued by Petro (1997), the Soviet Union’s interest in the 
Arabian Peninsula started in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when Moscow 
established relations with Yemen and Saudi Arabia. According to Kreutz (2004), the 
reason for such a reluctance to cooperate was mainly sourced in essentially too 
many ideological differences between the Soviets and the Saudis, in particular, the 
Saudi rulers seem to be concerned about Moscow’s intention to create the Soviet 
satellites across the Middle East. Therefore, Saudi Arabia became actively involved 
in the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet operations in various parts of the world, 
especially after the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Zuhur, 2011). With 
Gorbachev starting the ‘Perestroika’, the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan and 
stopped supporting its forces in the Saudi neighbourhood - this new Soviet policy 
enabled the Saudi to accept the restoration of diplomatic relations with Moscow in 
September 1990 (Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni, 2014). Nevertheless, it seems 
that everything changed since the demise of the Soviet Union. New Russia and 
Saudi Arabia found themselves to be the world’s two largest oil producers and 
exporters with subsequent dependency on exports of their oil products. Despite the 
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changes brought by the fall of the Communism, Russia and Saudi Arabia failed to 
find common grounds for cooperation. According to Andrej Kreutz (2004), there are 
major differences between the two countries and their policies toward the oil market:  
1) Saudi Arabia is a leading member of the OPEC with an overwhelming influence 
on other members, while Russia has never been the OPEC member and its 
relations with the cartel has always been tense; 
 2) The Saudi goal to keep oil prices stable. Moreover, in order to protect the global 
market and its own interests, Saudi leaders traditionally tried to prevent excessively 
high oil prices or their collapse from overproduction, while for Moscow, high oil 
prices promise strength in its economic performance (Kreutz, 2004). 
Another important issue that seriously affects Russia-Sadi relations, as observed by 
Hunter, Thomas and Melikishvili (2004), is that in the Russian political discourse, 
Saudi Arabia is often used in connection to ‘Wahhabism’. Hunter notices that the 
Russian politicians on a number of occasions accused the Saudis of providing 
support to the Chechen separatists and other ‘Islamist’ groups in the North 
Caucasus (in Hunter, Thomas, and Melikishvili, 2004). In response, how Kreutz 
(2004) argues, Saudi Arabia was the most vocal Muslim country in condemning the 
Moscow’s policy in Chechnya. However, it should be said that in the Russian 
political discourse, the Saudis were quite often condemned for their involvement in 
the Chechen war (Bagrov, 2003). In particular, Vladimir Putin quite often blamed 
Saudi-born Al-Qaeda for its support to the Chechen rebels (Williams, 2015). At the 
same time, it needs to be said that such a discourse was not entirely groundless. It 
is known that the Chechen commander, Hattab, was Saudi, and another top leader, 
Shamil Basaev, is also known for receiving financial support and ‘Jihadist’ recruits 
from the Persian Gulf (Hegghammer, 2015, p. 221).  Relationships between two 
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states deteriorated further in the late 1990s. That mainly became a consequence of 
the Saudi’s official support for the Chechen rebels during the Second Chechen War. 
As Mark Katz observes, Saudi Arabia accused Russia of “inhuman acts against the 
Muslim people of Chechnya”, as well as provided protection to the remains of 
Chechen fighters (Katz, 2008). 
The events of the 9/11 brought significant changes into the Russia-Saudi relations. 
However, as argued by Katz (2008), the relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia 
first deteriorated in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11. Moreover, Vladimir Putin 
blamed Saudis in reluctance to chase ‘Islamists’, while other Russian officials 
“issued frequent reminders that fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers came from 
Saudi Arabia” (Katz, 2008, p. 5). The rapprochement between Russia and Saudi 
Arabia came soon after the 9/11, in many ways due to cooling in the US-Saudi 
relations, and deterioration of the Russia-US relations (Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty, 2006; Katz, 2008). The rapprochement resulted in the signing of a number 
of bilateral agreements in gas and oil sectors, as well as in the field of trade and 
investment (Katz, 2008). Also, one of the main signals of compromise in the Russia-
Saudi relations came up when the Saudis recognised the conflict in Chechnya as 
the Russia’s internal affair (Katz, 2008, p. 6]. In February 2007, Vladimir Putin 
visited Saudi Arabia – it was the first visit for the Russian leader to the country. The 
visit facilitated further cooperation between states in security issues, energy, trade, 
transportation, and scientific cooperation.   
 
6.2 THE CASE OF SYRIA 
Russia’s presence and influence in Syria take roots in the 10th and 11th centuries. 
By 1830, Russian consular posts operated in a few Syrian cities (Kreutz, 2004). The 
	 156	
Imperial Russian Orthodox Society made lots of contacts with the Syrian Christian 
Orthodox communities, and by 1905, it opened more than 74 schools (Kreutz, 
2004). It is argued (Nizameddin, 1999), that the Bolshevik rulers were enthusiastic 
about establishing the Communist movement in the Arab East, and therefore, in 
1925, the Communist Party was created in Syria. Moscow established diplomatic 
links with Syria in 1944 before the country was formally recognized as an 
independent state on 17 April 1946. During the first decade after the World War II, 
however, the Moscow’s relations with Damascus were cold and the Soviet leaders 
often condemned the Syrian rulers for oppressing their people and acting as so-
called “tools of the Western imperialism” (Kreutz, 2004). However, Stalin’s death in 
March 1953 and a subsequent Nikita Khrushchev’s rise to power opened a new 
chapter in the Soviet-Third World relations, including the Arab World and Syria. In 
January 1956, the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party recognized the 
progressive role of the Third World, and since then the Arab World had become the 
focus of the Soviet attention (Kreutz, 2004). The Soviet-Syrian cooperation 
particularly flourished from 1956 to 1957. In addition to extensive military supplies, 
the Soviet bloc offered Syria its help in a large-scale construction of hydroelectric 
plants and irrigation projects (Kreutz, 2004). 
The 1971 coup brought the Ba’ath Party to power and Hafez al-Assad as the 
President of Syria. He pursued a strategic policy of close cooperation with the 
Soviet Union (Abrahms, 2003, p. 45). Although the Soviet and the Syrian 
Communists did not favor Ba’athists, Moscow was ready to maintain and develop 
friendly relations with Damascus in many ways due to Syria’s geostrategic 
importance for Russia (Hopwood, 2013, p. 74). The Soviet assistance greatly 
increased when more radical wings of the Ba’ath Party, which declared Socialism 
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as their goal, got power in two subsequent coups in January 1965 and February 
1966 (Kreutz, 2004). Overwhelming defeat during the Six Day War in June 1967 
increased the country’s dependence on Moscow’s help and protection. Overall, 
during 1970-1980s Syria was the USSR’s main ally in the Middle East. In many 
ways, it served as a base for experts and advisors from the USSR, as well as for 
the Soviet naval units. The Syria-Russia relations improved further during the break 
in the Soviet-Egyptian relations in the 1970s. As Nizameddin (1999) notes, since 
then Syria became Moscow’s most important ally in the region.  
Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 marked a significant decline in the Russia-Syria 
relations. Gorbachev openly denounced Assad for his reckless policy in in Lebanon 
and called for a significant reduction in economic and military aid. Moreover, 
Gorbachev was particularly concerned about Syria’s policy towards Israel, and 
during his first meeting with the Syrian President, Gorbachev told Assad that the 
Soviet Union would not support Syria's efforts to achieve military parity with Israel. 
In accordance to Sharnoff (2009), as a consequence of this cooling in relations, 
Soviet arms shipments to Syria dropped dramatically. 
The Soviet Union fall brought major changes in the Russia-Syria relations. In 
December 1991, Syria officially recognised the Russian Federation as the USSR’s 
successor, however, Syrian relations with Russia were far from being harmonious 
(Kreutz, 2004). At first, there was hardly any ideological or political compromise and 
solidarity between post-Soviet Russia and Syria. Although significant reorientation 
of the Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East started when Yevgeny 
Primakov replaced Andrei Kozyrev as the Russian Foreign Minister in January 
1996. Primakov specialised in the Middle East region and had particular sympathy 
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to Syria. He was the first foreign correspondent in Damascus after the Ba’athist 
coup in Syria and developed close personal ties with Hafez al-Assad. According to 
Andrej Kreutz, “Primakov believed that Syria was an indispensable partner in any 
true peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and that Syrian interests should be 
taken seriously into account” (Kreutz, 2004, p. 21). 
When Vladimir Putin came to power, his administration announced their intent to 
start so-called “constructive interaction” with the new Syrian leader – Bashar al-
Assad (Korany, 2008, p. 433). As Andrej Kreutz (2004) notes, unlike Primakov, 
Putin does not have any sentiments about the Middle East; his goals are rather 
pragmatic in a way that he sees the preservation and expansion of the Russian-
Syrian relations as a leverage for Russia in sustaining its influence in the Middle 
East.  
When the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011, Russia was perhaps the only 
European state, which promised its unequivocal support to President Assad. Russia 
repeatedly vetoed the UN Security Council resolutions, which were aimed at ousting 
the Syrian President. The US and its European allies are mainly upset about the 
Russia’s support to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, military aid to the Syria’s 
Armed Forces, and, more recently, about Russia’s direct military involvement.  
Overall the Russian-Syrian relations seem to be influenced by several factors, such 
as:  
Geopolitical interests 
First of all, as Dmitri Trenin calls it, “Syria is central to Russia’s geopolitical 
aspirations” (Trenin, 2014). In many ways, Russia’s engagement in the Middle East 
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reflects its intention to secure the status of ‘the Great Power’ in politics in general 
and in the Middle Eastern region in particular. Key political figures in Russia never 
miss a chance to emphasize Russia’s ‘special position’ in the world in their 
speeches or official statements. In reality, however, Russia can hardly equate itself 
with its Western counterparts due to decline in the economy, which aggravated in 
recent years, poor demography and the overall domestic security situation.  
Another aspect of Russia’s geopolitical interest in Syria is tied with Russia’s 
intention to ensure the reputation of a reliable protector of its allies, and especially 
the Muslim allies. This thought is also supported by Simon Saradzhyan, who 
suggests that by cooperating with the Muslims Russia wants to demonstrate to the 
world’s Muslim community, and the Muslim communities in Russia, that it is ready 
and willing to develop the ties with them and protect their interests (Saradzhyan, 
2015).  
Also, Russia intends to strengthen its military presence in the region. Russia’s port 
of Tartus in Syria, even though it is small, serves the Russia’s strategic interests in 
the Middle Eastern region (Cordesman, Nerguizian, and Popescu, 2008). The naval 
facility of Tartus has a long history, which is rooted in the 1970s. According to Al-
Marhoun (2014), since 1967, Russian watercrafts have been continually situated 
along the Mediterranean Sea. The Russians also settled in the port of Tartus, a city 
on the Syrian coast, what they call "a point of maintenance and supply". The facility 
was established during the Cold War, as a part of the Russia’s approach to the 
Mediterranean region. Precisely, as David Wragg notes, the base was built in 1971 
as a part of an agreement between the Soviets and Syria, under which Syria 
provided Russia with the facility in return of 75 percent cancellation of the Syria’s 
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debt to Russia from the Soviet era for a military equipment (Wragg, 2012). Since 
then, the Russians have been using Tartus on flexible terms and paid Damascus a 
limited rent for its use (Al-Marhoun, 2014). During the 1970s, how Gvosdev and 
Marsh observe, similar support points were located in Egypt, Ethiopia and Vietnam 
(Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013). Tartus quickly became the Syria’s largest port, and, 
according to data provided by Maoz and Yaniv “by 1981, it received 2,272 ships 
with 3,157,000 tons of merchandise and saw 2,100 ships sail with 5,799,00 tons of 
exports” (Maoz and Yaniv, 2013). Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
Tartus became the only Russia’s base in the Mediterranean. Gorodetsk says, “the 
only other foreign base is in the Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam” (Gorodetsk, 2008). 
Although small, the Tartus point has great strategic interest for Russia. First of all, 
as argued by Matthew Bodner, it serves as the main entry point for the Russian 
equipment to support the Syrian government (Bodner, 2015). Most importantly, the 
facility sustains the Moscow’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Bodner, 
2015). Before the Arab Spring reached Syria, the number of Russian personnel and 
military objects were rather low in Tartus, however, now Russia aims to strengthen 
its presence at Tartus even further. As noticed by Paul Schwartz, a Washington-
based authority on the Russian military at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, “Russia's desire to keep this base, which, on the one hand, does have 
huge military benefits, is mainly political in nature” (in Harress, 2015). It is true that 
the facility secures Moscow’s presence in the region, which is why recently the 
number of the Russian personnel and military vessels in Tartus increased 
dramatically, and the facility has all chances to be converted into a full-scale naval 
base (Harress, 2015). Moreover, it was also argued (Bodner, 2016) that Russia is 
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increasing its military presence at the second port in Syria, in the city of Latakia, 
which is situated at the North direction from the Tartus.  
Economic interests 
According to Nizameddin (1999), Russia and Syria proved to have long-standing 
economic ties. Even though, as it is stated by Azuolas Bogdonas, these interests 
were mainly centered on arms sales, it also included other trade relations, in 
particular, investments by Russian companies, and cooperation in the energy sector 
(Bogdonas, 2012). Continuing with Bogdonas’s (2012) opinion, the trade 
cooperation was generally focused on a fulfillment of government contracts, on the 
basis of which Russia supplies oil products and machinery. Several Russian 
companies have done work on large projects in Syria. For example, the former 
Gazprom’s subsidiary Stroytransgaz built the 319 km-long El Rehab–Homs section 
of the Arab Gas Pipeline in 2008 and a gas processing plant in 2009, while the 
Tatneft, the Russian sixth-biggest crude oil producer, has a joint venture with the 
Syrian General Petroleum Company for the exploration and development of oil 
fields since 2005 (Bogdonas, 2012; Cohen, 2014). Overall, in 2007-2011, 78 
percent of all the arms transfers to Syria came from Russia (Bogdonas, 2012). 
Security interests 
One of the most vital interests Russia has in Syria comes from the Russia’s 
domestic security concerns. The Syrian conflict marked an increase in terrorist 
activities across Russia. According to Johnston (2015), in Makhachkala, the capital 
of Dagestan, the rise in terrorist activities was traced between 2012-2014. In Kazan, 
the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, in 2012, Mufti Ildus Faizov was seriously 
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injured, and his deputy Valiulla Yakupov was killed. Also, according to Russia 
Today (2015), in December 2013, two suicide bombings in transport service took 
place in the city of Volgograd, Russia. 
Another danger for Russia comes from the general rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ in 
Syria and across the Middle East. The danger comes from these groups for Russia 
in particular because they have members coming from Russia and the CIS states. 
The list of these groups was greatly organized by Maceij Falkowski and Jozef Lang 
(2014) in their work ‘Homo Jihadicus: Islam In The Former USSR, And The 
Phenomenon Of The Post-Soviet Militants In Syria And Iraq’. This list should serve 
as a support to the argument about the danger coming from these groups for 
Russia, as it shows that there are groups, which include fighters with Russian origin 
or citizens from the CIS. It also shows how wide-spread activities of the ‘Islamist’ 
groups have become in Syria in recent years. According to Falkowski and Lang 
(2015), the list of main Islamists groups operating in Syria includes: 
- Islamic state 
The group first appeared on the International scene in 2014, when it seized large 
territories in Syria and Iraq and proclaimed itself as a "caliphate" (Lister, 2015). 
From the beginning, there seemed to be some controversy over the naming of the 
group, because it has renamed itself on a number of times. It was known as the 
Islamic State, but it was also frequently referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL), or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). According to Stern 
and Berger (2015), in June 2014, the Islamic State dropped the –IS or -IL from its 
names at the end, and now it is called ‘the Islamic State’ with abbreviation IS. As 
argued by BBC (2015), it demanded that Muslims across the world swear allegiance 
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to its leader - Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai, better known as Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi - and migrate to the territory of its control. The Islamic State has also 
told other ‘Islamist’ groups worldwide that they must accept its supreme authority 
(BBC, 2015). There are a lot of militants from Russia fighting on the side of the 
Islamic State in Syria. According to Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Russian 
Federal Security Service, many Russian nationals are believed to be fighting on the 
side of ISIS (TASS, 2015). As Barmin notes, the number is growing on a daily basis. 
Moreover, the Islamic State instantly threatens Russia and promises to include the 
Russian Caucasus into the Islamic State ‘caliphate’ by the year 2020 (Barmin, 
2014). 
It was also argued by a number of scholars, that the Islamic States operates as a 
multinational company, rather than a state, and using the very latest technology to 
attract would-be jihadists (Whitehead, 2014; Hayes, 2016; Covarrubias and 
Lansford, 2016). 
- Al-Nusra 
Al-Nusra or The Front for the Defense of the Syrian People – was formed in late 
2011-beginning of 2012 (Lister, 2016). The organization announced its 
establishment with a video statement, in which the group confirmed its connection 
to suicide bombings in Syria in 2011 (BBC, 2013). According to Mendelsohn (2016), 
Al-Nusra confirmed its part in numerous guerrilla attacks against the strategic state 
targets. Also, despite ideological and tactical differences, the group closely 
cooperates with the Islamic State. 
- Hisb ut-Tahrir.  
The organization was founded in 1953 as a Sunni Muslim organization in Jerusalem 
by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar, and since then Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
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spread to more than 50 countries including Russia (Choufi, 2012). The members of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir are being arrested by the Russian Security Services on a regular 
basis across the Russian country. As claimed by Russia Today (2015), the 
organization instantly recruits new militants in Russia and the Central Asia. 
Moreover, as found by Malashenko (2013), ‘Islamists’ from Hizb ut-Tahrir organized 
opposition protests in Kazan, Tatarstan in 2012. In Syria, Hizb ut-Tahrir is fighting 
on the side of the opposition forces to the Syrian government and acts in 
cooperation with other ‘Islamist’ groups.  
- Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (army of migrants and helpers). This group includes 
up to a thousand militants from the Caucasus, the Central Asia, and the Western 
Europe and the Balkans. In 2015, the group pledged its allegiance to Jabhat al-
Nusra (Paraszczuk, 2015).  
- Jund al-Sham (soldiers of the Levant) – A ‘Salafi Jihadist’ group formed in 
Syria in December 2012. The group is known to be siding with the Nusra Front 
(Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium). 
- Tarkhan’s group – a small group of several dozen of militants aligned with the 
two organizations named above and led by Tarkhan Gaziyev – until recently one of 
the most prominent figures of the Chechen militancy. In 2016, the group was 
renamed to Katiba Ibad ar (Paraszczuk, 2016).  
- Khalifat Jamaat (Caliphate community) – a Chechen ‘Jihadist’ group, which has 
an estimated 80 to 90 Chechen fighters operating in the Northwestern province. The 
group split from the Islamic Front's Ansar Sham earlier this year. Its leader, Abdul 
Hakim Shishani, is a veteran of the war in Chechnya (Roggio, 2014).  
- Ansar al-Sham (Helpers of the Levant) – a Syrian militant group formed in 2012 in 
Latakia by a local entrepreneur and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan – Abu Omar 
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al-Jamila. The supreme commander of the group’s militant wing is a Chechen – Abu 
Musa Shishani (Falkowski and Lang, 2015). 
- Jamaat Sabri – a small group (between 100 and 200 hundred people) established 
in 2012 by an Uzbek – Abdullah al-Tashkenti (Daly, 2014). 
- Jamaat Imam Bukhari (Imam Bukhari’s community) – an Uzbek group with up to 
several hundred members. (Falkowski and Lang, 2015). 
 
6.3 THE ARAB SPRING AND ITS EFFECTS ON RUSSIA AND ITS RELATIONS 
WITH THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES 
 
According to the report prepared by the Russian International Affairs Council in 
2013, during the last two years, we have been witnessing a fundamental reversal of 
politics in the Arab world (Naumkin, Aksenenok, Zvyagelskaya, Karasova, 
Kuznetsov, Popov, Sapronova, Stegny, Filonik and Shlykov, 2013). The report also 
says that such changes in the Arab world have already led to the regime change in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, the deployment of Saudi troops to Bahrain, the 
civil war in Syria and reforms in Morocco and Jordan (Naumkin, Aksenenok, 
Zvyagelskaya, Karasova, Kuznetsov, Popov, Sapronova, Stegny, Filonik and 
Shlykov, 2013). The process was formally marked as ‘The Arab Spring’. It took its 
start in Tunisia in late 2010 with mass anti-government protests. The uprising was 
marked ‘The Jasmin revolution’ in media by a number of authors (Ryan, 2011; 
Eltahawy, 2011; CNN, 2011). Unable to control the crowds, the President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee the country in January 2011, after 23 years in 
power. Over the next months, Ben Ali’s downfall inspired similar uprisings across 
the Middle East. 
	 166	
 
Originally the Arab Spring started with riots by young people, seeking freedom, 
justice, and political activism (Haddad, Bsheer, Abu-Rish , 2012). Although peaceful 
demonstrations quickly evolved into a civil war, in which other forces, including 
‘Islamist’ parties and militant groups, were involved. At the moment, the Arab Spring 
represents a complex conflict of a global dimension, which has drawn in not only 
Arab and non-Arab regional players but also global ones. As noticed by Alexey 
Malashenko (2013), the world’s leading powers are directly or indirectly drawn into 
the developments unfolding in the region. Russia seems to play one of the key roles 
in mediating the crisis in Syria, which has become a culmination of the Arab Spring.  
Although the Russian foreign policy has drawn criticism by many scholars (Stuster, 
2015). The Arab Spring also negatively affected Russia’s relations with Middle 
Eastern states. In this Part, there is a description of selected cases of how the 
relations between Russia and the Middle East states have changed. 
 
Libya 
When the protests reached Libya in 2011, Moscow found itself caught between the 
desires to keep Qaddafi, a Russian ally, in power and the Western pressure to allow 
international support to the rebels. The Kremlin tried to prevent the Western 
intervention in the Libyan conflict, blocking a number of the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions, however, eventually, Moscow gave in due to growing 
international pressure to support the forces opposing Qaddafi. On 26 February 
2011, Russia joined the embargo on arms exports to Libya (Aljazeera, 2011), and it 
abstained in the UN Security Council vote in March 2011, which imposed a no-fly 
zone over Libya, giving other countries the right to take necessary measures to 
protect the civilian population (United Nations, 2011). This allowed the North 
	 167	
Atlantic Treaty Organization to carry out a military operation at the end of March 
2011. As a result of this operation, Qaddafi was ousted, and a new pro-Western 
government was installed (Malashenko, 2013). Dmitry Medvedev, then the Russian 
President, confirmed that Russia’s support for the UN Security Council resolution 
was given “in response to the Libyan authorities’ actions”, and suggested that the 
Colonel Gaddafi lost the legitimacy and requested that he should step down 
(Medvedev, 2011). Vladimir Putin, who was the Russian Prime Minister in 2011, 
however, sharply criticized the Western coalition attacking Libya, and stated that the 
coalition had gone beyond the bounds of the U.N. Security Council resolution 
authorizing an intervention to protect civilians and suggested Gaddafi's actions did 
not justify foreign interference, let alone attempts to remove him (Reuters, 2011). 
With Qaddafi gone and the new Libyan government displeased with the Kremlin, 
Moscow appeared with only one remaining friend in the Middle East — the Syrian 
President Bashar Assad. As it was mentioned in Part 6.2 of this Chapter, the 
Kremlin’s policy of supporting Assad has earned it lots of criticism from its Western 
colleagues and further weakened its influence in the Arab world. 
Nevertheless, Russia managed to develop relatively good relations with the new 
government of Libya. According to Mark Katz, in December 2012, the Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov announced that Moscow was in talks 
with Tripoli regarding the military training between the Russian and Libyan military 
personnel (Katz, 2013, p. 38). In January 2013, the Russian oil firm Tatneft held 
discussions with the Libyan National Oil Corporation about e resuming operations in 
Libya (Fortin, 2013). In February 2013, the Russian Federal Service for Military-
Technical Cooperation announced that it held talks about resuming the Russian 
arms sales to Libya (Katz, 2013). Also, as observed by Mark Katz, in February, the 
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Russian Foreign Minister met with Mahmoud Jibril, the leader of the Libyan National 
Forces Alliance, in Moscow where they discussed ways to strengthen the 
traditionally friendly Russian–Libyan relationships in various fields (Katz, 2013, p. 
2). However, in 2013, the Russian embassy in Libya was attacked. All Russian 
diplomats and their families were evacuated. The Russian representatives 
announced as a condition for the return of the Russian diplomatic personnel to 
Libya only when the new Libyan government promises the security for the 
personnel (The Voice of Russia, 2013).  
 
Saudi Arabia 
The Syrian conflict had an especially negative impact on Moscow’s relations with 
Saudi Arabia. Shortly after the start of the Arab uprisings, tensions emerged 
between Moscow and Riyadh, with Saudi Arabia supporting the opposition to the 
Moscow-backed regimes in Libya and especially in Syria (Donaldson and Nogee, 
2014). It is argued that after the incident with downing the Russian jet in November 
2015, Turkey tried to ally with Saudi Arabia and deepen their strategic ties on the 
ground of the common Sunni identity (Grim, Schulberg, Jones, 2015). As some 
analysts also suggest, that may have a purpose to counter the Russian and Iranian 
interests in the Middle East (Bogdanov, 2015). Therefore, as believed by Katz, the 
Saudi-Russian relations will likely to remain acrimonious as long as the Syrian 
conflict persists (Katz, 2013). However more recently, the Saudi Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, expressed the Saudi’s intention to improve their 
ties with Russia, which he called the ‘Great power’ (Ellyatt, 2016). As found by 
Sergie, Smith, and Blas (2016), in February 2016, Russia and Saudi Arabia agreed 
to freeze oil output in order to tackle the supply crisis and reduce the collapse in oil 
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prices. As a few sources note (Sheppard, Raval, and Farchy, 2016; Mufson, 2016), 
it was the first coordinated move by the world’s two largest producers to counter the 
crisis of the oil production. 
Turkey  
Moscow and Ankara have serious differences with regards to Syria. Ankara seems 
being displeased that Moscow continues aiding the Assad regime. For its part, 
Moscow was not happy that Turkey has supported the Syrian opposition (Katz, 
2013). The tension culminated on 24 November 2015, when the Russian warplane 
SU-24 was shot down near the Turkey-Syria border. Turkey justified the act by 
saying that the Russian plane violated the Turkish airspace (Aljazeera, 2015). 
However, the Russian Defense Ministry acknowledged that the SU-24 fighter jet 
stayed within the Syrian airspace, and provided a video of the plane’s flight in 
confirmation (Sputnik News, 2015). The Russian President Vladimir Putin described 
the incident as “a stab in the back” (BBC, 2015). Meanwhile, the Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared “the Russian plane was shot down because it did 
not answer warning coming from the Turkish side” (in Melvin and Martinez, 2015). 
President Putin also added “Turkey’s current government has been following 
a domestic policy of quite conscious ‘Islamisation’ throughout the country 
for a number of years now” (Putin, 2015).  
At the moment of writing this chapter, significant changes occurred in Turkey. On 15 
July 2016, a coup d’etat was attempted in Turkey against the administration of the 
President Receip Tayyip Erdogan. Short before the coup, the President Erdogan 
and the Russian President Putin initiated an open dialogue on the construction of 
the ‘Turkish Stream’ natural gas pipeline, which signaled first step to a 
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rapprochement between two states after the incident with the plane in November 
2015 (Financial Times, 2016). It was argued that the failed military coup intensified 
tensions between Turkey and its NATO partners due to negative comments towards 
Erdogan’s reaction after the coup, and gave an incentive to pursue cooperation with 
Russia further (Center Of Strategic And International Studies, 2016). In June 2016, 
Erdogan reportedly even wrote a letter to Putin with the official apology for shutting 
down the Russian plane in November 2015 (Bertrand, 2016). It is worth saying that 
the rapprochement is beneficial for both sides, because Russia, as well as Turkey, 
is going through politically sensitive period caused by a negative discourse from 
Russian and Turkish colleagues from the West.  
 
Jordan  
Moscow and Amman also differ in their positions on Syria. Like Turkey, Jordan was 
forced to care for a large number of refugees fleeing from the conflict in Syria, and 
also is unhappy with continued Russian support to the Assad regime. Moscow, for 
its part, is unhappy that the Syrian opposition receives arms via Jordan (Katz, 
2013). Such a disagreement on the matter of the Syrian conflict remains rather 
peaceful and hasn’t evolved into an open political confrontation. 
 
Egypt  
Mohammad Morsi succeeded Hosni Mubarak, who was forced to resign on 11 
February 2011 as a part of the Arab Spring revolutions. The Russian government 
took a rather pragmatic attitude toward the Egypt’s new President and his Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters. Although the new Egyptian government was critical of the 
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Assad’s regime, Moscow very much appreciated Morsi’s negative reaction to the 
foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict (Borger, 2012). Morsi visited Moscow in 
2013 and had bilateral talks with the Russian President, which resulted in Putin 
pledging military and economic assistance to Egypt (Russia Today, 2013). 
Nevertheless, in July 2013, Russia supported the dismissal of Morsi by the Egyptian 
military and welcomed a democratically-elected President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi 
(DeGhett, 2015).  
As Dubovikova (2016) observes, following the deterioration of the Russia’s relations 
with Turkey, Egypt proposed its services to supply Turkish products, primarily fruits 
and vegetables, to Russian markets. However, the crash of the Russian A321 
airliner over the Sinai Peninsula significantly complicated the relations between two 
states. After the investigation, the Federal Security Service director Aleksander 
Bortnikov confirmed to the President Vladimir Putin that the Russian plane crash in 
Sinai, Egypt, was caused by the terrorist attack (Kremlin.ru, 2015).  
Russia still needs Egypt as a partner in the Middle East, and Egypt, as Maria 
Dubovikova notes, needs Russia as a stable partner to diversify its foreign relations 
and reduce dependence on particular players (Dubovikova, 2016). Nevertheless, it 
is still not clear how the relations between two states will operate in the future. 
Iran  
Throughout the Arab Spring, and the Syrian conflict, in particular, Iran has been 
perhaps the most loyal ally of Russia (PBS, 2016). The core for that lays in common 
interests the two states have about Syria. Firstly, as argued by Malashenko (2015), 
Iran and Russia share their sympathy to Assad and want to keep him as the Syrian 
President in the future. Secondly, both Iran and Russia are looking to reduce the 
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influence of the US in the Middle East (Malashenko, 2015). Moreover, it has been 
agreed between scholars, that Syria and the Middle East overall have become the 
ground of common strategic interests between Iran and Russia (Alterman and 
Barnett, 2013; Geranmayeh, and Liik, 2016). For Russia, Iran also tends to be an 
important balancing factor in the Russia’s Middle East policy.  
 
The effects of the Arab Spring for Russia 
From the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Russia plays a strategic role in unfolding 
the crisis. It is, however, needs to be said that for about four years since the 
beginning of the conflict in Syria, the Russia’s position remained essentially 
unchanged. In particular, Russia initially called for the immediate suspension of the 
use of force by all sides and for a peaceful resolution of the crisis through a broad-
based national dialogue, without outside interference, undue pressure, and 
preconditions. Although this position changed dramatically in September 2015, 
when Russia made a decision to launch air strikes in Syria against the Islamic 
State’s targets. For the first time in over a quarter of a century, the Kremlin is 
officially conducting a high-scale military operation abroad. Therefore the operation 
and its targets were immediately condemned by the United States and its European 
allies.  
Initial diplomatic efforts in support of the Assad’s regime in Syria seem to be heavily 
influenced by the assessment of the events in Libya. Russian foreign policy 
decision-makers perceived Russia’s abstention on the UN Security Council’s 
resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya as grossly misinterpreted by 
Russia’s Western collegues. Quite a few scholars agree that, in the eyes of the 
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Russian policy-makers, the Western partners ignored the Russia’s position on the 
situation in Libya, and decided to dismiss Gaddafi covertly (Mirovalev, 2015; 
Gorenburg, 2012; Bubnova, 2015). It is the author’s believe that such a move, of the 
Western colleagues was interpreted by the Russian political establishment as an 
effort to undermine the Russia’s authority in the Security Council and the Russia’s 
place in the world politics. In case of Syria, it seems that Russian policy-makers 
have become concerned that their Western colleagues could also apply so-called 
‘the Libyan scenario’, and decided to change their strategy in a direction, which 
mainly serves the Russia’s interests. These interests include sustaining ‘the Great 
power’ status of Russia in the World Politics in general and in the Middle East in 
particular. 
When it comes to the military intervention contemplated by the Russian forces in 
support of the Assad’s rule, it seems that such recourse to armed methods has a 
goal to show the means Russia is ready to use in achieving its foreign policy results. 
It also demonstrates a capacity the Russian military forces have reached in recent 
years. 
Russian Discourse with regards to the Arab Spring  
In the Russian media and political circles, there are two types of discourse 
regarding the Arab Spring. According to the first one, the Arab Spring, as a 
phenomenon, predominantly driven by the West, and by the US in particular. Such 
a discourse is traced in official speeches of Russian policy-makers in relation to the 
situation in Syria. As it is suggested by Maxim Suchkov (2015), as well as Yulia 
Nikitina (2014), this discourse was mainly influenced by a series of the ‘color 
revolutions’ that took place across the post-Soviet space in the 2000s (Georgia in 
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2003, Ukraine in 2004). It was found by some scholars, that the key Russian military 
personnel, including the Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, as well as the the Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that the ‘color revolutions’ by their nature are new 
forms of “aggressive war”, which are wrapped in “democracy” cover (Gorenburg, 
2014, p. 1; Papert, 2014, p.7).  
There are, however, a few similar features in the scenarios of both the ‘color 
revolutions’ and the Arab revolutions. Firstly, geographically they took place close to 
the Russian borders. Secondly, the main goal of uprisings in both cases was to 
install pro-Western governments, which, in case of the ‘color revolutions’ were anti-
Russian. That, in particular, provided NATO with an opportunity to expand in close 
proximity to the Russian border. In general, it seems that the Arab land, just like the 
post-Soviet space, was a playground of the great political struggle between the US 
and its European allies, on one side, and Russia, on the other. It is true that the 
Russia’s position in relation to Syria has made its relations with the Arab world even 
more complex, and as a result weakened its position in the region (Malashenko, 
2013).  
According to the second discourse outlined by Suchkov (2015), the Arab revolutions 
were seriously prompted by the ‘Islamist’ groups. Such a discourse is also traced in 
some official speeches of Russian policy-makers in relation to the situation in Syria. 
It is true that there are many ‘Islamist’ groups taking part in the Arab Spring, 
however, it is important to differentiate between them. One of the most influential 
roles during the Arab Spring is played by the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the 
majority of newly installed governments in the Middle East at the moment comprise 
of the Muslim Brothers. 
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‘Islamist’ element of the Arab Spring 
The origin of the Arab Spring also mainly lay in religion, and in Islam in particular. 
The Arab Spring was initially motivated by a democratic movement, and a desire to 
transform the autocratic ruling of the Arab states into more democratic one. 
However, soon other forces have become involved in the conflict, in particular – the 
‘Islamist’ groups. These groups found themselves in new governments that came to 
power after the regimes’ changes during the Arab Spring revolutions. For that, the 
Arab Spring was even called ‘the Islamic Spring’ by some scholars (Harrison, 2013).  
It is important to differentiate between ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist’, as well as ‘Islamist’ 
and ‘Radical Islamist’. ‘Islamism’ generally represents a distinctive form of the 
Muslim politics. As explained by Peter Mandaville, “the term ‘Islamism’ refers to 
forms of political theory and practice that have, as their goal, the establishment of 
an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, 
institutions, and legal system derive directly from the shari’ah” (Mandaville, 2007, p. 
57). As also argued by Mandaville (2007), the main obstacle comes with a 
differentiation between ‘Islamism’ or ‘Mainstream Islamism’ and ‘Radical Islamism’. 
According to Mandaville (2007), they are mainly different in their ideology and 
methods. ‘Mainstream Islamists’ were generally sought to make progress toward an 
Islamic political order via political means (civil society, informal networking. ‘Radical 
Islamists’, as defined by Mandaville (2007), reject the contemporary system of a 
territorially defined sovereign nation as illegitimate and seeks to replace it with a 
Shari’ah-based, Muslim polity, which is usually defined as a caliphate. In doing so, 
‘Islamists’ resource to ‘Jihad’ as a legitimate method for bringing about desired 
political change. It is worth adding though that ‘Mainstream Islamists’ quite often 
strongly and consistently condemn the methods deployed by ‘Radical Islamists’. 
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Among ‘Mainstream Islamists’ group perhaps the most prominent is the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, an 
Egyptian schoolteacher. The organization was dedicated, on the one hand, to 
‘spread Islamic law and morality through the region (Wickham, 2015), and on the 
other hand, it sought primarily to offset the corrosive effect of Westernization and 
secularization (Mandaville, 2007). In most Arab nations, and especially in Egypt, the 
Brotherhood was long known as an opposition movement critical of established 
strongmen leaders such as Hosni Mubarak. After the anti-Mubarak protests of the 
Arab Spring ended with the overthrow of the old administration, the Brotherhood 
organized the Freedom and Justice Party and won almost half of the lower house of 
parliament in January 2012.  
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood takes its birth in 1945, and in spite of common 
ideological background and organizational similarities, the two groups differ from 
one another. In many ways, that are due to different sociopolitical environments 
they were developed. As said by Raphael Lefevre (2013), the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood is considered more conservative than its Egyptian counterpart, and it 
also had more history of violent resistance to the regime. When the Arab Spring 
reached Syria in 2011, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has become an important 
component of the Western-backed Syrian opposition (Al Monitor, 2014), and 
continues to be so at present. 
Perhaps the most dangerous development of the Arab Spring has become the 
triumph of ‘Religious Extremist’ groups across the Middle East. In Syria, as a 
culmination of the Arab Spring, these groups play one of the key roles in unfolding 
the crisis. These groups are discussed in details in Part 2 of this Chapter.  
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The events in the Middle East, and particularly in Syria, have all chances to have an 
impact on the Russia’s domestic security. The triumph of the ‘Islamist’ groups in the 
Arab Spring has resonated with the Russian Muslim population and boosted the 
opposition movement within the community. As Alexey Malashenko (2013) 
observes, ‘the victories of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamist 
Ennahda party in Tunisia, and participation of Islamists in a new Libya’s government 
gave the Russian Muslims the impression these ‘Islamist’ elites could become the 
Russia’s allies, although no unequivocal evidence to prove this point has not been 
found yet. As a result, a few political demonstrations were organised across the 
Russian North Caucasus. Protests in Kazan, in August 2012, called to overthrow 
Russian government (Malashenko, 2013). Among participants were supporters of 
the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement operating in the North Caucasus (Malashenko, 2013). 
Another protest took place in Makhachkala (Dagestan) in February 2013. The 
protest was mainly dedicated to showing the solidarity to Assad’s opponents 
(Malashenko, 2013). 
Economic effects of the Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring also brought economic challenges to its main actors, and 
especially to Russia. In particular, Russian foreign policy in Syria deepens the 
economic crisis the country in since the end of 2014. The seizure of Crimea in 
March 2014 and Russian support of the pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine 
caused the West to impose sanctions on Russia and subsequently isolate it 
internationally. As a result, how argued by Kathrin Hille, the Russia’s economy 
contracted by 4.6 percent in the second quarter compared with the same period in 
2014, the largest drop in six years, marking the country’s first recession since the 
financial crisis in 2009 (Hille, 2015). By the beginning of 2015, according to data 
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provided by the Business Insider, the Russian ruble fell by 17.5 percent against the 
dollar, inflation jumped up into double figures (The Business Insider, 2015). 
Unfortunately, the Russia’s economic well-being is highly dependent on oil and gas 
prices. With the current price of oil being sometimes below $50 per barrel, it seems 
to be impossible to speak about any economic recovery for Russia in the nearest 
future. There is an opinion presented by Alexander Tabachnik, that Russia’s foreign 
policy in Syria, and in particular the Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015, 
provoke a response from the oil-producing Sunni monarchies (foremost from Saudi 
Arabia, which decide on the oil prices (Tabachnik, 2016). This opinion has all 
chances to be right, as the oil prices, according to Nasdaq Website, has not gone 
higher than $50 a barrel since late December 2014 (Nasdaq Crude Oil Rates). 
Overall, because of its foreign policy in Syria, Russia found itself in a political 
isolation and a deep economic crisis.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter showed that for modern Russia, the Middle Eastern region represents 
the area of great interest on a number of reasons. In the past, however, the region 
was not included in the scope of Russia’s primary interests; instead, Russia was 
mainly focused on its partners in Europe. The situation changed after the 
Bolsheviks took over power in Russia. It is contended that as the Soviets were 
constantly looking for new partners in their struggle for the Capitalist domination, the 
Middle Eastern states were included in the interests for a cooperation of the 
Soviets. In modern Russia, close interaction with the Middle East has proved to be 
actively supported. It is observed that for certain period in the past, the region was 
the scene for a competition between the US and Russia for ‘the Great Power’ 
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status, and remains so nowadays. Moreover, it is also discussed that in modern 
Russia, the Middle Eastern region represents the area of strategic importance, 
where Russia operates as a counterbalance to the West (mainly the US & its 
European allies). Moreover, the region also has particular economic value for 
Russia.  
This chapter was also dedicated to the analysis of the Arab Spring, which swept the 
Middle Eastern region since 2010, and was mainly targeted at the regime change in 
all Arab states of the region. This chapter offers an analysis of Russian political 
discourse formed in relation to the Arab Spring. It also argues that there are two 
types of discourse. On the one hand, there are some, who suppose that the Arab 
Spring, as a phenomenon, predominantly driven by the West, and mainly by the US. 
Moreover, according to this discourse, a certain similar scenario is detected 
between the ‘color revolutions’ that took place across the post-Soviet space in the 
2000s and the ‘Arab revolutions’. On the other hand, there is a discourse that the 
Arab revolutions were seriously prompted by the ‘Islamists’ groups. 
This chapter also finds that the origin of the Arab Spring also lay in the religion. In 
particular, the Arab Spring has become a scene for the ‘Islamist’ groups’ activities. 
However, it is argued that it’s important to differentiate between ‘Mainstream 
Islamist’ and ‘Radical Islamist’ groups, which a taking part in the Arab Spring 
revolutions. In this chapter, the author explains this difference in details.  
Another effect of the Arab Spring was proved to be the change of the political 
situation in the Middle Eastern region. At the beginning of the chapter, there is a 
historical review of the Russian relations with selected Middle Eastern states. In the 
third part of the chapter, there is an analysis on how the Arab Spring revolutions 
changed these relations. As mentioned before, the analysis of the Russian relations 
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with the Middle Eastern states is limited to selected states in the Middle Eastern 
region. Such a choice of states is based on the author’s considerations over which 
states are mainly involved or/and directly affected by the Arab Spring revolutions.  
This chapter also represents a study on a case of Syria in the Arab Spring. In 
particular, it explains the reasons behind the Russian foreign policy in Syria. It also 
demonstrates a historical continuity in the Russia-Syria relations. It is proved that 
despite the Russian-Syrian relations have deep roots, they have always been 
complex. It is argued that Russian support to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 
has many reasons, including economic, geopolitical interests, military cooperation, 
however, it is proved that two factors are decisive in this case: Russia’s desire to 
sustain its status as ‘the Great Power’ and the Russian domestic security 
implications. It is proved that the Syrian conflict is marked by the rise in terrorist 
activities across Russia and the Middle East. It is also stated that the ‘Islamist’ 
groups operating in the Middle East and in Syria are currently perceived by the 
Russian authorities as a threat to the Russian domestic security. The chapter 
demonstrates that these groups have members coming from Russia and post-
Soviet member states, and it is quite possible for them to return home with the 
expertise gain abroad or inspire their compatriots for similar activities in their home 
countries.   
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of a foreign policy position of the Russian Federation quite often leads 
to a number of contradictory conclusions. Many observers often criticize Russian 
foreign policy for being spontaneous, unpredictable, irrational and sometimes even 
aggressive (Carafano, 2015; Snetkov, 2015; Cox, 2014; Lucas, 2009; Mankoff, 
2009). At the same time, it was agreed that it is not possible to be dismissive of 
such an actor of the Global Politics, like Russia. Therefore, a qualified analysis of 
Russian foreign policy is necessary, and there remains a strong case for achieving 
a better understanding of the Russian activities in the International arena.  
This thesis was set out to analyze Russian foreign policy in relation to Syria. From 
the beginning of the conflict in 2011, Russia supported the legitimate Syrian 
government of Bashar al-Assad. With such a position Russia placed itself into a 
confrontation with the opposition forces, which are backed by the US, the EU and 
some other Arab states (like Saudi Arabia, Qatar). The confrontation evolved into a 
deep political crisis, which was further deteriorated as a result of the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 2014.  
The research was informed by numerous academic sources, which the author 
critically evaluated during the study process. Such an evaluation helped to outline 
the gaps in the existing body of materials. The author noticed that the body of 
theoretical literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of all theoretical approaches 
that can be used for the Russian foreign policy research. Although certain attempts 
were previously made by Tsygankov (Tsygankov, 2010). This dissertation intended 
to fill this gap and offered a review of various theoretical approaches to the Russian 
foreign policy analysis and the nature of the Russian politics. 
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In this dissertation, the author synthesized different International Relations theories, 
which served to outline the conceptual framework. Overall, in the field of the 
International Relations, there is a division between scholars on the matter of either 
applying a single theory-based approach to a state’s foreign policy analysis (Waltz, 
1959; Morgenthau, 1948; Bull, 1977, and others), or making a choice towards a 
theoretical pluralism (Katzenstein and Sil (2010), Jackson and Nexon (2004), Risse 
and Simmons (2002), and Barkin (2010). As such a theoretical pluralism remains a 
rather problematic approach and is criticized by a number of scholars (Kratochwil, 
2007; Lapid, 1989; Neumann). The author proved that a theoretical pluralism has a 
lot of limitations in its application, which quite often results in a lack of commonly 
agreed practice. Quite a number of academics agree that despite being challenging, 
a theoretical pluralism serves as an effort to overcome limitations inherent in a 
paradigm-bound research of the International Relations. By applying a theoretical 
synthesis, the author supported those scholars who use it as a methodological 
approach to the state’s foreign policy analysis.  
As a part of a theoretical synthesis, the author combined Neoclassic Realism and 
Constructivism. In the present study, the author explained the choice of Neoclassic 
Realist theory through making an analysis of the Realist theory evolution. The 
author found that Neoclassic Realism in many ways represents an advanced form 
of Realism, because it systematized all approaches of the Realist tradition, and 
extracted its basic insights. Moreover, Neoclassic Realism incorporated both 
external and internal variables into the analysis of state’s foreign policy. In other 
words, domestic and foreign policies were proved to be connected and even 
dependent on one another.  
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When it comes to Constructivist theory, in the thesis the author addressed certain 
division between those scholars, who support it (Wendt 1999, Zehfuss 2002, 
Tsygankov 2005), and those, who rather criticize it (Kowert 2011; Guzzini 2003). In 
the thesis, the author contributed to those, who support the Constructivist approach, 
and concluded that identity is the key driver behind Russian Foreign Policy, 
particularly in relation to Syria.  
The main limitation of the use of a theoretical pluralism was found to evolve over the 
question of how to reconcile different ontologies and epistemologies of diverse 
theoretical traditions, as well as the ways to link rather diverse theories. In this way, 
a theoretical synthesis is preferred over an analytic eclecticism as it allows 
combining different and sometimes conflicting theoretical approaches. During 
present research, the author noticed that those scholars who apply a theoretical 
pluralism into their research (Moravcsik, 1998; Laferriere & Stoett, 1999; Mutlu 
2012) also prefer a theoretical synthesis to an analytic eclecticism. 
The present study examined foreign policy through the scope of domestic policy. 
The author discovered that in the field of the International Relations, there is certain 
division among scholars on those who approach state’s foreign policy as a result of 
external factors (Fox, 1959; Wolfers, 1962; Rosenau, 1966; Waltz, 1979; Handel, 
1981; Walt, 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001; Galbreath, 2006), and those who see 
domestic policy and foreign policy as interconnected (Rose, 1998; Rathbun, 2008; 
Lobell, 2009; Romanova, 2012). In this research, the author followed the logic of the 
latter group and suggested that certain domestic developments affect foreign policy 
decisions, including those Russian foreign policy decisions in relation to Syria. 
Among those developments, the author claimed to be the effect of ‘the Great Power’ 
identity and the threat posed by the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ to the Russian 
	 184	
national security. Speaking more generally, the author contended that Russian 
foreign policy in Syria is identity-based and simultaneously security-oriented. The 
author put these two developments of Russian domestic policy as independent from 
one another. At the same time, the author recognized that some researchers might 
suggest that identity and security are connected. The author addressed in present 
thesis that it can be argued that ‘Religious Extremism’, as one of the major domestic 
security threats, threatens the Russian national identity as much as it affects 
Russian foreign policy. Although such an assumption might be developed in a 
separate research paper, the author decided to build the argument on identity and 
security being independent developments. The author supported the argument by 
proving that foreign policy in Syria continued the political tradition of Russian foreign 
policy being identity-based and security-oriented. In other words, the author argued 
that there is certain historical background in such development of Russian foreign 
policy-making. As such this development tends to be the unique characteristic of the 
Russian politics. Overall, in present thesis, the author argued that history serves as 
a helpful tool for analyzing the nature of the Russian state, and its foreign policy.  
The present study aimed to make a methodological contribution to the field of 
International Relations by applying a new approach to the foreign policy analysis. It 
is also hoped that this approach would prove useful for further researchers. 
Neoclassic Realism was used in this approach as a theory explaining how do 
Russian domestic security implications affect Russian foreign policy in Syria. 
Constructivist theory, on the other hand, provides explanations for the identity-
based Russian foreign policy in Syria. Also, as a part of this approach, two different 
ontological positions of Objectivism and Constructivism were combined. With 
regards to epistemology, the present study rests on the Interpretivist position, as it 
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adopted a political discourse analysis as the method of research. The contribution 
of the present approach was also laid by the multi-level analysis of Russian foreign 
policy. This study brought together the effects of the systemic and state levels, as 
well as an the individual level. According to such scheme, the author argued that 
external political environment affects state’s foreign policy on the systemic level, 
while the effects of domestic policies on the state’s foreign policy are addressed on 
the state level. Particular effects on foreign policy in case of modern Russia were 
proved to come from its political leadership, in particular from the President and his 
‘inner circle’. Therefore the author proved that Russian foreign policy in Syria is also 
built on the individual level of analysis. 
This research applied a political discourse analysis as a tool for proving the 
research arguments of Russian foreign policy being identity-based and 
simultaneously security-oriented. At the same time, the author also addressed a 
rather problematic nature of a discourse analysis. The author demonstrated that a 
number of scholars had no agreement on the terminology of a discourse and a 
discourse analysis (Larsen, 1997, Chernysh, 2011, Pietikäinen and Dufva, 2006, 
Fairclough, and Fairclough, 2013), while others were debating the matter of the 
application of a political discourse analysis on a foreign policy analysis (Fairclough 
and Fairclough, 2013; Larsen, 1997). Certain confusion also proved to exist on the 
matter of how to conduct a discourse analysis during a foreign policy analysis 
(Muller, 2010; Newman, 2008; Manheim et. al, 2012; Colin, 2004). This thesis took 
a challenge to reconcile those difficulties and contribute to the general knowledge of  
discourse analysis in the field of the International Relations.  
Analysis of a political discourse in this research has proven to have a particular 
value, as it mirrors current tendencies of the Russian politics. In particular, current 
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political discourse gave an opportunity to trace certain themes, which were 
frequently repeated over a long period of time. Among those themes, a discourse 
on the Russia’s ‘Greatpowerness’ is very common. The study showed how key 
figures from the contemporary Russia’s political establishment have constructed a 
narrative of Russia as the ‘Great Power’ during their interviews, public statements, 
and speeches. Various instances of the use of specific words, phrases, and their 
combinations demonstrated a certain conscious process of discourse building.  
The discourse on the Russia’s domestic security matters, on the other hand, 
revealed certain attention paid on the link between the rise of ‘Religious Extremism’ 
during the Arab Spring and in Syria in particular, and the situation in the Russian 
Caucasus. It was found that a separate discourse was formed around the threat 
posed by the Islamic State for the Russia’s domestic security and territorial integrity. 
The reasons for such a discourse were laid as a result of a number of videos and 
public statements made by the Islamic State’s commanders, in which they openly 
threatened Russia as a state and the Russian President in particular. 
On an initial stage of this research project, the author decided on the thesis being a 
qualitative research. And as a part of such research, it was considered to include 
interviews as one of the methods the present research. However, the author’s 
experience of interviewing some members from the Russian Federation Embassy in 
London demonstrated that the insights of the interviewed diplomats repeated 
information to be found in published sources, including copying spoken words and 
phrases of the Russian officials, as well as a regular reference to official speeches. 
Therefore the decision was made to exclude interviews from the methodological 
body of this research project, as such a method would not change the general 
quality of the thesis. 
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Overall, this thesis offered a critical study on the matter of the Russian domestic 
security threats. At the same time, the present study was limited only to the analysis 
of the rising threat of ‘Religious Extremism’ in Russia. The author discussed 
‘Religious Extremism’, or how it also is commonly referred to so-called ‘non-
tradition’ form of Islam in Russia, in contrast to ‘Sufism’ or one of so-called 
‘traditional’ Islamic currents in Russia. The research on ‘Sufism’ demonstrated a 
problematic and quite complicated nature of this form of Islam in Russia. The author 
discovered that in Russia ‘Sufism’ has quite a long history, however, there is still 
certain division among scholars on the matter of the exact period when ‘Sufism’ 
appeared in Russia. The author also discovered that ‘Sufism’ is represented by 
three brotherhoods or ‘tariqas’: ‘Naqshbanaya’, ‘Qadiriya’, and ‘Shaziliya’, although 
in Russia it is mainly represented by ‘Naqshbanaya’ and ‘Qadiriya’ brotherhoods. 
The author found that historically ‘Naqshbanaya’, ‘Qadiriya’ brotherhoods were quite 
often confronting each other. Although the confrontation has become one of the key 
factors in the reconciliation of the Russian-Chechen war.  
The author also discovered that generally ‘Sufism’ is divided into four schools: 
‘Hanafism’, ‘Hanabalism’, ‘Shafiism’ and ‘Malikism’. As the author observed, in 
Russia, so-called ‘traditional’ Islam is represented by ‘Hanafi’ school of ‘Sufism’. 
Moreover, the author also found that ‘Hanafism’ is considered to be the position of 
the official Russian Muslim clergy, including the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims 
of Russia and European Countries of the CIS and the Russian Council of Muftis. 
In present study on so-called ‘non-traditional’ Islam in Russia, the author reconciled 
certain confusion on the matter of differentiating between different Islamic currents, 
and in particular their so-called ‘extreme’ forms. Such a study contributed to a better 
understanding of Islam in Russia. The author also contended that ‘Religious 
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Extremism’ in Russia has an international dimension in a way that the Global 
‘Islamist’ network is closely connected to the ‘Islamists’ in Russia. The Russian 
‘Islamists’ have proved to receive material and ideological support from their 
coreligionists in the Middle East. In the present thesis, the author proved that such a 
tendency forms the particular threat for the Russian domestic security and territorial 
integrity. As such, the thesis also presented particular value for those who 
contemplate the security study in relation to Russia, as well as analyze Islam in 
Russia.  
The author discussed ‘Religious Extremism’ as the matter that bridges the Middle 
East with the Russian Caucasus. Any developments in the Middle Eastern region 
proved to affect Russia and its Muslim-populated regions (mainly the North 
Caucasus) through the ‘Islamists’ activities. The author contended that the situation 
in the Russian Caucasus remains quite vulnerable. Moreover, the region suffers 
from quite regular terrorist attacks, which are often targeted against the 
representatives of ‘Sufi’ Islam in Russia. In many ways, normalization of the security 
situation in Chechnya and in the Russian Caucasus, in general, was trusted to the 
current Head of the Chechen Republic - Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov forms part of 
‘the inner circle’ of Vladimir Putin and proved to be very loyal to the President. At 
the same time, the author argued that the figure of Ramzan Kadyrov remains quite 
problematic due to his militant background, and more recently, due to growing ‘cult 
of his personality’ in the region and among the Muslims across Russia.  
This thesis also explained the complex phenomenon of the Russian identity. As 
such, the study on this matter contributed to better understanding of the Russian 
foreign policy and a political discourse. Moreover, this research also contributed to 
an existing body of work on the Russian identity. The author offered a research of 
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the Russian national identity through some characteristics of the identity concept, 
namely history, geography, culture, religion, and the people. The author discovered 
that each of these components historically has been essential parts of the Russian 
identity, and all together continue to form its parts in modern time. The author also 
made a contribution to the research previously made by Prizel (1998), Tolz (2004); 
Trenin (1996) and Tsygankov (2012) on the nature of the Russian national identity. 
In the present research, the author put together all findings with those offered by 
Ponsard (2006), who suggested analyzing the Russian national identity through the 
scope of some key characteristics of the identity concept, namely history, 
geography, ethnicity, culture, and religion. The author also added to this list the 
Russian economy, and in particular, the Russian energy sector. In this regard, this 
thesis is limited to presenting energy as a part of the Russian national identity, 
rather than a separate variable.  
In present dissertation, the author also paid particular attention to the role of the 
political leadership in Russia, because, with a support of the evidence base the 
author was able to find during the research process. The author argued that in the 
Russian history there has always been the ruler’s cult and a continuous tradition of 
autocracy. The author suggested that Vladimir Putin in many ways took over such a 
tradition. The author discovered that in the eyes of many Russians, Putin is seen as 
a powerful leader, who is pursuing an independent and sovereign foreign policy and 
acts at best interests of their country. At the same time, the author noticed that such 
an image of Putin was carefully created by the Kremlin with a particular purpose to 
gain supporters among the population. By this, the author explained the reasons 
why Vladimir Putin enjoys almost the absolute support from the Russian people at 
the moment.  
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In this thesis, the author also contended that rebuilding of the ‘Great Power’ identity 
tends to form part of the ideology of ‘exceptionalism’ in today’s Russia. This 
ideology is actively pursued by the current political establishment in Russia through 
their political discourse, and will likely to be sustained in the future. 
This study also added to the general knowledge on Russia’s relations with Middle 
Eastern states. The author discovered that historically, Russia avoided states of the 
Middle Eastern region as potential partners for cooperation. That was mainly due to 
lack of common interests between the states. In further years, however, and 
especially during the Soviet time, the states, which had put themselves as followers 
of the Communist ideology, became the Soviet Union’s close allies. At certain 
periods of the Soviet rule, the Russia’s authority in particular Middle Eastern states 
was rather high. That, however, changed after 1991, as one of the consequences of 
the Soviet Union’s demise. Modern Russia was forced to find alternative means for 
cooperation with the states in the region. The author also interrogated how Russia’s 
relations with the Middle Eastern states have changed during the Arab Spring 
revolutions.   
The findings of this study, in general, offered an important alternative to the frequent 
readings of the Russian foreign policy as contradictory, irrational and unpredictable. 
In this thesis, the author argued that, when contemplating the Russian foreign policy 
analysis, we need to pay attention to the Russian domestic matters, the Russian 
history, and understand the political traditions, culture and the Russian identity. The 
discursive element of this study also matters because it addresses recent 
tendencies and developments of the Russian politics. Having considered all these 
matters, the author hopes that the present study contributed to the general 
	 191	
knowledge of Russian foreign policy and offered a qualified in-depth analysis of 
Russian foreign policy for the future researchers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 192	
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Primary Sources (official political documents, public statements, speeches & 
interviews): 
 
Constitution Of The Russian Federation. (1993). [online]. 12 December, The 
National Voting. Available at: http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm 
[Accessed: 7 November 2016]. 
 
Dugin, A. (2014). Interview ‘On Eurasianism, the Geopolitics of Land and Sea, and 
a Russian Theory of Multipolarity’. [online]. 7 December, Theory Talk. Available at: 
http://www.theory-talks.org/2014/12/theory-talk-66.html [Accessed 2 August 2016].  
 
Energy Strategy Of Russia For The Period Up To 2030. (2009). [online]. 13 
November, Moscow. Available at:  http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-
2030_(Eng).pdf [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
 
Federal Law On Security. (2010). [online]. 28 December. Available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/9941 [Accessed: 20 November 2016]. 
 
Foreign Policy Concept of The Russian Federation. (2013). [online]. 12 February. 
Available at:  http://www.rusemb.org.uk/in1/ [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
 
Kremlin Website, (2008). Vladimir Putin Arrived In Libya On An Official Visit. [online] 
Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/44145 [Accessed on 29 
February 2016].  
 
Kremlin.ru, (2015). Meeting on investigation into the crash of a Russian airliner over 
Sinai. [online] Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50707 
[Accessed 26 February 2016].  
 
Lavrov, S. (2014). Address by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the 69th 
session of the UN General Assembly. [online]. 27 September, UN General 
Assembly, New York. Available at:  
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/CDEA7854FF002B5A44257D62004F7236 [Accessed 
7 November 2016]. 
 
Lavrov, S. (2014). Interview with NTV. [online]. 19 October, Moscow. Available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/A21EA8CBA9B1DC3B44257D77003F39DA 
[Accessed 13 November 2015]. 
 
Lavrov, S. (2015). Answers to Questions at a Joint News Conference Following 
Talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. [online]. 7 April, Moscow. Available 
at: 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/40903d
819ac1478c43257e200064660e!OpenDocument [Accessed 13 November 2015]. 
 
	 193	
Medvedev, D. (2011). Statement on the situation in Libya. [online]. 21 March, 
Moscow. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/10701 [Accessed 
29 February 2016]. 
 
Medvedev, D. (2011). Statement on The Situation in Libya. [online]. 21 March, 
Kremlin, Moscow. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/10701 
[Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. (2014). [online]. 25 December, The 
Presidential Decree № 2976. Available at: http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 
[Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
 
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Website, (2015). Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov’s live radio interview with Sputnik, Ekho Moskvy and Govorit 
Moskva. [online] Available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1199312 [Accessed 15 November 
2016]. 
 
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Website, (2016). Sergey 
Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on 
Russia’s diplomacy performance in 2015. [online] Available at: 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2032328 [Accessed 15 November 
2016]. 
 
National Security Concept of The Russian Federation. (2000). [online]. 10 January, 
Presidential Decree № 24. Available at:   
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/nsosndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36ab
a64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31!OpenDocument [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (1999). Rossia na rubege tisiyacheletii [Russia at The Turn of The 
Millennium]. Nezavisimaiya Gazeta [The Independent Newspaper], [online] 209-29. 
Available at: http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html or 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm [Accessed 17 December 2015]. 
 
Putin, V. (2007). Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference 
on Security Policy. [online]. 10 February, Munich. Available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 [Accessed 7 November 
2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2008). Interview to Le Monde Newspaper. [online]. 31 May, Moscow. 
Available at: http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/visits/world/6048/events/1708/ 
[Accessed 10 August 2015]. 
 
Putin, V. (2012). Russia And The Changing World. [Online]. 27 February, Moscow. 
Available at: http://rusemb.org.uk/press/612 [Accessed 18 September 2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2013). The Syrian Alternative. The New York Times, [online]. Available at: 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5974 [Accessed 3 October 2015]. 
 
	 194	
Putin, V. (2013). Press statement and answers to journalists’ questions following 
the APEC Leaders' Meeting [online] 8 October, Bali, Indonesia. Available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19382 [Accessed 15 November 
2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2013). Press statement and answers to journalists’ questions following 
the APEC Leaders' Meeting [online] 8 October, Bali, Indonesia. Available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19382 [Accessed 15 November 
2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2014). Address by President of the Russian Federation. [online]. 18 
March, The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia. Available at: http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 
[Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2014). Speech at The Seliger 2014 National Youth Forum in The Tver 
Region. [online]. 29 August, The Seliger Youth Forum. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iw5Ij_RFJ1Q [Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2015). Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. [online]. 22 
October, Valdai Discussion Club, Sochi, Russia. Available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548 [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2015). Meeting on Investigation Into The Crash of a Russian Airliner Over 
Sinai. [online]. 17 November, Moscow. Available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50707 [Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
Putin, V. (2015). Questions and Answers Session Following The Crash 
of The Russian Military Plane in Syria. [online]. 15 November, Moscow. Available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/50777 [Accessed 25 
February 2016]. 
Russia: National Security Strategy. (2015). [online]. 31 December, Presidential 
Edict 683. Available at:  
http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-
National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf  [Accessed 7 November 2016].  
United Nations Sesurity Council Resolution 1973 (2011). [online]. 17 March. 
Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-
UNSCR-1973.pdf [Accessed 11 November 2016]. 
 
 
 
Books: 
 
Adomeit, H. (2008). Inside or outside? Russia’s Policies Towards NATO. In:  E. 
Rowe and S. Torjesen, ed., The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy. 
 Routledge  , pp. 97-121. 
 
	 195	
Aitamurto, K. (2015). The Approved and The Disapproved Islam in Russia. In: G. 
Simons and D. Westerlund, ed., Religion, Politics and Nation-Building in Post-
Communist Countries. Ashgate, pp. 99-116.  
 
Akaev, V. (2009). Islam and Politics in Chechnya and Ingushetiia. In: G. 
Yemelianova, ed., Radicl Islam in the Former Soviet Union. Routledge, pp. 62-82. 
Akaev, V. (1999). Religious-Political Conflict in The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 
In: L. Jonson and M. Esenov, ed., Political Islam and Conflict in Russia and Central 
Asia. Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, pp. 54-7. 
 
Aksakov, K. (1861-80). Polnoe sobranie sochinenii [A Complete Set Of Works]. 3 
vols. Moscow. 
 
Alterman, J., Barnett, C. (2013). Turkey, Russia, and Iran in the Middle East. In: J. 
Alterman, C. Barnett, A. Kuchins and J. Mankoff, ed., The Turkey, Russia, Iran 
Nexus: Evolving Power Dynamics in The Middle East, The Caucasus, and Central 
Asia. Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 4-12. Available at: https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/131112_Brannen_TurkeyRussiaIranNexus_Web
.pdf [Accessed by 23 November 2016]. 
 
Armstrong, D. (1989). Berkeley's Theory of Vision: A Critical Examination of Bishop 
Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (The Philosophy of George 
Berkeley). Garland Publishing Inc.  
 
Arutunyan, A. (2014). The Putin Mystique: Inside Russia’s Power Cult.  Skyscraper 
Publications . 
 
Askari, H. (2013). Conflict In The Persian Gulf: Origins And Evolution. Palgrave 
Macmillan . 
 
Assenova, M. (2003). Debate on NATO’s Evolution: A Guide. CSIS. 
  
Atherton, M. (1990). Berkley’s Revolution of Vision. Cornell University Press. 
 
Aybak, T. (2006). From ‘Turkic Century’ to the Rise of Eurasianism. In: G. MacLean, 
ed., Writing Turkey: Explorations in Turkish history, politics, and cultural identity. 
London: Middlesex University Press, pp. 69-84 . 
 
Bagby, L. (1996). Thucydidean Realism: Between Athens and Melos. In: B. Frankel, 
ed., Roots of Realism . Psychology Press , pp. 169-194.  
 
Barkin, S. (2010). Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory. 
Campridge University Press.  
 
Bassin, M., Glebov, S. and Laruelle, M. (2015). Between Europe and Asia: The 
Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism. University of Pitsburgh 
Press. 
 
	 196	
Belinsky, V. (1976). The Russian Nation and the Russian Tsar. In: J. Edie, ed., 
Russian Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Beginings Of Russian Philosophy: The Slavophiles, 
The Westernizers. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, p. 298.  
 
Bell, I. (2002). Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia. 3rd ed. Taylor & Francis. 
 
Belopolsky, H. (2008). Russia And The Challengers: Russian Alignment With China, 
Iran, And Iraq In The Unipolar Era. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Benediktov, K. (2013). Soyuz Pravykh Sil: Kratkayia Istoriya Partii [The Union of 
Right Forces: history of the party]. Directmedia. 
 
Bennigsen, A. (1989). Soviet Strategy and Islam. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Bezrukov, M. (1994). Institutional Mechanisms Of Russian Foreign Policy. In: L. 
Aron and K. Jensen, ed., The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy. Washington: 
US Institute of Peace Press . pp. 17-34.  
 
Blaikie, N. (1993). Approaches to Social Enquiry. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Brennan, R. (2015). The Growing Strategic Threat of Radical Islamist Ideology. 
RAND.  
 
Bryman, A. (2008). Social Research Methods. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press. 
 
Burchill, S. (2001). Realism and Neo-realism. In: Burchill, S. el al. ed. Theories of 
international relations. 2nd ed. Palgrave. 
 
Buzan, B., Jones, C. and Little, R. (1993). The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism and 
Structural Realism. Columbia University Press. 
 
Caldwell, L. (2007). Russian Concepts of National Security. In: R. Legvold, ed., 
Russian Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First Century and The Shadow of The Past. 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Carr, E. (1964). The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1990-1939: An Introduction to the Study 
of International Realtions. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Cassiday, J. and Johnson, E. (2013). A Personality Cult for The Postmodern Age: 
Reading Vladimir Putin’s Public Persona. In: H. Goscilo, ed., Putin as Celebrity and 
Cultural Icon. Routledge, pp. 37-65. 
 
Celikpala, N. (2011). The Russian Policies In The South Caucasus. In: M. Aydin, 
ed., Non-Traditional Security Threats And Regional Cooperation In The Southern 
Caucasus. IOS Press, pp. 125-139.  
 
Chaadaev, P. (1976). Philosophical Letters. In: J. Edie, J. Scanlan and M-B. Zeldin, 
ed., Russian Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Beginings Of Russian Philosophy: The 
Slavophiles, The Westernizers. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, pp. 94-
95. 
	 197	
 
Chernoff, F. (2008). Theory and Metatheory in International Relations. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
 
Cheterian, V. (2011). War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier. 
Columbia University Press. 
Chilton, P. (2004). Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. Routledge. 
 
Christensen, T. (1996). Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, 
and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton: University Press. 
 
Cocks, P. et al. (1976). The Dynamics of Soviet Politics. Harvard University Press. 
 
Colin, G. (2007). Russian Foreign Policy Discourse during the Kosovo 
Crisis: Internal Struggles and the Political Imaginaire. Paris: Science Po. 
 
Copleston, F. (1986). Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev. 
Search Press. 
 
Cottey, A. (2012). Security in 21st Century Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Covarrubias, J. and Lansford, T. (2016). The New Islamic State: Ideology, Religion 
and Violent Extremism in the 21st Century .  Routledge. 
 
Cox, R. (1986). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory. In: R. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia 
University Press , pp. 204-54.  
 
Cox, T. (2013). Challenging The Communism in Eastern Europe: 1959 and its 
Legacy. Routledge. 
 
Crane, G. (1998). Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political 
Realism. Berkeley:  University of California Press. 
 
Davies, A. (1998). Politicized Language. In: J. Mey and R. Asher, ed., Concise 
Encyclopedia of Pragmatics. New York: Elsevier, pp. 684-87. 
 
D'Encausse, H. (2009). Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in 
Central Asia. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. 
 
D’Amato, A. (1972). The Relevance of Machiavelli to Contemporary World Politics. 
In: A. Parel, ed., The Political Calculus. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Dannreuther, R. (2010). Russian Discourses and Approaches to Islam and 
Islamism. In: R. Dannreuther and L. March, ed.,  Russia and Islam: State, Society 
and Radicalism . Routledge, pp. 9-26 
Dawisha, K. (1990). Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, And Reform: The Great 
Challenge. CUP Archive. 
	 198	
 
Dawisha, K. (2014). Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? Simon & Schuster. 
 
Devyatkov, A. (2013). Master Signifier In Decay: Evolution Of Russian Political 
Discourse Since Putin’s Comeback. In:  A. Makarychev and A. Mommen, ed.,  
 Russia’s Changing Economic and Political Regimes :  The Putin Years and 
Afterwards .  Routledge , pp. 16-29. 
 
Donaldson, R. and Nogee, J. (2014). The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing 
Systems, Enduring Interests. Routledge. 
 
Doty, R. (1996). Imperial Encounters: Patterns of Representation in North/South 
Relations. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Dugin, A. (1999). Osnovi geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe budushee Rossii. Mislit 
Prostranstvom. (Seriya Bolshoe prostranstvo), [Fundamentals of Geopolitics: 
Geopolitical Future of Russia: To think about Space (Series of Great Space)]. 
Russian Edition Arktogeya-tsentr, Open Center, Moscow. 
 
Dyson, T. (2010). Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War 
Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
El-Hussini, M. (2016). Soviet-Egyptian Relations. Springer. 
Farrell, R. (1966). Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Fearon, J. and Wendt, A. (2002). Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. 
In: W. Carlsnacs, T. Risse and B. Simmons, ed., Handbook of International 
Relations. London: Sage. 
 
Feifer, G. (2009). The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. Harper 
Collins . 
 
Fernandes, S. (2014). Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards Europe: Evolving Trends of 
an (Un)Avoidable Relations. In: R. Kanet and R. Piet, ed., Shifting Priorities in 
Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy. Ashgate Publishing, pp. 13-35.  
Fox, A. B. (1959). The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II. Chicago: 
University of Chicago.  
Fowkes, B. and Gokay, B. (2012). An Unholy Alliance Against A Common Enemy: A 
History Of Communists’ Relations With Muslims. In: B. Fowkes and B. Gokay, ed., 
Muslims And Communists In Post-Transition States. Routledge, pp. 1-70.  
 
Freire, M. (2011). USSR/Russian Federation’s Major Power Status Inconsistencies. 
In: R. Baird, R. Corbetta, K. Grant and T. Volgy, ed., Major Powers and The Quest 
for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives. Palgrave 
Macmillan , pp. 55-75. 
 
	 199	
Furlong, P. and Marsh, D. (2010). A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and 
Epistemology in Political Science. In: D. Marsh and G. Stoker, ed., Theory and 
Methods in political Science. 3rd ed. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 184-211.  
 
Gavrilenkov, E., Welfens, P. and Wiegert, R., ed. (2004). Economic Opening Up 
And Growth In Russia: Finance, Trade, Market Institutions And Energy. Springer 
Science & Business Media . 
 
Gel’man, V. (2013). Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy. In: R. 
Sakwa, ed., Power and Policy in Putin’s Russia. Routledge.  
 
George, J. (2009). The Politics Of Ethnic Separatism In Russia And Georgia. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Gilbert, F. (1984). Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth 
Century Florence. New York: Norton. 
 
Gill, G. (2013). Symbolism And Regime Change In Russia. Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Gilpin, R. (1986). The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism. In: R. Keohane 
ed., Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia University Press . 
Glasersfeld, E. (2007), Aspects of Constructivism: Vico, Berkeley, Piaget. In: E. 
Glasersfeld, ed., Key Works in Radical Constructivism. Sense, Rotterdam, pp. 91-
99.  
Gokay, B. (1997). A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and 
British Imperialism, 1918-1923: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British 
Imperialism, 1918-23. Library of Modern Middle East. 
 
Gokay, B. (2006). Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign 
Policy, Turkey and Communism. Routledge. 
 
Goodrich, J. (2008). Russia in Europe and Asia. BiblioBazar. 
 
Gorodetsky, G. (2008). Russia Between East And West: Russian Foreign Policy On 
The Threshold Of The Twenty-First Century. Taylor & Francis . 
 
Goscilo, H. (2013). Russia’s Ultimate Celebrity: VVP As VIP Object D’art. In: H. 
Goscilo, ed., Putin As Celebrity And Cultural Icon. Routledge, pp. 6-36.  
 
Govella, K., Aggarwal, V. (2011). Introduction: The Fall of the Soviet Union and the 
Resurgence of Russia. In: V. Aggarwal and K. Govella, ed., Responding to a 
Resurgent Russia: Russian Policy and Responses from the European Union and 
the United States. Springer Science & Business Media, pp. 2-18.  
 
Graham, I., Dixon, D. and Jones III, J. (2010). Theorizing Our World. In: B. Gomez, 
J. Jones III , ed., Research Methods in Geography: A Critical Introduction. John 
Wiley & Sons, pp. 9-26.  
	 200	
 
Green, N. (2012). Sufism: A Global History. John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Guroff, G. and Guroff, A. (1994). The Paradox of Russian National Identity. In: R. 
Szporluk, ed., National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of 
Eurasia. M.E. Sharpe , pp. 78-101.  
 
Gvosdev, N. and Marsh, C. (2013). Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and 
Sectors. CQ Press . 
 
Haddad, B., Bsheer, R., Abu-Rish , Z. (2012).  The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End 
of an Old Order? Pluto Press. 
Hahn, G. (2011). Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right: A Report of The CSIS 
Russia and Eurasia Program. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Hahn, G. (2007). Russia’s Islamic Threat. Yale University Press. 
Handel, M. (1981). Weak States in the International System. London: Frank Cass. 
Harnisch, S. (2012). German Foreign Policy: Gulliver's Travails in the 21st Century. 
In: R. Beasley , ed.,  Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective :  Domestic and 
International Influences on State Behavior . 2nd ed. SAGE , pp. 71-93. 
 
Hay, C. (2002). Political Analysis: A critical Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Hayes, L. (2016). The Islamic State in the Post-Modern World: The Political 
Experience of Pakistan .  Routledge. 
 
Hegghammer, T. (2015). “Classic” and “Global” Jihadism in Saudi Arabia. In: B. 
Haykel, T. Hegghammer and S. Lacroix, ed., Saudi Arabia in Transition. Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 207-31.   
 
Herzen, A. (1968). The Russian People and Socialism. A Letter to Michelet. In: The 
Memoirs of Alexander Herzen. Vol 4, London: Chatto & Windus. 
 
Hobbes, T. (2007). Leviathan. Wilder Publications. 
 
Hoffmann, K. (2013). The Collective Security Treaty Organization: A Multilateral 
Response To New Security Challenges? In: S. Aris and A. Wenger, ed.,  Regional 
Organisations and Security: Conceptions and Practices , Routledge, pp. 161-181. 
 
Hopf, T. (2002). Social Construction Of Foreign Policy: Identities And Foreign 
Policies, Moscow, 1955 And 1999. Cornell University Press. 
 
Hopwood, D. (2013).  Syria 1945-1986 (RLE Syria): Politics and Society . Routledge. 
 
Horujy, S. (2010). Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian Philosophical 
Humanism. In: G. Hamburg, R. Poole, ed., A History of Russian Philosophy 1830-
	 201	
1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity. Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 27-51. 
 
Horujy, S. and Michelson, P. (2010). A History of Russian Philosophy 1830-1930. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hroub, K. (2011). Political Islam: Context Versus Ideology. Saqi Books. 
 
Hunt, C., Sharp, S. and Lowenthal, S. (1991). Ideology and Power Politics: A 
Symposium. In: F. Fleron, E. Hoffman and R. Laird, ed., Classic Issues in Soviet 
Foreign Policy: From Lenin to Brezhnev. Aldine Transaction, pp. 217-51. 
 
Hunter, S. (2004). Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security. ME Sharpe. 
 
Hunter, S., Thomas, J. and Melikishvili, A. (2004). Islam In Russia: The Politics Of 
Identity And Security. M.E.Sharpe. 
 
Isakova, I. (2004). Russian Governance in the 21st Century: Geo-Strategy, 
Geopolitics and New Governance. Routledge . 
 
Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G. (2010). Introduction to International Relations 
Theories and Approach. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press. 
 
Jacobson, J. (1994). When The Soviet Union Entered World Politics. University Of 
California Press. 
 
Jahn, H. (2004). ‘Us’: Russians on Russianness’. In: S. Franklin and E. Widdis, ed., 
National Identity In Russian Culture: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 53-73. 
 
Jensen, L. (1982). Explaining Foreign Policy. Prentice-Hall. 
 
Jorgensen, K. (2014). Constructing European Diplomacy in Changing World. In: C. 
Carta and J. Morin, ed., EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis: 
Making Sense of Diversity. Ashgate Publishing, pp. 79-95. 
 
Kabir, N. (2013). Young American Muslims: Dynamics of Identity. Edinburgh 
University Press. 
 
Kaplan, V. and Orlov, B. (2013). Toward a Multi-Party System, 1985-93. In: N. 
Schleifman, ed., Russia at a Crossroads: History, Memory and Political Practice. 
Routledge, pp. 173-227. 
Karagiannis, E. (2002). Energy And Security In The Caucasus. Routledge. 
 
Katzenstein, P. (1996). The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia. 
 
Keohane, O. (1986). Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia University Press . 
 
	 202	
Khamidov, A. (2015). Life After Divorce: Russia, Central Asia, And Two Decades Of 
Tumultuous Relations. In: D. Denoon, ed.,  China, The United States, and the Future 
of Central Asia :  U.S.-China Relations . NYU Press, pp. 3-19. 
 
Khomiakov, A. (1900-14). Polnoe sobranie sochinenii [A Complete Set Of Works]. 8 
vols. Moscow. 
 
Kireyevsky, I. (1987). A Reply to A. S. Khomyakov. In: W. Leatherbarrow, ed., A 
Documentary History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism. 
Ardis, pp. 79-88. 
 
Kocho-Williams, A. (2013). Russia’s International Relations in the Twentieth 
Century. Routledge. 
 
Korany, B. (2008).  The Foreign Policies of Arab States :  The Challenge of 
Globalization . American University in Cairo Press . 
 
Kotz, D. et al. (2007).  Russia's Path from Gorbachev to Putin :  The Demise of the 
Soviet System and the New Russia . Routledge . 
 
Kratochwil, F. (2007). Evidence, Inference, and Truth as Problems of Theory 
Building in the Social Sciences. In: R. Lebow and M. Lichbach, ed., Theory And 
Evidence In Comparative Politics And International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp. 25-54. 
 
Krejci, O. (2007).  Geopolitics of the Central European Region :  The View from 
Prague and Bratislava. Bratislava : Veda. 
 
Kreutz, A. (1999). Russia’s Place In The World. Algora Publishing. 
 
Kreutz, A. (2006). Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe? Praeger Security 
International. 
 
Lacroix, S. (2011). Awakening Islam: The Politics Of Religious Dissent In 
Contemporary Saudi Arabia. Harvard University Press. 
 
Laferriere, E. and P. Stoett. (1999). International Relations Theory And Ecological 
Thought. Routledge. 
 
Laine, V. (2015). Managed Nationalism: Contemporary Russian Nationalistic 
Movements and Their Relationship to The Government. The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs. 
Larsen, H. (1997). Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and 
Europe. Routledge. 
 
Leal-Arcas, R. (2010). International Trade and Investment Law: Multilateral, 
Regional and Bilateral Governance. Edward Elgar. 
 
	 203	
Lefevre, R. (2013). Ashes Of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood In Syria. Hurst & 
Company. 
 
Legvold, R. (2007). Russian Foreign Policy During Periods of Great State 
Transformation. In: R. Legvold, ed., Russian Foreign Policy in The Twenty-First 
Century and The Shadow of The Past. Columbia University Press, pp. 77-143. 
 
Light, M. (2002). International Relations of Russia and The Commonwealth of 
Independent States. In: I. Bell, ed., Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia 2003. 
3rd ed. Taylor & Francis. 
 
Lister, C. (2015). The Islamic State: An Introduction.  Harper Collins. 
 
Lister, C. (2016). The Syrian Jihad :  Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of 
an Insurgency . Oxford University Press . 
 
Livermore, G. (1999). Russian Foreign Policy, 1994-1998 :  Charting an Independent 
Course .  Current Digest . 
 
Lo, B. (2008). The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin. In: G. 
Gordetsky, ed., Russia between east and west: Russian foreign policy on the 
threshold of the twenty-first century. Taylor & Francis, pp. 12-27. 
 
Lo, B. (2008). Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy. John 
Wiley & Sons. 
 
Lo, B. (2015). Russia and The New World Disorder. Brookings Institute Press. 
 
Lobell, S. (2009). Threat Assessment, The State, and Foreign Policy: a 
Neoclassical Realist Model. In: S. Lobell, N. Ripsman and J. Taliaferro, ed., 
Neoclasssical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 42-74. 
 
Lounev, S. (2011). Russian Energy Sector And Geopolitics. In: R. Mishra, R. Sinha 
and R. Rybakov, ed., India And Russia: Problems In Ensuring Energy Security. 
Academic Foundation, pp. 79-88.  
 
Lucas, E. (2009). The New Cold War: How The Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and 
The West. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
 
Machiavelli, N. (2005). Discourses. BN Publishing. 
 
Machiavelli, N. and Bull, G. (2003). The Prince. Penguin Classics. 
 
Maddy-Wetzmann, B. (1995). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 19. 
BoulderCO:  Westview. 
 
Maksimychev, I. (1998). How the Beginning of NATO Enlargement Threatens 
Russian Security. Moscow Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science.  
 
	 204	
Malashenko, A. (1999). Islam and Politics in Central Asian States. In: L. Jonson and 
M. Esenov, ed., Political Islam and Conflict in Russia and Central Asia. Stockholm: 
The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, pp. 9-18. 
 
Malashenko, A. (2010). Islam in Russia: Religion and Politics. In: H. Heinrich, L. 
Lobova and A. Malashenko, ed., Will Russia Become a Muslim Society? Peter 
Lang, pp. 13-39.  
 
Malashenko, A. (2015) Islam versus Communism. In: V. Laine, ed., Managed 
Nationalism: Contemporary Russian Nationalistic Movements and Their 
Relationship to The Government. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. pp. 
63-79. 
 
Malcolm, N., Pravda, A., Allison, R. and Light, M (1996). Internal Factors In Russian 
Foreign Policy. 1st ed. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Malinova, O., Casula, P. (2010). Political and National Identity in Russian Political 
Discourse. In: A. Lecours, L. Moreno, ed., Nationalism and Democracy: 
Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions. Routledge, 170-83.  
 
Mandaville, P. (2007). Global Political Islam. Routledge. 
 
Maness, R., Valeriano, B. (2015).  Russia's Coercive Diplomacy :  Energy, Cyber, and 
Maritime Policy as New Sources of Power .  Palgrave Macmillan . 
 
Manheim, J., Rich, R., Willnat, L., Brians, C. and Babb, J. (2012). Empirical Political 
Analysis. 7th ed. Pearson Education. 
 
Mankoff, J. (2011). Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. 2nd  
ed. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Maoz, M. and Yaniv, A. (2013). Syria Under Assad (RLE Syria): Domestic 
Constraints and Regional Risks. Routledge . 
 
Marsh, C. (2005).  Unparalleled Reforms :  China's Rise, Russia's Fall, And The 
Interdependence Of Transition.  Lexington Books . 
Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. 
Mearsheimer, J. (2006). Structural Realism. In: T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith, 
ed., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 71-88. 
 
Melville, A. and Shekleina, T. (2005). Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: 
Concepts and Realities.  Central European University Press . 
 
Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice For Europe: Social Purpose And State Power 
From Messina To Maastricht. Cornell University Press. 
 
	 205	
Morgan, D. (2008).  Snakes in Myth, Magic, and History :  The Story of a Human 
Obsession . ABC-CLIO. 
 
Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Moss, W. (2003). A History of Russia Volume 1: To 1917. Anthem Press. 
 
Mutlu, G. (2012). Turkey’s Foreign Aid Policy Toward Central Asia. USAK Yearbook 
Of Politics And International Relations: Volume 5.  International Strategic Research 
Organization (USAK) , pp. 123-49.  
 
Myers, S. (2015). The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin. Simon & 
Schuster . 
 
Natho, K. (2009). Circassian History. Xlibris Corporation.  
 
Neumann, I. (2008). Discourse Analysis. In: A. Klotz and D. Prakash, ed., 
Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 61-77. 
 
Nichol, U. (2007). Focus On Politics And Economics Of Russia And Eastern 
Europe. Nova Publishers. 
 
Niebuhr, K. (1940). Why the Church is Not Pacifist. London: Student Christian 
Movement Press. 
 
Nizameddin, T. (1999). Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy 
C. Hurst & Co. Publishers . 
 
Northedge, F. (1986). The Foreign Policies of the Powers. London: Faber and 
Faber. 
 
Obeng, S. and Hartford, B. (2008). Political Discourse Analysis. Nova Publishers. 
 
Oliker, O., Crane, K., Schwartz, L. and Yusupov, C. (2009). Russian Foreign Policy: 
Sources and Implication. RAND. 
 
Onuf, N. (1989). World of Our Making. Columbia: University of South California 
Press. 
 
Özdal, H., Özertem, H., Demirtepe, M. and Has, K. (2006). Turkey-Russian 
Relations in The Post-Cold War Era: Current Dynamics, Future Prospects. 
Uluslararasi Stratejik Arastirma Kurumu Yayinlari, Ankara. 
Papert, T. (2014). Moscow Conference Identifies ‘Color Revolutions’ as War. 
Executive Intelligence Review, pp. 7-25. 
 
Pass, S. (2004). Parallel Paths to Constructivism: Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. 
Information Age Publishing. 
 
	 206	
Perrie, M. and Pavlov, A. (2014). Ivan The Terrible. Routledge. 
 
Petro, N. (1997). Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-state. Longman. 
 
Petro, N. and Rubinstein, A. (1996). Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to 
Nation-State. Longman. 
 
Phillips, S. (2000). Stalinist Russia. Heinemann. 
 
Pilkington, H. and Yemelianova, G. (2003). Islam in Post-Soviet Russia. Routledge. 
 
Piontkovsky, A. (2006). East or West? Russia’s Identity Crisis in Foreign Policy. The 
Foreign Policy Centre. 
 
Plamper, J. (2003). The Spatial Poetics Of The Personality Cult: Circles Around 
Stalin. In: E. Dobrenko and E. Naiman, ed., The Landscape Of Stalinism: The Art 
And Ideology Of Soviet Space. University of Washington Press, pp. 36-44. 
 
Plokhy, S. (2006). The Origins of The Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in 
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Polikanov, D. and Timmins, G. (2004). Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin. In: C. 
Ross, ed., Russian Politics Under Putin. Manchester University Press , pp. 223-35. 
 
Ponsard, L. (2006). Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap. 
Routledge. 
 
Primakov, Y. (2009). Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East 
from the Cold War to the Present. Basic Books. 
 
Prizel, I. (1998). National Identity And Foreign Policy: Nationalism And Leadership 
In Poland, Russia And Ukraine. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Protsyk, O. and Harzl, B. (2013). Managing Ethinc Diversity In Russia. Routledge.  
 
Pursiainen, C. (2010). The Impact Of International Security Regimes On Russia’s 
Behavior: The Case Of OSCE And Chechnya. In: T. Hopf, ed., Understanding Of 
Russian Foreign Policy. Penn State Press, pp. 135-36. 
 
Rabinovich, I. (1979). The Limits of Military Power: Syria’s Role. In: P. Haley and L. 
Snyder, ed., Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues. New York: Syracuse 
University Press, pp. 55-73.   
 
Rabow-Edling, S. (2012). Slavophile Thought and the Politics of Cultural 
Nationalism. SUNY Press. 
 
Ragsdale, H. (1996). The Russian Tragedy: The Burden of History. M.E Sharpe. 
 
	 207	
Reus-Smit, C. (2001). Constructivism. In: S. Burchill, R. Devetak, A. Linklater, M. 
Paterson, C. Reus-Smith and J. True, ed., Theories of International Relations. 3rd 
ed. New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, pp. 195-6. 
 
Richmond, W. (2008). Russian Policies Towards Islamic Extremism in The Northern 
Caucasus and Distabilization in Kabardino-Balkaria. In: M. Gammer, ed., Islam and 
The State in The Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. Routledge, pp. 86-101.  
 
Richmond, W. (2013). The Circassian Genocide. Rutgers University Press. 
 
Rippin, A. (2013). The Islamic World. Routledge. 
 
Roberts, G. (2005). The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and 
Cold War, 1945-1991. Routledge. 
 
Roberts, S. (2012). Putin’s United Russia Party. Routledge. 
 
Ronczkowski, M. (2011).  Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime :  Intelligence 
Gathering, Analysis and Investigations . 3rd ed. CRC. 
Rosenau, J. (1966). Pre-theories and Theories of International Politics. In: R. 
Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, pp. 27-92. 
Ross, C. (2004). Russian Politics Under Putin. Manchester University Press. 
Rozakēs, C. (1987). The Turkish Straits.  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Russel, J. (2014). Kadyrov’s Chechnya – Template, Test or Trouble for Russia’s 
Regional Policy? In: C. Ross, ed., Regional Politics Under Putin and Medvedev. 
Routledge, pp. 149-69.  
 
Ryan, K. (2009). Stalin In Russian Satire, 1917–1991. University of Wisconsin 
Press . 
 
Sagramoso, D. and Yarlykapov, A. (2013). Caucasian Crescent: Russia’s Islamic 
Policies and its Respononses to Radicalization. In: R. Ware, ed., The Fire Below: 
How The Caucasus Shaped Russia. Bloomsbury Publishing, pp. 67-9, 256-78. 
 
Saikal, A. (2012). Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. 
I.B.Tauris . 
 
Sakharov, A. (1998). The Main Phases and Distinctive Features of Russian 
Nationalism. In: G. Hosking and R. Service, ed., Russian Nationalism: Past and 
Present. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 14-15.  
 
Sakwa, R. (2009). Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Policy Towards the West: 
Towards a New Realism. In:  J. Gower and G. Timmins, ed.,  Russia and Europe in 
the Twenty-First Century :  An Uneasy Partnership . Anthem Press , pp. 1-22. 
 
	 208	
Savranskaya, S. (2014). The Fall Of The Wall, Eastern Europe, 1988-1989: A Policy 
Of Optimism And Caution. In: M. Kramer and V. Smetana, ed., Imposing, 
Maintaining And Tearing Open The Iron Curtain: The Cold War And East-Central 
Europe, 1945-1989. Lexington Books, pp. 335-55.  
 
Scheafer, R. (2010). The Insurgency in Chechnya and The North Caucasus: From 
Gazavat to Jihad. ABC-CLIO. 
 
Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. London: Allen Lane. 
 
Seweryn Bialer. (1986). The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline. 
I.B. Tauris. 
 
Shearman, P. (2000). Russia and NATO Enlargement: The Case Against. In: M. 
Bowker and R. Cameron, ed., Russia After The Cold War. London & New York: 
Longman. Pp. 299-318. 
 
Shearman, P. (2015). Rethinking Soviet Communism. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Shlykov, P. (2015). Russian Foreign Policy In The Eastern Mediterranean Since 
1991. In: S. Litsas, et al. ed., The Eastern Mediterranean In Transition: Multipolarity, 
Politics and Power. Ashgate Publishing, 31-51. 
 
Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P. (2010). Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the 
Study of World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Skinner, Q. (1981). Machiavelli. New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Smith, H. (2012). Domestic Influences On Russian Foreign Policy: Status, Interests 
And Resentiment. In: M. Freire and R. Kanet, ed., Russia And Its Near Neighbours: 
Identity, Interests And Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 39-62.  
 
Smith, M. (2012). Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Euro-Atlanticism. Conflict 
Studies Research Centre. 
 
Snetkov, A. (2014). Russia’s Security Policy Under Putin: A Critical Perspective. 
Routledge. 
 
Snyder, J. (1991). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Soderbaum, F. (2012). Theories of Regionalism. In:  M. Beeson and R. Stubbs, ed., 
Handbook of Asian Regionalism.  Routledge , pp. 1-21 . 
 
Sokirianskaia, E. (2008). Ideology and Conflict: Chechen Political Nationalism Prior 
to, and During, Ten Years of War. In: M. Gammer, ed., Islam and The State in The 
Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. Routledge, pp. 103-39. 
 
Sperling, V. (2015). Sex, Politics, And Putin: Political Legitimacy In Russia. Oxford 
University Press. 
	 209	
 
Stayer, R. (1998). Why Did The Soviet Union Collapse?: Understanding Historical 
Change. M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Steinberg, M. and Coleman, H. (2007). Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in 
Modern Russia. Indiana University Press. 
 
Steinberg, M. and Khrustalev, V. (1995). The Fall Of The Romanovs: Political 
Dreams And Personal Struggles In A Time Of Revolution. Yale University Press. 
 
Stent, A. (2013). Restoration and Revolution in Putin’s Foreign Policy. In: R. Sakwa, 
ed., Power and Policy in Putin’s Russia. Routledge , pp. 1089-106. 
 
Stern, J. and Berger, J. (2015). ISIS: The State Of Terror.  Harper Collins. 
 
Suraska, W. (1998). How The Soviet Union Disappeared: An Essay on The Causes 
of Dissolution. Duke University Press. 
 
Sutton, J. (1998). The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Towards a 
Reassessment. Basingstoke. 
 
Szabo, S. (2014). Germany, Russia, And The Rise Of Geo-Economics. Bloomsbury 
Publishing. 
 
Szvak, G. (2010). The Place of Russia in Europe and Asia. Social Studies 
Monographs. 
 
Taliaferro, J., Lobell, S. and Ripsman, N. (2009). Neoclassical Realism, the State 
and Foreign Policy. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Therme, C. (2013). Iran And Russia: A Tactical Entente. In: S. Cronin, ed., Iranian-
Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions Since 1800. Routledge, pp. 377-401. 
 
Toje, A. and Kunz, B. (2012). Neoclassical Realism in European Politics: Bringing 
Power Back In. Manchester: University Press. 
 
Tolz, V. (2004). The Search for National Identity in Russia of Yeltsin and Putin. In: 
Y. Brudny, J. Frankel and S. Hoffman, ed., Restructuring Post-Communist Russia. 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 160-78. 
 
Trenin, D. (1996). Russia’s Security Interests And Policies In The Caucasus 
Region. In: B. Coppieters, ed., Contested Borders In The Caucasus. VUB Press, 
pp. 115-30. 
 
Tsygankov, A. (2012). Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in 
International Relations. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tsygankov, A. (2013). Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change And Continuity In National 
Identity. 4th ed. Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
	 210	
Tsygankov, A. and Tsygankov, P. (2010). Russian Theory of International 
Relations. In: R. Denemark, ed., International Studies Encyclopedia. NJ: Wiley-
Blackwell Publishers, pp. 6375-87. 
 
Tuminez, A. (2000).  Russian Nationalism Since 1856 :  Ideology And The Making Of 
Foreign Policy .  Rowman & Littlefield . 
 
Turner, J. (2014).  Religious Ideology and the Roots of the Global Jihad :  Salafi 
Jihadism and International Order . Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Vatchagaev, M. (2014). Sufism in Chechnya: Its Influence on Contemporary 
Society. In: A. Le Huerou, A. Merlin, A. Regamey and E. Sieca-Kozlowski, ed., 
Chechnya at War and Beyond. Routledge, pp. 220-36. 
 
Vaughn, J. (2016). Socio-Political Model Of Lies In Russia: Putin Against The 
Personal. UPA. 
 
Vishnevsky, A. (1996). Family, Fertility, and Demographic Dynamics in Russia: 
Analysis and Forecast. In: J. DaVanzo and D. Adamson, ed., Russia’s Demographic 
“Crisis”: How Real Is It? RAND, pp. 1-35.  
 
Wagemakers, J. (2012).  A Quietist Jihadi :  The Ideology and Influence of Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi . Cambridge University Press. 
 
Walicki, A. (1979). A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to 
Marxism. Stanford University Press. 
 
Wallander, C. (1996). The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After The Cold War. 
Westview Press. 
Walt, S. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Waltz, K. (1986). Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power. In: R. Keohane, ed., 
Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia University Press , pp. 98-130. 
 
Waltz, K. (1986). Political Structures. In: R. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its 
Critics. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 70-97. 
 
Waltz, K. (2010). Theory of International Politics. Waveland Press. 
 
Weismann, I. (2007). The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide 
Sufi Tradition. Routledge. 
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Westerlund, D. (2004). Sufism in Europe and North America. Routledge. 
 
White, J. and Bourdeaux, M. (2009).  Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The 
New War for Souls . Wipf and Stock Publishers. 
	 211	
 
White, S and Feklyunina, V. (2014).  Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus: The Other Europe .  Springer. 
 
Wickham, C. (2015). The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement. 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Williams, B. (2015).  Inferno in Chechnya: The Russian-Chechen Wars, the Al 
Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings . University Press of New 
England. 
 
Wohlforth. W. (2012). Realism And Foreign Policy. In: S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. 
Dunne, ed., Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. 2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press, pp. 35-54. 
 
Wohlworth, W. (1993). The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the 
Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Wolfers, A. (1962). Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. 
Baltimore: The Johns  
Wragg, D. (2012). The World Sea Power Guide.  Casemate Publishers . 
 
Wren, M. and Stults, T. (2009). The Course of Russian History. 5th ed.  Wipf and 
Stock Publishers . 
 
Yemelianova, G. (2002). Russia And Islam: A Historical Survey. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Yemelianova, G. (2003). Islam in Russia: An Historical Perspective. In: H. Pikington 
and G. Yemelianova, ed., Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private Faces. 
Routledge, pp. 15-60. 
 
Zigon, J. (2013). Multiple Moralities and Religions in Post-Soviet Russia. Berghahn 
Books. 
 
Zimmerman, W. (2016). Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism From The Revolution To 
Putin. Princeton University Press. 
 
Zuhur, S. (2011). Saudi Arabia. ABC-CLIO. 
 
Zygar, M. (2016). All The Kremlin’s Men: Inside The Court of Vladimir Putin. 
PublicAffairs,U.S. 
 
Articles: 
 
Abrahms, M. (2003). When Rogue Defy Reasons: Bashar’s Syria. Middle East 
Quarterly, 10(4), pp. 45-56.  
 
	 212	
Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. 
European Journal of International Relations 3(3), pp. 319-63. 
 
Ashley, R. (1984). The Poverty of Neorealism. International Organization 38(2), pp. 
225-86. 
 
Baev, P. (2015). Russia as Opportunist or Spoiler in the Middle East? The 
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 50(2), pp. 8-21. 
 
Baraz, Y. (2010). Islamic Modernism: Responses to Western Modernization in the 
Middle East. Inquiries Journal [online] 2(5). Available at: 
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/248/islamic-modernism-responses-to-
western-modernization-in-the-middle-east [Accessed: 3 August 2016]. 
 
Bates, S., Jenkins, L. (2007). Teaching And Learning Ontology And Epistemology In 
Political Science. Politics 27(1), pp. 55-63. 
 
Bogdonas, A. (2012). Russia’s Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, and 
Profit. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies [online] 2. Available at: 
http://ejeps.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/159.pdf [Accessed: 9 February 2016]. 
 
Bozdaglioglu, Y. (2007). Constructivism and Identity Formation: An Interactive 
Approach. Uluslararasi Hukuk ve Politika Cilt 3(11), pp. 121-44. 
 
Clover, C. (1999). Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of 
Geopolitics. Foreign Affairs [online] Available at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54793/charles-clover/dreams-of-the-eurasian-
heartland-the-reemergence-of-geopolitics [Accessed: 14 April 2016]. 
 
Codevilla, G. (2008). Relations Between Church and State in Russia Today. 
Religion, State and Society 36(2), pp. 113-38. 
 
Cohen, A. (2002). Russia, Islam, and The War on Terrorism: an Uneasy Future. 
Demokratizatsiya, 10(4), pp. 556-67 
Copeland, D. (2000). The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review 
Essay. International Security 25(2), pp. 187-212. 
 
Desch, M. (1998). The Cilture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security 
Studies. International Security 23(1), pp. 141-70. 
 
Doyle, M. (1990). Thucydidean Realism. Review of International Studies 16(3), pp. 
223-37. 
 
Ersen, E. (2004). Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s ‘Multipolarism’ in Russian Foreign 
Policy. Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies 4, pp. 135-72. 
 
Falkowski, M. (2014). On The Periphery Of Global Jihad, The North Caucasus:  The 
Illusion Of Stabilisation. Point Of View [online] 45. Available at: 
	 213	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_46_ang_kaukaz-polnocny_net.pdf 
[Accessed 11 August 2015]. 
 
Fleming, D. (1948). The Soviet Union and Collective Security. The Journal of 
Politics, 10(1), pp. 117-30. 
 
Fowkes, B., Gokay, B. (2009). An Unholy Alliance Against A Common Enemy: A 
History Of Communists’ Relations With Muslims. Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics. [online] 25(1), pp. 1-31. Available at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523270802655597 [Accessed 11 
November 2016].   
Galbreath, D. (2006). Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement: Continuity and 
Change. Cooperation and Conflict 41, pp. 443-62. 
Gill, G. (1984). Personality Cult, Political Culture and Party Structure. Studies in 
Comparative Communism, 17(2), pp. 111-21. 
Gleason, P. (1983). Identifying Identity: A Semantic History. Journal of American 
History 69(4), pp. 910-31. 
Golan, G. (1982-1983). The Soviet Union and the Israeli Action in Lebanon. 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 59(1), pp. 7-16. 
Gorenburg, D. (2006). Russia’s Muslims: A Growing Challenge For Moscow. 
PONARS Policy Memo 421, pp. 1-5. 
 
Gusher, A. (1997). On Russian-Iranian Relations. International Affairs 43(2), pp. 38-
44. 
 
Habibi, N. (2008). The Iranian Economy In The Shadow Of Sanctions. Middle East 
Brief, 31. Available at: https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB31.pdf 
[Accessed 6 December 2016].  
 
Hart, P. (1991). Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of 
Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Political Psychology 12(2), pp. 247-78. 
 
Herd, G. and Sargsyan, G. (2007).  Debating Russian Demographic Security: 
Current Trends and Future Trajectories. Security Index: A Russian Journal on 
International Security, 13(2), pp. 51-67.  
 
Hermann, M. (1980). Explaining Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics 
of Political Leaders. International Studies Quarterly 24(1), pp. 7-46. 
 
Hopf, T. (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. 
International Security 23(1), pp. 171-200. 
 
Houghton, D. (2007). Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: 
Towards the Constructivist Approach. Foreign Policy Analysis 3(1), pp. 24-45. 
 
	 214	
Jackson, P. (2004). Bridging the Gap: Towards a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue. 
International Studies Review 6(2), pp. 337-52. 
 
Jackson, P., Nexon, D. (2004). Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism? 
International Studies Review 6(2), pp. 337-52. 
 
Katz, M.  (2008). The Russian-Libyan Rapprochement: What Has Moscow Gained. 
Middle East Policy [online] 15(3). Available at: http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-
policy-archives/russian-libyan-rapprochement-what-has-moscow-gained [Accessed: 
29 February 2016]. 
Katz, M. (2008). The Russian-Libyan Rapprochement: What Have Moscow Gained. 
Middle Eastern Policy, 15(3), pp. 122-28. 
Katz, M. (2008). The Emerging Saudi-Russian Partnership. Mide East Monitor, 
[online] 3(1), pp. 1-11. Available at: 
http://ebot.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/3015/The%20Emerging%20Saudi-
Russian%20Partnership.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 22 November 
2016]. 
Katz, M. (2013). Russia and The Conflict in Syria: Four Myths. Middle East Policy, 
20(2), pp. 38-46.  
 
Katz, M. (2013). The Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Russian Relations with Other 
Middle Eastern Countries. Russian Analytical Digest 128, pp. 2-4.  
 
Katzenstein, P., Okawara, A. (2001-2002). Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the 
Case for Analytical Eclecticism. International Security 26(3), pp. 153-85. 
 
Kaveshnikov, N. (2010). The Issue Of Energy Security In Relations Between Russia 
And The European Union. European Security 19(4), pp. 585-605. 
 
Keenan, R. (2013). Tatarstan: The Battle Over Islam In Russia’s Heartland. World 
Policy Journal 30(2), pp. 70-9. 
 
Knysh, A. (2007). Conteztualizing the Salafi-Sufi Conflict (From Northern Caucasus 
to Hadramawt). Middle Eastern Studies, 43(4), pp. 503-30. 
Kowert, P. (2001). The Peril and Promises of Constructivist Theory. Ritsumeikon 
Journal of International Studies 13(3), pp. 157-70. 
 
Kreutz, A. (2004). Russia And The Arabian Peninsula. Journal of Military Strategic 
Studies 7(2), pp. 1-57. 
 
Labs, E. (1997). Beyond victory: Offensive realism and the expansion of war aims. 
Security Studies 6(4), pp.1-49. 
 
Lapid, Y. (1989). The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a 
Post-Positivist Era. International Studies Quarterly 33(3), pp. 235-54. 
 
	 215	
MacFie, A. (1989). The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45. Middle 
Eastern Studies 25(2), pp. 238-48. 
 
Magen, Z. (2011). Russia and the Middle East. INSS Insight 262. 
 
Mearsheimer, J. (2005). E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On. International 
Relations 19(2), pp. 139-52. 
 
Moravcsik, A. (2003). Theory Synthesis In International Relations: Real Not 
Metaphysical. International Studies Review 5(1), pp. 131-6. 
Nikitina, Y. (2014). The “Color Revolutions” and “Arab Spring” in Russian Official 
Discourse, The Quarterly Journal 14(1), pp. 87-105. 
Obeng, S. (1997). Language and Politics: Indirectness in Political Discourse. 
Discourse and Society 8, pp. 49-83. 
 
Pietikäinen, S., Dufva, H. (2006). Voices in discourses: Dialogism, Critical 
Discourse Analysis and ethnic identity. Journal of Sociolinguistics, 10, pp. 205-24. 
 
Potserebov, A. (1997). On Russian-Egyptian Relations. International Relations 
43(3), pp. 104. 
 
Poulin, K. (2011). Disappearance and Death: The Fate of Chechen Human Rights 
Activists. Inquiries Journal, [online] 3(2), pp. 1-21. Available at: 
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/396/disappearance-and-death-the-fate-of-
chechen-human-rights-activists [Accessed 21 November 2016].  
 
Rathbun, B. (2008). A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the 
Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism. Security Studies 17(2), pp. 
294-321. 
 
Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World 
Politics 51(1), pp. 144-72. 
 
Sakwa, R. (2013). The Soviet Collapse: Contradictions And Neo-Modernisation. 
Journal of Eurasian Studies 4, pp. 65-77. 
 
Shaposhnikov, Y. (1993). A Security Concept for Russia. International Affairs 
39(10), pp. 10-19. 
 
Sharnoff, M. (2009). The Syria-Soviet Alliance. inFocus Quarterly [online] 3(2). 
Available at: https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2009/02/28/the-syria-soviet-
alliance/ [Accessed: 11 November 2016]. 
 
Silviusa, R. (2014). The Russian State, Eurasianism, and Civilisations in the 
Contemporary Global Political Economy. Journal of Global Faultlines 2(1), pp. 44-
69. 
 
Smirnov, A. (2008). Salafists and Sufis Square Off Over Chechnya. North Caucasus 
	 216	
Weekly, 9(27). 
Stanley, T. (2005). Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism. 
Terrorism Monitor [online] 3(14). Available at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=528&#.
VcoGP0u2NFI [Accessed: 11 August 2015]. 
 
Sullivan, R. (1973). Machiavelli’s Balance of Power Theory. Social Science 
Quarterly 54(2), pp. 258-70. 
 
Tsygankov, A. (2007). Finding a Civilizational Idea: “West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-
East” in Russia’s Foreign Policy. Geopolitics 12(3), pp. 375–99. 
 
Tsygankov, A. (2014). Contested Identity and Foreign Policy: Interpreting Russia’s 
International Choices. International Studies Perspectives 15(1), pp. 19-35. 
 
Tsygankov, A., Tsygankov, P. (2004). Dilemmas and Promises of Russian 
Liberalism. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37(1), pp. 53-70. 
 
Tsygankov, A., Tsygankov, P. (2004). New Directions in Russian International 
Studies: Pluralization, Westernization, and Isolation. Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 37(1), pp. 1-17.   
 
Vatchagaev, M. (1970). The Role of Sufism in the Chechen Resistance. North 
Caucasus Weekly Volume 6(16). [online] Available at: 
https://jamestown.org/program/the-role-of-sufism-in-the-chechen-resistance-2/ 
[Accessed 25 November 2016]. 
Walt, S. (1998). International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy 
110, pp. 29-32, 34-46. 
 
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Constructivism of 
Power Politics. International Organization 46(2), pp. 391-425. 
 
Yilmaz, Y. (2013). Muslims in Contemporary Russia: Russia’s Domestic Muslim 
Policy, European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 6(2), pp. 101-20. 
Yusupov, A. (2010). Sufism in the Volga Region. Journal of South Asian and middle 
Eastern Studies 34(1), pp. 54-8. 
Zakaria, F. (1992). Realism and Domestic Politics. International Security 17(1), pp. 
177-98. 
 
Zehfuss, M. (2001). Constructivism and Identity: A dangerous Liaison. European 
Journal of International Relations 7(3), pp. 315-48. 
 
 
 
 
 
	 217	
Websites & pdf files:  
 
Akhmetova, E. Islam in Russia. [online] Islam.ru Available at: 
http://islam.ru/en/content/story/islam-russia [Accessed on 19 July 2015]. 
 
Al Monitor, (2014). Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood: Past and present. [online] Available 
at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/01/syria-muslim-brotherhood-past-
present.html [Accessed 10 March 2016]. 
 
Al-Amir, A. (2012). Iraq, Russia Sign Military Deal. [online] Al-Monitor. Available at: 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/01/10/iraq-security-deal-russia.html 
[Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
 
Al-Marhoun, J (2014). The story of Syrian-Russian relations. [online] Middle East 
Monitor. Available at:  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/europe/9631-the-
story-of-syrian-russian-relations [Accessed 10 February 2016]. 
 
al-Tijani al Samawi, M (2008). All Solutions Are With The Prophet’s Progeny. 
[online] Al Islam. Available at: http://www.al-islam.org/all-solutions-are-with-prophet-
s-progeny-muhammad-al-tijani [Accessed on 11 August 2015]. 
 
Aleksashenko, S (2015). Russia and Iran: Past is not necessarily prologue. [online] 
Brookings. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-
chaos/posts/2015/11/19-russia-iran-relations-in-syria-aleksashenko [Accessed 2 
March 2016]. 
 
Aljazeera, (2011). Russia Bans Arms Sales to Libya. [online] Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/03/20113107287576160.html 
[Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
 
Aljazeera, (2015). Russian Warpalne Shot Down Near Turkey-Syria Border. [online] 
Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/turkey-shoots-warplane-syria-
border-151124081519290.html [Accessed on 25 February 2016]. 
 
Alperovich, V. (2016). Transformation of the Russian Nationalist Movement: 2013-
2016. [online] Center for Information and Analysis. Available at: http://www.sova-
center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2016/08/d35252/ [Accessed 21 
November 2016]. 
Amnesty International. Russian Federation 2015/2016. [online] Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/russian-
federation/report-russian-federation/ [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
 
Anishchuk, A (2013). Putin Says Foreign Foes Use Radical Islam To Weaken 
Russia. [online] Reuters. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-
putin-islam-idUSBRE99L0NJ20131022 [Accessed 1 August 2016]. 
 
Baczynska, G (2015). Russia's Lavrov says U.S. must work with Assad to fight 
Islamic State. [online] Reuters. Available at: 
	 218	
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/09/us-mideast-crisis-russia-saudi-
idUSKCN0QE0LS20150809 [Accessed 13 August 2015]. 
 
Bagrov, Y. (2003). Putin Likens Chechen, Saudi Attacks. [online] Midland Daily 
News. Available at: http://www.ourmidland.com/news/article/Putin-Likens-Chechen-
Saudi-Attacks-7107977.php [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
 
Balderson, K. (2013). Soviet Afghan War, Al Qaeda and the Muslim Rebel Formula. 
[online] Wide Shut. Available at: http://wideshut.co.uk/soviet-afghan-war-cia-muslim-
rebels/ [Accessed 21 November 2016].  
Barmin, Y (2014). Is Russia’s Chechnya next for ISIS? [online] Russia Direct. 
Available at: http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/russias-chechnya-next-isis 
[Accessed on 19 July 2015]. 
 
BBC, (2013). Profile: Syria’s Al-Nusra Front. [online] Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18048033 [Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
 
BBC, (2015), Turkey downing of Russia jet 'stab in the back' – Putin. [online] 
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34913173 [Aaccessed 
25 February 2016]. 
 
BBC, (2015). Russia to Provide Iran With S-300 Air Defense Missiles. [online] 
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34767012 [Accessed 22 
November 2016].  
 
BBC, (2015). What Is ‘Islamic State? [online] Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144 [Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
 
 
Bertrand, N. (2016). Russia May Be Preparing a ‘Long-Term, Game-Changing 
Move’ With Turkey. [online] Business Insider. Available at: 
http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-turkey-relations-coup-2016-8 [Accessed 23 
November 2016]. 
 
Bodner, M. (2015). Why Russia Is Expanding Its Naval Base In Syria? The Moscow 
Times, [online]. Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/why-
russia-is-expanding-its-syrian-naval-base/531986.html [Accessed on 27 February 
2016]. 
 
Bogdanov, Y (2015). Turkey and Saudi Arabia Strengthen Alliance Against Russia. 
[online] Russia Beyond the Headlines. Available at: 
http://rbth.com/international/2015/12/30/turkey-and-saudi-arabia-strengthen-
alliance-against-russia_556249 [Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
Borger, J. (2012). Egyptian PM Mohamed Morsi to UN: Conflict in Syria is 'Tragedy 
of Our Age'. [online] The Guardian. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/26/egyptian-pm-morsi-syria-tragedy 
[Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
 
	 219	
Borshchevskaya, A. and Gordon, P. (2016). Putin’s Middle East Policy: Causes and 
Consequences. [online] The Washington Institute. Available at: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/putins-middle-east-policy-
causes-and-consequences [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Bubnova, N. (2015). Efforts in Syria against ISIS won’t bring US, Russia closer 
together. [online] Russia Direct. Available at: http://www.russia-
direct.org/opinion/russia-and-us-unlikely-cooperate-ending-syrian-conflict [Accessed 
18 November 2016]. 
 
Campbel, A. (1999). Russia's Primakov and Iraq's Hussein: the World's Most 
Dangerous Political Partnership. National Observer, [online] 41. Available at: 
http://www.nationalobserver.net/1999_winter_campbell.htm [Accessed 22 
November 2016]. 
Carafano, J. Gardiner, N. (2015). How the Next President Should Deal with Russia 
[online] National Review. Available at: 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/416628/how-next-president-should-deal-
russia-james-jay-carafano-nile-gardiner [Accessed 13 November 2016]. 
Center For Strategic & International Studies, (2016). A Friend In Need? Russia And 
Turkey After The Coup. [online] Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/friend-
need-russia-and-turkey-after-coup [Accessed 8 August 2016]. 
 
Center For Strategic & International Studies. Economic Change In Russia. [online] 
Available at: https://www.csis.org/programs/russia-and-eurasia-program/russia-and-
eurasia-past-projects/economic-change-russia [Accessed 29 June 2016]. 
 
Chavez, A (2011). Putin’s New Russia: Foreign Policy. [online] Academia.edu. 
Available at: 
http://www.academia.edu/6817459/_Putin_s_New_Russia_Foreign_Policy_ 
[Accessed 15 March 2016]. 
 
Choufi, F (2012). Hizb Ut-Tahir In Syria: The Regime Will Cede To The Islamic 
Chaliphate. [online] Islam.ru. Available at: http://islam.ru/en/content/story/hizb-ut-
tahrir-syria-regime-will-cede-islamic-caliphate [Accessed on 27 February 2016]. 
 
Chubais, A. (2003). Missia Rossii v 21-m veke [Russia’s Mission in the 21st century]. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 
 
CNN, (2011). How a Fruit Seller Caused Revolution in Tunisia. [online] Available at: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/16/tunisia.fruit.seller.bouazizi/ 
[Accessed on 23 February 2016]. 
 
Cohen, A (2012). A Threat to the West: The Rise of Islamist Insurgency in the 
Northern Caucasus and Russia’s Inadequate Response. [online] The Heritage 
Foundation. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/a-threat-
to-the-west-the-rise-of-islamist-insurgency-in-the-northern-caucasus [Accessed 11 
November 2016]. 
 
	 220	
Cohen, J. (2014). Russia’s Vested Interests In Supporting Assad. The Moscow 
Times, [online]. Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-
s-vested-interests-in-supporting-assad/509979.html [Accessed on 27 February 
2016]. 
 
Colin, G. (2004). Russian Foreign Policy Discourse during the Kosovo 
Crisis: Internal Struggles and the Political Imaginaire. [pdf]. Available at: 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/qdr12.pdf [Accessed 11 
November 2016]. 
 
Conant, M. Emergence of Radical Islam in the Volga Region. [online] Geostrategic 
Forecasting. Available at: http://www.geostrategicforecasting.com/emergence-of-
radical-islam-in-the-volga-region/ [Accessed 9 August 2015]. 
 
Daly, J. (2014). Central Asia Struggles With Jihadi Repatriates. [online] Silk Road 
Reporters. Available at: http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/09/02/central-asia-
struggles-jihadi-repatriates/ [Accessed 22 November 2016 
Dearden, L. (2014). Chechen Isis Fighters Under Omar al-Shishani Threaten To 
Take Fight To Putin. The Independent, [online]. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/chechen-isis-fighters-under-
omar-alshishani-threaten-to-take-fight-to-putin-9787809.html [Accessed 11 August 
2015]. 
 
Deschepper, J. (2013). The reformulation of Russian foreign policy after the fall of 
the USSR: reflections on Russian power – reality, illusion and ambition. [pdf] 
Available at: http://culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-
papers/2013-09-emr/Julie_Deschepper_-
_The_Reformulation_of_Russian_Foreign_Policy.pdf [Accessed 6 December 2016]. 
DeGhett, T. (2015). While Russia Makes War in Syria, it Makes Love in Egypt. 
[online] Vice News. Available at: https://news.vice.com/article/while-russia-makes-
war-in-syria-it-makes-love-in-egypt [Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
Dubovikova, M (2014). Russia will stand its ground despite ISIS threats. [online] Al 
Arabia. Available at: 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/world/2014/09/08/Russia-will-stand-its-
ground-despite-ISIS-threats.html [Accessed on 15 July 2015]. 
Dubovikova, M. (2016). What’s in Store for Egypt-Russia Relations in 2016? [online] 
Al Arabia. Available at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-
east/2016/01/13/What-s-in-store-for-Egypt-Russia-relations-in-2016-.html 
[Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
Durie, M (2013). Salafis and The Muslim Brotherhood: What is The Difference? 
[online] Middle East Forum. Available at: http://www.meforum.org/3541/salafis-
muslim-brotherhood [Accessed on 11 August 2015]. 
 
	 221	
Ellyatt, H., Gamble, H (2016). Saudi Arabia: We Want Better Relations With Russia. 
[online] CNBC. Available at:  http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/06/saudi-arabia-russia-
relations-must-improve.html [Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
Eltahawy, M. (2011). Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution. The Washington Post, [online]. 
Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/14/AR2011011405084.html [Accessed on 23 February 
2016]. 
 
Eremenko, A. (2015). Why Russia Faces Another Islamic Terror Front: Afghanistan 
[online] NBC. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/why-russia-
faces-another-islamic-terror-front-afghanistan-n445136 [Accessed 21 November 
2016]. 
Falkowski, M (2014). On the Periphery of Global Jihad; The North Caucasus; The 
Illusion of Stabilization. [online] Center for Eastern Studies. Available at: 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_46_ang_kaukaz-polnocny_net.pdf 
[Accessed 11 August 2015]. 
 
Falkowski, M (2015). The Islamic State in The Caucasus – Who Benefits? [online] 
The Center of Eastern Studies. Available at: 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-14/islamic-state-caucasus-
who-benefits [Accessed on 19 July 2015]. 
 
Falkowski, M, (2016). Russia’s ‘Middle East’: the escalation of religious conflicts in 
the Northern Caucasus. [online] OSW. Available at: 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-04-04/russias-middle-
east-escalation-religious-conflicts-northern [Accessed 21 November 2016] 
Falkowski, M., Lang, J (2015). Homo Jihadicus: Islam In The Former USSR, And 
The Phenomenon Of The Post-Soviet Militants In Syria And Iraq. [online] Centre For 
Eastern Studies. Available at: 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194511/homojihadicus.pdf [Accessed 15 May 2016]. 
 
Fasanotti, F. (2016). Russia and Libya: A Brief History of an On-Again-Off-Again 
Friendship. [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2016/09/01/russia-and-libya-a-brief-history-of-an-on-again-off-again-
friendship/ [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
 
Ferris-Rotman, A (2011). Russian rebel calls for jihad, praises Arab unrest. [online] 
Reuters. Available at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/03/03/idINIndia-
55306020110303?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11
709 [Accessed 12 August 2015]. 
 
Financial Times, (2015). Turkey Seeks A Way Out Of International Isolation. 
[online]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8d8472e0-3d1b-11e6-9f2c-
36b487ebd80a [Accessed 8 August 2016]. 
 
Fortin, J. (2013). Whatever Happened To Libyan Oil? For Western Oil Giants, The 
Crude Is Sweet But China And Russia May Get The Biggest Taste. [online] IB 
	 222	
Times. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/whatever-happened-libyan-oil-western-
oil-giants-crude-sweet-china-russia-may-get-1266107 [Accessed 23 November 
2016]. 
 
Fyodorov, E. The National Liberation Movement in Russia today. [online] 
Geopolitics. Available at: http://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/national-liberation-
movement-russia-today#.WDMEM3ecbEY [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
Galeotti, M. (2015). Could Kadyrov Replace Putin? The Moscow Times, [online]. 
Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/could-kadyrov-replace-
putin/517831.html [Accessed on 15 August 2015]. 
 
Geopolitical Weekly, (2013). The Past, Present and Future of Russian Energy 
Strategy. [online] Available at: https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/past-present-and-
future-russian-energy-strategy [Accessed 16 September 2016]. 
 
Geranmayeh, E. and Liik, K. (2016). The new power couple: Russia and Iran in the 
Middle East. [online] European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/iran_and_russia_middle_east_power_cou
ple_7113 [Accessed 23 November 2016].  
 
Goble, P. (2013). Moscow Mufti Urges Revival of Sufism to Win Over Russia’s 
Muslim Youth. [online] Window to Eurasia. Available at: 
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com.cy/2013/04/window-on-eurasia-moscow-
mufti-urges.html [Accessed 28 November 2016]. 
Gorenburg, D. (2012). Why Russia Supports Repressive Regimes in Syria and the 
Middle East. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 198 [pdf]. Available at: 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm198.pdf 
[Accessed 18 November 2016 
Gorenburg, D. (2014). Countering Color Revolutions: Russia’s New Security 
Strategy and its Implications for US Policy. [pdf] PONARS Eurasia, pp. 1. Available 
at: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-
pdf/Pepm342_Gorenburg_Sept2014.pdf [Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
 
Gould-Davies, N (2016). Russia’s Sovereign Globalization: Rise, Fall and Future. 
[online] Chatham House. Available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016
0106RussiasSovereignGlobalizationGouldDaviesFinal.pdf [Accessed 18 September 
2016]. 
 
Grim, R., Schulberg, J. and Jones, S. (2015). Saudi Arabia, Turkey Discussing to 
Oust Syria’s Assad. [online] The Huffington Post. Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/12/saudi-arabia-turkey-
syria_n_7012268.html [Accessed 23 November 2016].   
 
Grishin, A (2012). Tsel’ islamistov—prevratit rossiiskikh musulman v pyatuyu 
kolonnu [The Islamists’ Aim Is to Turn Russia’s Muslims Into a Fifth Column]. 
	 223	
[online] Regnum. Available at: www.regnum.ru/news/1602890.html [Accessed 15 
November 2015]. 
 
Gulf News, (2008). Putin’s Visit ‘Historic And Strategic. [online] Available at: 
http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/libya/putin-s-visit-historic-and-strategic-1.98399 
[Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
Gusev, A. and Westphal, K. (2015). Russian Energy Policies Revisited. [pdf] 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. Available at: 
https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015RP08_gsv_wep.pdf 
[Accessed 16 September 2016]. 
 
Harress, C (2015). Syrian Civil War: Russian Navy Base Tartus In Syria Giving 
NATO Cause For Concern While Helping To Prop Up Assad Regime. [online] 
International Business Times. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-civil-war-
russian-navy-base-tartus-syria-giving-nato-cause-concern-while-2092371 
[Accessed on 27 February 2016]. 
 
Harrison, R (2013). Arab Spring Or Islamic Spring? [online] The National Interest. 
Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/arab-spring-or-islamic-spring-
8950 [Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
 
Heathershaw, J. and Montgomery, D. (2014). The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim 
Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics. [pdf] Chatham House. Available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141
111PostSovietRadicalizationHeathershawMontgomery.pdf [Accessed 24 November 
2016]. 
 
Hill, F. and Gaddy, C (2013). Putin Personality Disorder. [online] Foreigh Policy. 
Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/15/putin-personality-disorder/ 
[Accessed on 2 July 2015]. 
 
Hille, K (2015). Fears of financial crisis rise as Russia’s economy shrinks. The 
Financial Times, [online]. Available at:  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4b9944c-3f77-
11e5-b98b-87c7270955cf.html#axzz41mLKR9Oz [Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
 
Hosking, G (2012). Slavophiles and Westernizers in Russia. [online] Valdai 
Discussion Club Website. Available at: http://valdaiclub.com/politics/40240.html 
[Accessed on 27 January 2015]. 
 
Human Rights Watch. World Report 2014: Russia. [online] Available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/russia [Accessed 21 
November 2016]. 
 
Interfax.com, (2015). Patrushev dubs activity of ISIL terrorists as main threat to 
peace, security [online] Available at: http://www.interfax-
religion.com/?act=news&div=12140 [Accessed 15 November 2016]. 
 
Jensen, D. (2015). Is Radical Nationalism in Russia Getting Out of Control? [online] 
	 224	
Institute of Modern Russia. Available at: 
http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/2250-is-radical-nationalism-in-russia-getting-
out-of-control [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
 
Johnston, R. (2015). Terrorist attacks in Russia. [online] John Stone Archive. 
Available at: http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terr-russia.html [Accessed 3 
March 2016]. 
 
Judah, B (2013). Putin’s Medieval Peace Pact in Chechnya. [online] Bloomberg 
View. Available at: http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-04-25/putin-s-
medieval-peace-pact-in-chechnya [Accessed on 12 August 2015]. 
 
Judah, B. (2010). Immigrant Russia - a crisis of demography or ethnicity? [online] 
European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_immigrant_russia_-
_a_crisis_of_demography_or_ethnicity [Accessed 20 November 2016]. 
 
Jund al-Sham - Syria. [online] Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. 
Available at: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jund-al-sham-syria [Accessed 
22 November 2016]. 
Keenan, R (2013). Tatarstan: The Battle Over Islam in Russia’s Heartland. [online] 
World Policy Institute. Available at: 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/summer2013/tatarstan-battle-islam-russias-
heartland [Accessed 15 September 2016]. 
 
Kemos, A. (1994). The Influence of Thucydides in the Modern World: The Father of 
Political Realism Plays a Key Role in Current Balance of Power Theories. [online] 
Harvard University. Available at: http://www.hri.org/por/thucydides.html [Accessed 3 
February 2015]. 
 
Khrushcheva, N. and Hancox, E. (2006). The New Post-Transitional Russian 
Identity: How Western is Russian Westernisation? [pdf] The World Policy Institute, 
and The Graduate Program of International Affairs at The New School, and The 
Harriman Institute at Columbia University. Available at: 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/imported/projects/russia/RussiaIIReport
.pdf [Accessed 19 June 2015]. 
 
Kommersant, (2006). Vladislav Surkov Divides Democracy into Sovereign and 
Managed. [online] Available at: 
http://www.kommersant.com/p686274/r_1/Vladislav_Surkov_Divides_Democracy/ 
[Accessed 9 October 2015]. 
 
Komori, G., Kurita, S. and Nakashima, K (2005). The Russian Oil Policies And Its 
Oil Industry Trends. [online] The Institute of Energy Economics. Available at: 
http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/311.pdf [Accessed 15 September 2016]. 
	 225	
Lendman, S. (2015). Is Jordan Switching Sides? Putin Signs Military Cooperation 
Agreement with King Abdullah. [online] Global Research. Available at: 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/is-jordan-switching-sides-putin-signs-military-
cooperation-agreement-with-king-abdullah/5484324 [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Levada.ru, (2015). Putin’s Approval Rating. [online] Available at: 
http://www.levada.ru/en/about-us/ [Accessed 29 June 2016]. 
 
Likhacheva, A. and Makarov, I. (2014). National Identity and The Future of Russia. 
[online] Valdai Discussion Club Website. Available at: http://vid-
1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Identity_eng.pdf [Accessed 5 February 2015]. 
 
Lipman, M. (2015). Ramzan Kadyrov: a challenge to the Kremlin. [online] European 
Council Of Foreign Relations. Available at: 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ramzan_kadyrov_a_challenge_to_the_kremli
n3013 [Accessed on 15 August 2015]. 
 
Lynch, C. (2015). Why Putin Is So Committed to Keeping Assad in Power. [online] 
Foreign Policy. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/putins-russia-is-
wedded-to-bashar-al-assad-syria-moscow/ [Accessed on 14 June 2017]. 
 
Makarychev, A. (2006). Russia’s Energy Policy: Between Security And 
Transparency. [pdf] Ponars Eurasia. Available at: 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pm_0425.pdf 
[Accessed 16 September 2016]. 
 
Malashenko, A. (2015). Islamic Challenges to Russia, From the Caucasus to the 
Volga and the Urals. [online] Carnegie Moscow Center. Available at: 
http://carnegie.ru/2015/05/13/islamic-challenges-to-russia-from-caucasus-to-volga-
and-urals-pub-60334 [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
Malashenko, A. (2013). The Dynamics of Russian Islam. [online] Carnegie Moscow 
Center. Available at: http://carnegie.ru/2013/02/01/dynamics-of-russian-islam-pub-
50811 [Accessed 28 November 2016]. 
Malashenko, A. (2013). Russia and the Arab Spring. [pdf] Carnegie Moscow Centre. 
Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/russia_arab_spring2013.pdf 
[Accessed 3 October 2015]. 
Mirovalev, M. (2015). Russian fears of Syria becoming a 'new Afghanistan. [online] 
Aljazeera.com. Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/russian-fears-syria-afghanistan-
151027110248343.html [Accessed 18 November 2016]. 
Markedonov, S. and Ulchenko, N. (2011). Turkey and Russia: An Evolving 
Relationship. [online] Carnedie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/19/turkey-and-russia-evolving-relationship-
pub-45383 [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
 
	 226	
Melvin, D. and Martinez, M (2015). Putin calls jet's downing 'stab in the back'; 
Turkey says warning ignored. [online] CNN. Available at: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/24/middleeast/warplane-crashes-near-syria-turkey-
border/ [Accessed 25 February 2016]. 
 
Menkiszak, M. (2011). Russia’s Afghan Problem: The Russian Federation And The 
Afghanistan Problem Since 2001 [pdf] Centre for Eastern Studies. Available at: 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_38_en.pdf [Accessed 26 February 
2016]. 
 
Mezzofiore, G. (2014). Russia: London-Based Islamic Sect Hizb ut-Tahrir's Leaders 
Arrested in Tatarstan for Terrorism. International Business Times, [online]. Available 
at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russia-london-based-islamic-sect-hizb-ut-tahrirs-
leaders-arrested-tatarstan-terrorism-1470210 [Accessed 13 August 2015]. 
 
Miller, R (2015). Comeback: How Islam Got Its Groove Back in Russia. [online] The 
National Interest. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/comeback-how-
islam-got-its-groove-back-russia-12609 [Accessed 16 August 2015]. 
 
Mirovalev, M. (2015). Behind Russia's ultra-nationalist crackdown. [online] 
Aljazeera. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/09/russia-
ultra-nationalist-crackdown-150916131749975.html [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
 
Mirsky, G. (2013). The West is Playing in to Moscow’s Hands on Syria. Financial 
Times. [online]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/97797d0a-1095-11e3-
b291-00144feabdc0 [Accessed 11 December 2016].  
 
Monaghan, A (2015). Who Runs Russia With Putin? [online] BBC News. Available 
at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34866597 [Accessed 20 November 
2016]. 
Mufson, S. (2016). Saudi Arabia, Russia Agree To Freeze Oil Output — If Others 
Do, Too. Washington Post, [online]. Available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/saudi-arabia-russia-agree-to-
freeze-oil-output--if-others-do-too/2016/02/16/647e29a8-d4ad-11e5-be55-
2cc3c1e4b76b_story.html [Accessed 1 August 2016]. 
 
Muller, M. (2010). Doing Discourse Analysis in Critical Geopolitics. [online] L’espace 
Politique. Available at: http://espacepolitique.revues.org/1743 (Accessed 4 March 
2016]. 
 
Myers, S. (2006). In Anti-Immigrant Mood, Russia Heeds Gadfly’s Cry. The New 
York Times, [online]. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/world/europe/22belov.html[Accessed 21 
November 2016]. 
Nasdaq.com, (2016). Nasdaq Crude Oil Rates. [online] Available at:  
http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil.aspx [Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
 
 
	 227	
Naumkin, V., Aksenenok, A., Zvyagelskaya, I., Karasova, T., Kuznetsov, V., Popov, 
V., Sapronova, M., Stegny, P., Filonik, A. and Shlykov, P. (2013). Russia and The 
Greater Middle East. [online] Russian International Affairs Council. Available at: 
http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/Russia_Middle_East_En.pdf [Accessed 11 
November 2016]. 
 
Nechepurenko, I (2014). Russia Reverses Birth Decline – But For How Long? 
[online] The Moscow Times. Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-reverses-birth-decline-but-for-
how-long/502325.html [Accessed 29 January 2016]. 
 
Page, J. (2005). The Rise of Russian Muslims Worries Orthodox Church. [online] 
The Times. Available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/ 
world/article1980815.ece [Accessed 24 November 2016].   
 
Paraszczuk, J. (2015). JMA Statement on Pledging Bay’ah to Jabhat Al-Nusra. 
[online] Chechens in Syria. Available at: 
http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?tag=jaish-al-muhajireen-wal-ansar [Accessed 22 
November 2016] 
 
Paraszczuk, J. (2016). Tarkhan Gaziyev ‘Prevented by Illness From Joining Jamaat 
in Syria’. [online] Chechens in Syria. Available at: 
http://www.chechensinsyria.com/?p=25271#more-25271 [Accessed 22 November 
2016]. 
Parfitt, T. (2007). The Battle for the Soul of Chechnya. [online] The Guardian. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/22/chechnya.tomparfitt 
[Accessed 25 November 2016]. 
 
Parker, J. (2015). Understanding Putin rough a Middle Eastern Looking Glass. [pdf] 
Washington: National Defence University Press. Available at: 
http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-
Perspectives-19.pdf [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
PBS, (2016). Russia-Iran Cooperation in Syria Sends Message to US. [online] 
Available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/russia-iran-cooperation-syria-
sends-message-u-s/ [Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
Pew Research Center, (2011). The Future Of The Global Muslim Population. 
[online] Available at: http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-
muslim-population/ [Accessed 3 August 2016]. 
 
Pickles, K. (2015). Putin pledges Russia's support to Syrian president Bashar 
Assad and urges all Middle East nations to fight ISIS. Daily Mail, [online]. Available 
at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3143609/Putin-pledges-Russia-s-
support-Syrian-president-Bashar-Assad-urges-Middle-East-nations-fight-ISIS.html 
[Accessed 13 August 2015]. 
 
	 228	
Piontkovsky, A. (2006). East or West? Russia’s Identity Crisis in Foreign Policy. 
[pdf] The Foreign Policy Centre. Available at: http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/681.pdf 
[Accessed 19 September 2016]. 
 
Popov, K. (2012). Sufism in Russia. [online] Vestnik Kavkaza. Available at: 
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/society/30558.html [Accessed 25 November 
2015]. 
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. (2006). Five Years After 9/11: The Kremlin's War 
On Terror. [online] Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/1071174.html [Accessed 22 
November 2016]. 
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website. Turkey’s Commercial and 
Economic Relations with Russian Federation. [online] Available at:  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-russian-
federation.en.mfa [Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
  
Reuters, (2011). Putin: Libya coalition has no right to kill Gaddafi. [online] Available 
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-libya-idUSTRE73P4L920110426 
[Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
Reuters, (2013). Putin says foreign foes use radical Islam to weaken Russia. 
[online] Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-islam-
idUSBRE99L0NJ20131022[Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
 
Roggio, B. (2014). 3 New Jihadist Training Camps Identified in Syria. [online] 
Foundation for Defense of Democracy. Available at: 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/bill-roggio-3-new-jihadist-training-
camps-identified-in-syria/ [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Romanova, T (2012). Neoclassical Realism and Today’s Russia. [online] Global 
Affairs. Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Neoclassical-Realism-and-
Todays-Russia-15681 [Accessed 13 November 2015]. 
 
Ruff, A. (2016), New dynamism in Russia-Turkey relations? [online] Modern 
Diplomacy. Available at: 
http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1600:new-
dynamism-in-russia-turkey-relations&Itemid=139 [Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
Russia Today, (2013). Egypt Invites Russia to Mine Uranium, Build Nuclear Power 
Plants. [online] Available at: https://www.rt.com/news/putin-morsi-nuclear-uranium-
132/ [Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
Russia Today, (2013). Suicide bombing kills at least 17 in Russia's Volgograd. 
[online] Available at: https://www.rt.com/news/volgograd-blast-victims-russia-937/ 
[Accessed 3 March 2016]. 
 
Russia Today, (2015). 20 Islamist terrorists arrested in Moscow. [online] Available 
at: https://www.rt.com/news/319187-hizbut-tahrir-arrests-russia/ [Accessed 3 March 
2016]. 
	 229	
 
Russia Today, (2015). Islamic State threat to Russia is real – FSB [online] Available 
at: https://www.rt.com/politics/248685-russia-islamic-state-threat/ [Accessed 15 
November 2016]. 
 
Russia Today, (2015). NATO expansion threatens Russia’s allies’ – key security 
official. [online] Available at: https://www.rt.com/politics/260337-patrushev-nato-
expansion-threat/ [Accessed 31 January 2016]. 
 
Russia Today, (2016). Anti-Russian sanctions cost Western countries over $60bn – 
research. [online] Available at: https://www.rt.com/business/349630-russia-eu-
sanctions-losses/ [Accessed 20 November 2016]. 
 
Russia Today, (2016). US wants to distract attention from coalition strike on Syria 
troops – Lavrov. [online] Available at: https://www.rt.com/news/360615-us-lavrov-
syria-distract/ [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
 
Ryan, Y (2011). How Tunisia’s Revolution Began. [online] Aljazeera.  Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html 
[Accessed  23 February 2016]. 
 
Saradzhyan, S. (2015). Russia’s Interest In Syria Is Not Assad. [online] Carnegie 
Forum. Available at: https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/russias-interest-syria-
not-assad/ [Accessed on 27 February 2016]. 
 
Schwirtz, M. (2011). Russian Anger Grows Over Chechnya Subsidies. The New 
York Times, [online]. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/europe/chechnyas-costs-stir-anger-as-
russia-approaches-elections.html [Accessed on 12 August 2015]. 
 
Sergie, M., Smith, G. and Blas, J (2016). Saudi Arabia, Russia To Freeze Oil Output 
Near Record Levels. [online] Bloomberg. Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-16/saudi-arabia-and-russia-
agree-oil-output-freeze-in-qatar-talks [Accessed 1 August 2016]. 
 
Shekhovtsov, A. (2015). Russian Politicians Building an International Extreme Right 
Alliance. [online] Euromaidan Press. Available at: 
http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/09/19/russian-politicians-building-an-
international-extreme-right-alliance/#arvlbdata [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
Sheppard, D., Raval, A. and Farchy, J. (2016). Saudi Arabia And Russia Ministers 
Agree Oil Production Freeze. Financial Timse, [online]. Available at: 
https://next.ft.com/content/da44fb1c-d485-11e5-8887-98e7feb46f27 [Accessed 1 
August 2016]. 
 
Skidelsky, R. (2007). Liberal Empire’ vs. ‘Sovereign Democracy. [online]. Robert 
Skidelsky. Available at: http://www.skidelskyr.com/site/article/liberal-empire-vs-
sovereign-democracy/ [Accessed 9 October 2015]. 
 
	 230	
Slabodiyan, E (2016). Kakim budet materinskiy capital v 2016 gody [How much will 
be the ‘mother capital’ in 2016?]. [online] Argumenti I Fakti [Arguments and Facts]. 
Available at: 
http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/actual/kakoy_razmer_materinskogo_kapitala_budet_v_
2016_godu [Accessed 29 January 2016]. 
 
Smith, M. (2002). Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Euro-Atlanticism. [pdf] 
Conflict Studies Research Centre. Available at: 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/96477/02_Feb.pdf [Accessed 13 November 2016]. 
 
Sokirianskaia, E. (2015). Chechnya: The Inner Abroad’ International Crisis Group, 
Europe. [online] International Crisis Group. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/236-chechnya-the-inner-
abroad.pdf [Accessed 13 August 2015]. 
 
Sputnik News, (2015). Russian Defense Ministry Video Proves Su-24 Never 
Entered Turkish Airspace. [online] Available at: 
http://sputniknews.com/military/20151124/1030695406/mod-su-24-flight-path.html 
[Accessed 25 February 2016].  
 
Sputnik News, (2016). Russia-Iraq Annual Trade Approaches $2 Bln, Needs 
Diversification – Official. [online] Available at: 
https://sputniknews.com/business/201602111034579218-russia-iraq-AnnualTrade/ 
[Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Sputniknews.com. (2004). Liberal Imperialism Project by SPS [online] Available at: 
https://sputniknews.com/onlinenews/2004121639775799/ [Accessed 18 November 
2016]. 
Stepanyan, A., Roitman, A., Minasyan, G., Ostojic, D. and Epstein, N. (2015) The 
Spillover Effect Of Russia’s Economic Slowdown On Neighboring Countries [pdf] 
European Department and Middle East and Central Asia Department. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2015/eur1501mcd.pdf [Accessed 15 
September 2016]. 
 
Stuster, D. (2015). US and Israel Criticize Russian Escalation in Syria. [online] 
Foreign Policy. Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/16/u-s-and-israel-
criticize-russian-escalation-in-syria/ [Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
 
Suchkov, M (2014). Islamic State gains victory for Chechen jihadists. [online] Al 
Monitor. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/islamic-
state-chechen-caucasus-emirate.html# [Accessed 13 August 2015]. 
 
Suchkov, M. (2016). Russia’s Plan for The Middle East. [online] The National 
Interest. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-plan-the-middle-
east-14908 [Accessed 11 November 2016].  
 
Suleimanov, R. Arabskaya Revolyutsiya v Tatarstane: Islamskiye Fundamentalisty v 
Regionalnoy Politike [Arab Revolution in Tatarstan: Islamic Fundamentalists in 
Regional Politics]. [online] Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Volga Region 
	 231	
Center for Regional and Ethno-religious Studies. Available at: www.kazan-
center.ru/osnovnye-razdely/14/302 [Accessed 5 February 2015]. 
 
Tabachnik, A (2016). Russia In Ukraine And Syria: Strengths And Weaknesses. 
[online] New Eastern Europe. Available at: http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-
commentary/1851-russia-in-ukraine-and-syria-strengths-and-weaknesses 
[Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
 
Taher, A (2015). Russia Says Hezbollah Is Not A Terrorist Group. [online] Reuters. 
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-terrorgro-
idUSKCN0T412520151115 [Accessed 26 February 2016]. 
 
TASS, (2015). Around 1,700 Russian citizens fight alongside militants in Iraq — 
Russian security chief. [online] Available at: http://tass.ru/en/world/778834 
[Accessed on 12 August 2015]. 
 
TASS, (2015). Putin approves Russia’s updated national security strategy. [online] 
Available at: http://tass.ru/en/politics/848108 [Accessed 31 January 2016]. 
 
TASS, (2016). Putin: Western sanctions against Russia after Crimea’s reunification 
‘silly decision’. [online] Available at: http://tass.com/politics/848653 [Accessed 20 
November 2016]. 
 
The Business Insider, (2015). How We Know Russia's Economic Crisis Has 
Officially Arrived. [online] Available at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/russias-
economic-crisis-has-officially-arrived-2015-1?r=US&IR=T [Accessed 2 March 2016]. 
 
The Conversation, (2015). Russia and Turkey: a Long History of Turbulent 
Relations. [online] Available at: http://theconversation.com/russia-and-turkey-a-long-
history-of-turbulent-relations-51424 [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
 
The Economist, (2013). Chechnya and Dagestan: Islamists in Russia. [online] 
Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576728-boston-bombs-
have-put-new-focus-russias-islamist-republics-islamists-russia [Accessed on 9 July 
2015]. 
 
The Voice of Russia, (2013). Attack on embassy in Tripoli: extremist revenge? 
[online] Available at: http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_10_03/Attack-on-
embassy-in-Tripoli-extremist-revenge-8487/ [Accessed 29 February 2016]. 
 
The Washington Times, (2006). Muslim birthrate worries Russia. [online] Available 
at: [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
 
 
Trenin, D. (2014). Russia’s Interests In Syria. [online] Carnegie Moscow Center. 
Available at: http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=55831 [Accessed 27 February 
2016]. 
 
Trenin, D. (2016). Russia in The Middle East: Moscow’s Objectives, Priorities, and 
Policy Drivers. [online] Carnegie Moscow Center. Available at: 
	 232	
http://carnegie.ru/2016/04/05/russia-in-middle-east-moscow-s-objectives-priorities-
and-policy-drivers-pub-63244 [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
United Nations, (2011). Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, 
Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour 
with 5 Abstentions. [online] Available at: 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm [Accessed 22 November 2016].  
 
US Energy Information Administration, (2014). Oil and Gas Sales Accounted for 
68% of Russia’s Total Export Revenues in 2013. [online] Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231 [Accessed 10 August 2016]. 
 
Valdai Discussion Club Website, (2013). Traditional and political Islam in Russia: 
One against another. [online] Available at: http://valdaiclub.com/politics/56460.html 
[Accessed on 11 August 2015]. 
 
Valdai Discussion Club Website, (2014). National Identity and The Future of Russia. 
[online] Available at: http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Identity_eng.pdf [Accessed 28 June 
2015]. 
 
Vision of Humanity, (2014). Global Terrorism Index 2014. [online] Available at: 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%2
0Report%202014.pdf [Accessed on 19 July 2015]. 
 
Walker, S. (2015). Chechen leader's show of strength muddies loyalty to Putin. The 
Guardian, [online]. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/03/chechen-leaders-show-of-strength-
muddies-loyalty-to-putin [Accessed 12 August 2015]. 
 
Watkinson, W (2015). Putin's inner circle: A glimpse of the powerful men pulling the 
strings behind Russia's president. [online] International Business Times. Available 
at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/putins-inner-circle-glimpse-powerful-men-pulling-
strings-behind-russias-president-1511474 [Accessed  28 January 2016]. 
 
Whitehead, T. (2014). ISIS Operating Like a Multinational Company. [online] The 
Telegraph. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10911412/Isis-
operating-like-a-multinational-company.html  [Accessed 24 November 2016]. 
 
Wiginton, P. (2011). Russian Nationalism on the Rise, Despite Putin Crackdown. 
[online] Occidental Observer. Available at: 
http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2011/12/russian-nationalism-on-the-rise-
despite-putin-crackdown/ [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
 
Working, R. (2001). War ‘back home’ divides Jordan’s Chechen community. [online] 
The Japan Times. Available at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2001/12/20/commentary/world-
commentary/war-back-home-divides-jordans-chechen-
community/#.WDRhGHecauU [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
 
	 233	
YourNewsWire.com, (2015). Russian Military Intelligence Chief: West Creating 
Islamist Terror Network . [online] Available at: http://yournewswire.com/russian-
military-intelligence-chief-west-creating-islamist-terror-network/ [Accessed 15 
November 2016]. 
 
Yudina, N. and Alperovich, V. 2015. Calm Before the Storm? Xenophobia and 
Radical Nationalism in Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2014. [online] 
SOVA Centre for Information and Analysis. Available at: http://www.sova-
center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2015/04/d31818/ [Accessed 21 
November 2016]. 
 
Zevelev, I (2014). The Russian World Boundaries. [online] Russia In Global Affairs. 
Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-World-Boundaries-
16707 [Accessed 21 January 2015]. 
 
Zubarevich, N (2011). Russian Elections and Relations Between the Centre and 
The Regions. [online] European Union Institute for Security Studies. Available at: 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/russian-elections-and-relations-
between-the-centre-and-the-regions/ [Accessed 12 August 2015]. 
 
 
Research & Conference papers: 
 
Deschepper, J. (2013). The Reformulation of Russian Foreign Policy After The Fall 
of The USSR: Reflections on Russian Power – Reality, Illusion and Ambition. In: 
The Forum «The Europe Meets Russia – a Forum for Young leaders». [online] 
Berlin. Available at: 
http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2013-09-
emr/Julie_Deschepper_-_The_Reformulation_of_Russian_Foreign_Policy.pdf 
[Accessed 25 June 2015]. 
 
Tsygankov, A. (2005). Do Rationalists Have a Theory of Foreign Policy? 
Understanding Russia’s Geostrategic Chances After the Cold War. In: Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association. Hawaii. 
 
 
Dissertations: 
 
Chernysh, K. (2011). Russian Foreign Policy Discourse During and After the 
Georgian War: Social Constructivism and Media Discourse as an Alternative 
Approach in Political Research. MPhil. LinköPings Universitet. 
 
Smith, H. (2014). Russian Greatpowerness: Foreign Policy, The Two Chechen 
Wars and International Organisations. PhD. University of Helsinki. Available at: 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/135688/russiang.pdf?sequence=1 
[Accessed 3 October 2015]. 
 
 
	 234	
APPENDIX 1. Content analysis of “Russia at The Turn of The 
Millenium” Statement by Vladimir Putin on December 30, 1999 
 
 
RUSSIA AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM 
 (Vladimir Putin, December 30, 1999) 
 
The humankind lives under the sign of two signal events: the new millennium and 
the 2000th anniversary of Christianity. I think the general interest for and attention to 
these two events mean something more than just the tradition to celebrate red-letter 
dates. 
  
 New Possibilities, New Problems 
  
It may be a coincidence - but then, it may be not - that the beginning of the new 
millennium coincided with a dramatic turn in world developments in the past 20-30 
years. I mean the deep and quick changes in the life of humankind connected with 
the development of what we call the post-industrial society. Here are its main 
features.  
 * Changes in the economic structure of society, with the diminishing weight of 
material production and the growing share of secondary and tertiary sectors. 
 * The consistent renewal and quick introduction of novel technologies and the 
growing output of science-intensive commodities. 
  
 * The landslide development of the information science and telecommunications. 
 * Priority attention to management and the improvement of the system of 
organisation and guidance of all spheres of human endeavour. 
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 * And lastly, human leadership. It is man and high standards of his education, 
professional training, business and social activity that are becoming the guiding 
force of progress today. 
 
The development of a new type of society is a sufficiently lengthy process for the 
careful politicians, statesmen, scientists and all those who can use their brains to 
notice two elements of concern in this process. 
The first is that changes bring not only new possibilities to improve life, but also new 
problems and dangers. They were initially and most clearly revealed in the 
ecological sphere. But other, and acute, problems were soon detected in all other 
spheres of social life. Even the most economically advanced states are not free 
from organised crime, growing cruelty and violence, alcoholism and drug addiction, 
the weakening durability and educational role of the family, and the like. 
And the other alarming element is that far from all countries can use the boons of 
modern economy and the new standards of prosperity offered by it. The quick 
progress of science, technologies and advanced economy is underway in only a 
small number of states, populated by the so-called golden billion. Quite a few other 
countries reached new economic and social development standards in this outgoing 
century. But it cannot be said that they joined the process of creating a post-
industrial society. Most of them are still far away from the mere approaches to it. 
And there are grounds to believe that this gap will persist for quite some time yet. 
This is probably why the humankind is peering into the future with both hope and 
fear at the turn of the new millennium. 
 
 Modern Situation in Russia 
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It would not be exaggeration to say that this feeling of hope and fear is expressed 
especially graphically in Russia. For there are few states in the world which faced 
so many trials as Russia in the 20th century. 
First, Russia is not a state symbolising top standards of economic and social 
development now. And second, it is facing difficult economic and social problems. 
Its GDP nearly halved in the 1990s, and its GNP is ten times smaller than in the 
USA and five times smaller than in China. After the 1998 crisis, the per capita GDP 
dropped to roughly 3,500 dollars, which is roughly five times smaller than the 
average indicator for the G7 states. 
  
The structure of the Russian economy changed, with the key positions held by the 
fuel industry, power engineering, and the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy. They 
account for some 15% of the GDP, 50% of the overall industrial output, and over 
70% of exports. 
Productivity in the real economy sector is extremely low. It rose to well nigh the 
world average in the production of raw materials and electricity, but is 20-24% of the 
US average in the other industries. 
The technical and technological standards of finished commodities largely depend 
on the share of equipment that is less than five years old. It dwindled from 29% in 
1990 to 4.5% in 1998. Over 70% of our machinery and equipment are over ten 
years old, which is more than two times the figure in the economically developed 
countries. 
This is the result of the consistently dwindling national investments, above all to the 
real economy sector. And foreign investors are not in a hurry to contribute to the 
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development of Russian industries. The overall volume of direct foreign investments 
in Russia amounts to barely 11.5 billion dollars. China received as much as 43 
billion dollars in foreign investments. Russia has been reducing allocations on R&D, 
while the 300 largest transnational companies provided 216 billion dollars on R&D 
in 1997, and some 240 billion dollars in 1998. Only 5% of Russian enterprises are 
engaged in innovative production, whose scale is extremely low. 
  
The lack of capital investments and insufficient attitude to innovations resulted in a 
dramatic fall in the production of commodities that are world competitive in terms of 
price-quality ratio. Foreign rivals have pushed Russia especially far back on the 
market of science-intensive civilian commodities. Russia accounts for less than 1% 
of such commodities on the world market, while the USA provides 36% and Japan, 
30% of them. 
The real incomes of the population have been falling since the beginning of the 
reforms. The deepest fall was registered after the August 1998 crisis, and it will be 
impossible to restore the pre-crisis living standards this year. The overall monetary 
incomes of the population, calculated by the UN methods, add up to less than 10% 
of the US figure. Health and the average life span, the indicators that determine the 
quality of life, deteriorated, too. 
The current dramatic economic and social situation in the country is the price, which 
we have to pay for the economy we inherited from the Soviet Union. But then, what 
else could we inherit? We had to install market elements into a system based on 
completely different standards, with a bulky and distorted structure. And this was 
bound to affect the progress of the reforms. We had to pay for the excessive focus 
of the Soviet economy on the development of the raw materials sector and defence 
	 238	
industries, which negatively affected the development of consumer production and 
services. We are paying for the Soviet neglect of such key sectors as information 
science, electronics and communications. For the absence of competition between 
producers and industries, which hindered scientific and technological progress and 
made Russian economy non-competitive on the world markets. This is our payment 
for the brakes, and even a ban, put on the initiative and enterprise of enterprises 
and their personnel. And today we are reaping the bitter fruit, both material and 
mental, of the past decades. 
On the other hand, we could have avoided certain problems in this renewal process. 
They are the result of our own mistakes, miscalculation and lack of experience. And 
yet, we could not have avoided the main problems facing Russian society. The way 
to the market and democracy was difficult for all states that entered it in the 1990s. 
They all had roughly the same problems, although in varying degrees. 
Russia is completing the first, transition stage of economic and political reforms. 
Despite problems and mistakes, it has entered the highway by which the whole of 
humanity is travelling. Only this way offers the possibility of dynamic economic 
growth and higher living standards, as the world experience convincingly shows. 
There is no alternative to it. 
The question for Russia now is what to do next. How can we make the new, market 
mechanisms work to full capacity? How can we overcome the still deep ideological 
and political split in society? What strategic goals can consolidate Russian society? 
What place can Russia occupy in the international community in the 21st century? 
What economic, social and cultural frontiers do we want to attain in 10-15 years? 
What are our strong and weak points? And what material and spiritual resources do 
we have now?  
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These are the questions put forward by life itself. Unless we find clear answers to 
them which would be understandable to all the people, we will be unable to move 
forward at the pace and to the goals which are worthy of our great country. 
  
The Lessons Russia to Learn 
  
The answers to these questions and our very future depend on what lessons we will 
learn from our past and present. This is a work for society as a whole and for more 
than one year, but some of these lessons are already clear. 
 
1. For almost three-fourths of the outgoing century Russia lived under the sign of 
the implementation of the communist doctrine. It would be a mistake not to see and, 
even more so, to deny the unquestionable achievements of those times. But it 
would be an even bigger mistake not to realise the outrageous price our country 
and its people had to pay for that Bolshevist experiment. What is more, /it would be 
a mistake/ not to understand its historic futility. Communism and the power of 
Soviets did not make Russia a prosperous country with a dynamically developing 
society and free people. Communism vividly demonstrated its inaptitude for sound 
self-development, dooming our country to a steady lag behind economically 
advanced countries. It was a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the 
mainstream of civilisation. 
  
2. Russia has used up its limit for political and socio-economic upheavals, 
cataclysms and radical reforms. Only fanatics or political forces which are 
absolutely apathetic and indifferent to Russia and its people can make calls to a 
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new revolution. Be it under communist, national-patriotic or radical-liberal slogans, 
our country, our people will not withstand a new radical break-up. The nation's 
tolerance and ability both to survive and to continue creative endeavour has 
reached the limit: society will simply collapse economically, politically, 
psychologically and morally. 
Responsible socio-political forces ought to offer the nation a strategy of Russia's 
revival and prosperity based on all the positive that has been accumulated over the 
period of market and democratic reforms and implemented only by evolutionary, 
gradual and prudent methods. This strategy should be carried out in a situation of 
political stability and should not lead to a deterioration of the life of the Russian 
people, of any of its sections and groups. This indisputable condition stems from the 
present situation of our country. 
  
3. The experience of the 90s vividly shows that our country's genuine renewal 
without any excessive costs cannot be assured by a mere experimentation in 
Russian conditions with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign text-
books. The mechanical copying of other nations' experience will not guarantee 
success, either. 
Every country, Russia included, has to search for its own way of renewal. We have 
not been very successful in this respect thus far. Only in the past year or the past 
two years we have started groping for our road and our model of transformation. We 
can pin hopes for a worthy future only if we prove capable of combining the 
universal principles of a market economy and democracy with Russian realities. 
It is precisely with this aim in view that our scientists, analysts, experts, public 
servants at all levels and political and public organisations should work. 
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A Chance for a Worthy Future 
  
Such are the main lessons of the outgoing century. They make it possible to outline 
the contours of a long-tern strategy which is to enable us, within a comparatively 
short time, by historic standards, to overcome the present protracted crisis and 
create conditions for our country's fast and stable economic and social headway. 
The paramount word is "fast", as we have no time for a slow start. 
I want to quote the calculations made by experts. It will take us approximately fifteen 
years and an annual growth of our Gross Domestic Product by 8 percent a year to 
reach the per capita GDP level of present-day Portugal or Spain, which are not 
among the world's industrialised leaders. If during the same fifteen years we 
manage to ensure the annual growth of our GDP by 10 percent, we will then catch 
up with Britain or France. 
Even if we suppose that these tallies are not quite accurate, our current economic 
lagging behind is not that serious and we can overcome it faster, it will still require 
many years of work. That is why we should formulate our long-term strategy and 
start fulfilling it as soon as possible. 
We have already made the first step in this direction. The Strategic Research 
Centre created on the initiative and with the most active participation of the 
Government began its work in the end of December. This Centre is to put together 
the best minds of our country to draft recommendations for the government and 
proposals and theoretical and applied projects which are to help elaborate the 
strategy itself and the more effective ways of tackling the tasks which will come up 
in the process of its implementation. 
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I am convinced that ensuring the necessary growth dynamics is not only an 
economic problem. It is also a political and, in a certain sense, - I am not afraid to 
use this word - ideological problem. To be more precise, it is an ideological, spiritual 
and moral problem. It seems to me that the latter is of particular importance at the 
current stage from the standpoint of ensuring the unity of Russian society. 
  
 (A) Russian Idea 
Fruitful and creative work which our country needs so badly today is impossible in a 
split and internally disintegrated society, a society where the main social sections 
and political forces have different basic values and fundamental ideological 
orientations. 
Twice in the outgoing century has Russia found itself in such a state: After October 
1917 and in the 90s. 
In the first case, civil accord and unity of society were achieved not so much by 
what was then called "ideological- educational work" as by power methods. Those 
who disagreed with the ideology and policy of the regime were subjected to different 
forms of persecution up to repression. 
As a matter of fact, this is why I think that the term "state ideology" advocated by 
some politicians, publicists and scholars is not quite appropriate. It creates certain 
associations with our recent past. Where there is a state ideology blessed and 
supported by the state, there is, strictly speaking, practically no room for intellectual 
and spiritual freedom, ideological pluralism and freedom of the press, that is, for 
political freedom. 
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I am against the restoration of an official state ideology in Russia in any form. There 
should be no forced civil accord in a democratic Russia. Social accord can only be 
voluntary. 
That is why it is so important to achieve social accord on such basic issues as the 
aims, values and orientations of development, which would be desirable for and 
attractive to the overwhelming majority of Russians. The absence of civil accord and 
unity is one of the reasons why our reforms are so slow and painful. Most of the 
strength is spent on political squabbling, instead of the handling of the concrete 
tasks of Russia's renewal. 
Nonetheless, there have appeared some positive changes in this sphere in the past 
year or a year and a half. The bulk of Russians show more wisdom and 
responsibility than many politicians. Russians want stability, confidence in the future 
and possibility to plan it for themselves and for their children not for a month but for 
years and even decades to come. They want to work in a situation of peace, 
security and a sound law-based order. They wish to use the opportunities and 
prospects opened by the diversity of the forms of ownership, free enterprise and 
market relations. 
It is on this basis that our people have begun to perceive and accept supra-national 
universal values which are above social, group or ethnic interests. Our people have 
accepted such values as freedom of expression, freedom to travel abroad and other 
fundamental political rights and human liberties. People value that they can have 
property, be engaged in free enterprise, and build up their own wealth, and so on, 
and so forth. 
Another foothold for the unity of Russian society is what can be called the traditional 
values of Russians. These values are clearly seen today. Patriotism. This term is 
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sometimes used ironically and even derogatively. But for the majority of Russians it 
has its own and only original and positive meaning. It is a feeling of pride in one's 
country, its history and accomplishments. It is the striving to make one's country 
better, richer, stronger and happier. When these sentiments are free from the tints 
of nationalist conceit and imperial ambitions, there is nothing reprehensible or 
bigotedly about them. Patriotism is a source of the courage, staunchness and 
strength of our people. If we lose patriotism and national pride and dignity, which 
are connected with it, we will lose ourselves as a nation capable of great 
achievements. 
Belief in the greatness of Russia. Russia was and will remain a great power. It is 
preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and 
cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the 
government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so at present. 
But Russian mentality should be expanded by new ideas. In the present world the 
might of a country as a great power is manifested more in its ability to be the leader 
in creating and using advanced technologies, ensuring a high level of people's 
wellbeing, reliably protecting its security and upholding its national interests in the 
international arena, than in its military strength. 
  
Statism. It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all, that Russia will become the 
second edition of, say, the US or Britain in which liberal values have deep historic 
traditions. Our state and its institutes and structures have always played an 
exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a 
strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they 
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see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of 
any change. 
Modern Russian society does not identify a strong and effective state with a 
totalitarian state. We have come to value the benefits of democracy, a law-based 
state, and personal and political freedom. At the same time, people are alarmed by 
the obvious weakening of state power. The public looks forward to the restoration of 
the guiding and regulating role of the state to a degree which is necessary, 
proceeding from the traditions and present state of the country. 
Social Solidarity. It is a fact that a striving for corporative forms of activity has 
always prevailed over individualism. Paternalistic sentiments have struck deep roots 
in Russian society. The majority of Russians are used to connect improvements in 
their own condition more with the aid and support of the state and society than with 
their own efforts, initiative and flair for business. And it will take a long time for this 
habit to die. 
Do not let us try to answer the question whether it is good or bad. The important 
thing is that such sentiments exist. What is more, they still prevail. That is why they 
cannot be ignored. This should be taken into consideration in the social policy, first 
and foremost. 
I suppose that the new Russian idea will come about as an alloy or an organic 
unification of universal general humanitarian values with traditional Russian values 
which have stood the test of the times, including the test of the turbulent 20th 
century. 
This vitally important process must not be accelerated, discontinued and destroyed. 
It is important to prevent that the first shoots of civil accord be crushed underfoot in 
the heat of political campaigns, of some or other elections. 
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The results of the recent elections to the State Duma inspire great optimism in this 
respect. They reflected the turn towards stability and civil accord, which is being 
completed in our society. The overwhelming majority of Russians said No to 
radicalism, extremism and the opposition with a revolutionary tint. It is probably the 
first time since the reforms have begun that such favourable conditions have been 
created for constructive cooperation between the executive and legislative branches 
of power. 
Serious politicians whose parties and movements are represented in the new State 
Duma, are advised to draw conclusions from this fact. I am positive that the feeling 
of responsibility for the destinies of the nation will have the upper hand, and 
Russian parties, organizations and movements and their leaders will not sacrifice 
the common interests of and prospects in store for Russia, which call for a solidary 
effort of all healthy forces, to the narrow partisan and time-serving considerations. 
  
 (B) Strong State 
  
We are at a stage where even the most correct economic and social policy starts 
misfiring while being realised due to the weakness of the state power, of the 
managerial bodies. A key to Russia's recovery and growth is in the state-policy 
sphere today. 
Russia needs a strong state power and must have it. I am not calling for 
totalitarianism. History proves all dictatorships, all authoritarian forms of government 
are transient. Only democratic systems are intransient. Whatever the shortcomings, 
mankind has not devised anything superior. A strong state power in Russia is a 
democratic, law-based, workable federative state. 
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I see the following directions of its formation: 
  
 - a streamlined structure of the bodies of state authority and management, higher 
professionalism, more discipline and responsibility of civil servants, keener struggle 
against corruption; 
 - a restructuring of the state personnel policy on the basis of a selection of the best 
staffs; 
 - creating conditions beneficial for the rise in the country of a full-blooded civil 
society to balance out and monitor the authorities; 
 - a larger role and higher authority of the judiciary; 
  
 - improved federative relations, including in the sphere of budgets and finances; 
and 
 - an active offensive on crime. 
  
Amending the Constitution does not seem to be an urgent, priority task. What we 
have is a good Constitution. Its provisions dealing with the individual rights and 
freedoms are seen as the best Constitutional instrument of its kind in the world. It is 
a serious task, indeed, to make the current Constitution and the laws made on the 
basis thereof, the norm of life of the state, society and every individual, rather than 
draft a new Basic Law for the country. 
The Constitutional nature of laws in the making is a major problem in this respect. 
Russia currently operates over a thousand federal laws and several thousand laws 
of the republics, territories, regions and autonomous areas. Not all of them 
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correspond to the above criterion. If the justice ministry, the prosecutor's office and 
the judiciary continue to be as slow in dealing with this matter as they are today, the 
mass of questionable or simply un-Constitutional laws may become critical legally 
and politically. The Constitutional safety of the state, the federal Centre's 
capabilities, the country's manageability and Russia's integrity would then be in 
jeopardy. 
Another serious problem is inherent in that tier of authority which the government 
belongs to. The global experience prompts the conclusion that the main threat to 
human rights and freedoms, to democracy as such emanates from the executive 
authority. Of course, a legislature which makes bad laws also does its bit. But the 
main threat emanates from the executive authority. It organises the country's life, 
applies laws and can objectively distort, substantively and not always maliciously, 
these laws by making executive orders. 
The global trend is that of a stronger executive authority. Not surprisingly, society 
endeavours to better control it in order to preclude arbitrariness and misuses of 
office. This is why I, personally, am paying priority attention to building partner 
relations between the executive authority and civil society, to developing the 
institutes and structures of the latter, and to waging an active and tough onslaught 
on corruption. 
  
 (C) Efficient Economy 
  
I have already said that the reform years have generated a heap of problems that 
have accumulated in the national economy and social sphere. The situation is 
complex, indeed. But, to put it mildly, it is too early to bury Russia a great power. All 
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troubles notwithstanding, we have preserved our intellectual potentiality and human 
resources. A number of R&D advances, advanced technologies have not been 
wasted. We still have our natural resources. So the country has a worthy future in 
store for it. 
  
At the same time, we must learn the lessons of the 1990s and ponder the 
experience of market transformations. 
  
 1. I see one of the main lessons in that throughout these years we have been 
groping in the dark without having a clear understanding of national objectives and 
advances which would ensure Russia's standing as a developed, prosperous and 
great country of the world. The lack of a long-range development strategy for the 
next 15-20 and more years, is badly felt in the economy.  
The government firmly intends to build its activity on the basis of the principle of 
unity of the strategy and tactics. Without it, we are doomed to close holes and 
operate in the mode of fire-fighting. Serious politics, big business are done 
differently. The country needs a long-term national strategy of development. I have 
already said that the government has started devising it. 
  
 2. Another important lesson of the 1990s is the conclusion that Russia needs to 
form a wholesome system of state regulation of the economy and social sphere. 
I do not mean to return to a system of planning and managing the economy by fiat, 
where the all-pervasive state was regulating all aspects of any factory's work from 
top to bottom. I mean to make the Russian state an efficient coordinator of the 
country's economic and social forces that balances out their interests, optimises the 
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aims and parameters of social development and creates conditions and 
mechanisms of their attainment. 
  
The above naturally exceeds the commonplace formula which limits the state's role 
in the economy to devising rules of the game and controlling their observance. With 
time, we are likely to evolve to this formula. But today's situation necessitates 
deeper state involvement in the social and economic processes. While setting the 
scale and planning mechanisms for the system of state regulation, we must be 
guided by the principle: The state must be where and as needed; freedom must be 
where and as required. 
  
 3. The third lesson is the transition to a reform strategy that would be best suited 
for our conditions. It should proceed in the following directions. 
  
 3.1. To encourage a dynamic economic growth. The first to come here should be 
the encouragement of investments. We have not yet resolved this problem. 
Investments into the real economy sector fell by 5 times in the 1990s, including by 
3.5 times into fixed assets. The material foundations of the Russian economy are 
being undermined. 
We call for pursuing an investment policy that would combine purely market 
mechanisms with measures of state guidance. 
At the same time, we will continue working to create an investment climate 
attractive to foreign investors. Frankly speaking, the rise would be long and painful 
without foreign capital. But we have no time for this. Consequently, we must do our 
best to attract foreign capital to the country. 
	 251	
  
3.2. To pursue an energetic industrial policy. The future of the country, the quality of 
the Russian economy in the 21st century will depend above all on progress in the 
spheres that are based on high technologies and produce science-intensive 
commodities. For 90% of economic growth is ensured today by the introduction of 
new achievements and technologies. The government is prepared to pursue an 
economic policy of priority development of industries that lead in the sphere of 
research and technological progress. The requisite measures include: 
 - assist the development of extra-budgetary internal demand for advanced 
technologies and science-intensive products, and support export-oriented high-tech 
productions; 
 - support non-raw materials industries working mostly to satisfy internal demand; 
 - buttress the export possibilities of the fuel and energy and raw-materials 
complexes. 
   
We should use the mechanisms, which have long been used in the world, to 
mobilise the funds necessary for pursuing this policy. The most important of them 
are the target-oriented loan and tax instruments and the provision of privileges 
against state guarantees. 
  
3.3. To carry out a rational structural policy. The government thinks that like in other 
industrialised countries, there is a place in the Russian economy for the financial-
industrial groups, corporations, small and medium businesses. Any attempts to slow 
down the development of some, and artificially encourage the development of other 
economic forms would only hinder the rise of the national economy. The policy of 
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the Government will be spearheaded at creating a structure that would ensure an 
optimal balance of all economic forms of management.  
Another major sphere is the rational regulation of the operation of natural 
monopolies. This is a key question, as they largely determine the structure of 
production and consumer prices. And hence they influence both the economic and 
financial processes, and the dynamics of the people's incomes. 
  
3.4. To create an effective financial system. This is a challenging task, which 
includes the following directions: 
 - to raise the effectiveness of the budget as a major instrument of the economic 
policy of the state; 
 - to carry out a tax reform; 
  
 - to get rid of non-payments, barter and other pseudo-monetary forms of 
settlement; 
 - to maintain a low inflation rate and stability of the rouble; 
 - to create civilised financial and stock markets, and turn them into an instrument of 
accumulating investment resources; 
 - to restructure the bank system. 
  
 3.5. To combat the shadow economy and organised crime in the economic and 
financial-credit sphere. All countries have shadow economies. But their share in the 
GDP does not exceed 15-20% in industrialised countries, while the figure for Russia 
is 40%. To resolve this painful problem, we should not just raise the effectiveness of 
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the law-enforcement agencies, but also strengthen the license, tax, hard currency 
and export control. 
  
 3.6. To consistently integrate the Russian economy into world economic structures. 
Otherwise we would not rise to the high level of economic and social progress that 
has been attained in the industrialised countries. The main directions of this work 
are: 
 - to ensure an active support of the state to the foreign economic operation of 
Russian enterprises, companies and corporations. In particular, the time is ripe for 
creating a federal agency to support exports, which would provide guarantees to the 
export contracts of Russian producers; 
 - to resolutely combat the discrimination of Russia on the world markets of 
commodities, services and investments, and to approve and apply a national anti-
dumping legislation; 
 - to incorporate Russia into the international system of regulating foreign economic 
operation, above all the WTO. 
  
 3.7. To pursue a modern agrarian policy. The revival of Russia will be impossible 
without the revival of the countryside and agriculture. We need an agrarian policy 
that would organically combine measures of state assistance and state regulation 
with the market reforms in the countryside and in land ownership relations. 
  
4. We must admit that virtually all changes and measures entailing a fall in the living 
conditions of the people are inadmissible in Russia. We have come to a line beyond 
which we must not go. 
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Poverty has reached a mind-boggling scale in Russia. In early 1998, the average-
weighted world per capita income amounted to some 5,000 dollars a year, but it 
was only 2,200 dollars in Russia. And it dropped still lower after the August 1998 
crisis. The share of wages in the GDP dropped from 50% to 30% since the 
beginning of reforms. 
  
This is the most acute social problem. The Government is elaborating a new income 
policy designed to ensure a stable growth of prosperity on the basis of the growth of 
real disposable incomes of the people. 
Despite these difficulties, the Government is resolved to take new measures to 
support science, education, culture and health care. For a country where the people 
are not healthy physically and psychologically, are poorly educated and illiterate, will 
never rise to the summits of world civilisation. 
Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first 
time in the past 200-300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and 
possibly even third, echelon of world states. We are running of time left for removing 
this threat. We must strain all intellectual, physical and moral forces of the nation. 
We need coordinated creative work. Nobody will do it for us. 
Everything depends on us, and us alone. On our ability to see the size of the threat, 
to pool forces and set our minds to hard and lengthy work.  
  
 
